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Eul^rs  of  Inibia 


EDITED    BY 


SIR  WILLIAM  WILSON   HUNTER,  K.C.S.I.,  CLE. 

M.A.  (Oxford)  :    LL.D.  (Cambridgi.) 


CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 


^^^^^i^^l!^iS^»li('$&  jitm!' 


Bonbon 

HENRY     FROWDE 

Oxford  University  Press  Warehouse 

Amicn  Corner,  E.C. 


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p — 
"I 


Prepared  lor  Sir  William  \«lsr>u  Hunters 

IMPERIAL    GAZETTEER  OF    INDIA 


..  t 


UNIVERSITY 


li '' 


Do       iu>t  opened 

'J'he  rtuiru3-aU  denote  ihe.  heUfht  aJxn-c  »ea  level  in ; 
ThU  yai>  ia  inustded  onl^  to  ecSahit  the  prindpal 
places,  chier  rivers  Ac.  iti  ItuHh,. 


Ctarmdon  Preea ,  Oxfimi. 


UNIVERSITY 


RULERS    OF    INDIA 


Cl^be  anb  Stvatbnairn 


By  Maj.-Grnl.  Sir  OWEN    TUDOR    BURNE,   K.C.S.I. 

SOMETIME    MILITARY    SECRETARY   TO   THE    COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF 
IN    INT>TA 


THIRD  THOUSAND 


AT  THE  CLARENDON  PRESS:   1892 


■y 


^ 


O;cfotb 

PRINTED    AT    THE    CLARENDON    PRESS 

BY  HORACE  HART.   PRINTER  TO  THE  UNIVERSITY 


PREFACE 


I\  writing  the  following  account  of  the  Indian 
Mutiny  operations,  I  have  not  attempted  to  discuss 
political  measures  whiclpi  ^h'a^  already  been  dealt 
with  by  more  practised  writers  than  myself,  but 
have  merely  endeavoured  to  verif}^,  and  in  some 
cases  to  correct,  the  militar}^  narrative  by  my  own 
personal  recollections,  and  to  present  it  to  the  public 
in  an  abridged  and  readable  form.  The  helpful 
revision  of  the  manuscript  by  Mr.  Stephen  Wheeler 
and  the  editor  is  entitled  to  my  sincere  acknow- 
ledgments. 

0.  T.  B. 


CONTENTS 


CHAP.  PAGES 

I.    Introduction 9-18 

II.    The  Outbreak 19-32 

III.  The  Situation 33-43 

IV.  The   Northern   Operations  to    the    Relief    op 

LucKNOW 44-70 

V.    The    Northern  Operations   {continued)   to  the 

Reduction  of  Oudh 7T-89 

VI.    The  Southern  Operations  to  the  Fall  of  Jhansi  90-125 

VII.    The    Southern    Operations    {continued)    to   the 

Recapture  of  Gwalior         ....  126-154 

VIII.     Reconstruction i55--78 

IX.     Conclusion 179-183 

Index 185-194 


NOTE 

The  orthography  of  proper  names  follows  the  system  adopted  by  the 
Indian  Govermnent  for  the  Imperial  Gazetteer  of  India.  That  system, 
while  adhering  to  the  popular  spelling  of  very  well-known  places,  such 
as  Punjab,  Lucknow,  &c.,  employs  in  all  other  cases  the  vowels  with 
the  following  uniform  sounds  : — 

a,  as  in  woman :  a,  as  in  fathers :  i,  as  in  police :  /,  as  in  intrigue : 
o,  as  in  cold :  w,  as  in  huW  :  u,  as  in  sare  :  e,  as  in  grey. 


CLYDE  AND   STRATHNAIRN 

THE  SUPPRESSION  OF  THE 
GREAT  REVOLT 


CHAPTER  I 

Introduction 

The  thrilling  incidents  and  heroic  deeds  of  the 
Indian  Mutiny  have  already  been  so  graphically 
recounted  by  historians  and  biographers  that  it  is 
difficult  to  invest  the  subject  with  new  interest,  or  to 
compress  the  narrative  within  reasonable  limits.  An 
attempt  will  be  made,  however,  in  the  present  volume 
to  describe  in  general  terms  the  military  operations 
rendered  necessary  for  the  suppression  of  the  revolt ; 
indicating,  as  briefly  as  practicable,  ihe  causes  of  the 
outbreak,  and  the  sequence  of  events  during  the 
anxious  months  of  1857,  when  British  rule  seemed 
for  a  moment  to  tremble  in  the  balance. 

To  realise  the  position  of  affairs  in  that  year,  and 
the  magnitude  of  the  danger,  it  must  be  borne  in 
mind  that  India  is  not  a  united  country  containing  a 
homogeneous  population,  but  a  congeries  of  countries 
inhabited    by   races    who   in    number   (287,000,000) 


lO  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

are  double  the  population  of  the  Roman  Empire  at 
the  time  of  its  greatest  extent,  who  speak  a  variety 
of  languages,  hold  many  creeds,  observe  widely  dif- 
ferent customs,  and  present  every  t^pe  and  degree 
of  civilisation. 

We  are  dealing,  too,  with  immense  areas.  The 
single  Lieutenant-Governorship  of  Lower  Bengal  is 
as  large  as  France ;  Madras  exceeds  Great  Britain 
and  Ireland ;  Bombay  equals  Germany ;  the  North- 
Western  Provinces  and  Oudh  cover  as  much  space  as 
Great  Britain,  Belgium,  and  Holland ;  the  size  of  the 
PuDJab  is  that  of  Italy  ;  while  the  Native  States  put 
together  have  an  area  equal  to  that  of  Great  Britain 
and  Ireland,  Germany,  and  France  combined. 

Bearing  these  facts  in  mind  it  will  be  seen  that  the 
suppression  of  an  outbreak  of  upwards  of  100,000 
trained  Sepoys  ^  was  no  easy  task ;  while  to  have 
held  the  country  during  the  earlier  stages  of  the 
revolt,  with  a  mere  handful  of  British  troops^  was 
an  achievement  to  which  Englishmen  may  ever  point 
with  becoming  pride. 

The  bulk  of  the  population  of  India  may  for  the 
purposes  of  this  volume  be  regarded  as  divisible  into 
Hindus  and  Muhammadans,  inasmuch  as  these  two 
classes  inhabit  in  greater  or  less  numbers  every  one 
of  its  provinces,  and  figure  almost  exclusively  in 
the  events  of  the  Mutiny.     Speaking  generally,   the 

^  Out  of  seventy-four  regular  regiments  of  the  Bengal  Native 
Infantry  forty-five  mutinied,  twenty  were  disarmed,  and  three 
were  disbanded.     Only  six  remained  true  to  their  salt. 


INTRODUCTION  II 

typical  Hindu  is  quiet,  industrious,  and  tolerant 
in  religious  matters  unless  provoked  to  excitement. 
As  a  soldier  he  is  obedient  and  patient,  although 
warped  by  those  caste  prejudices  which  have  always 
given  the  Brahmans  special  control  over  comrades 
and  subordinates.  These  qualities  were  strongly 
marked  in  the  mutinous  Sepoys.  The  Muhammadan, 
on  his  part,  is  by  nature  restless,  fanatical,  and  ready 
for  any  adventure  that  may  come  to  hand.  In 
Northern  India  he  is,  as  a  rule,  a  born  soldier,  and 
even  in  the  South  he  still  retains  in  some  measure 
the  martial  instincts  which  inspired  his  forefathers. 

Such,  briefly,  were  the  characteristics  of  the  people 
with  whom  the  British  Government  and  its  adminis- 
trators in  the  India  of  thirty-four  years  ago  had 
to  deal.  They  laboured  under  the  disadvantage  of 
being  separated  from  those  people  by  blood,  religion, 
and  character,  and  had  therefore  to  contend  with  the 
almost  insuperable  difficulty  of  ignorance  as  to  the 
undercurrents  of  public  feeling.  To  obtain  trust- 
worthy information  from  the  natives  was  in  fact  all 
but  impossible,  while  the  motives  of  the  governing 
power  were  as  constantly  liable  to  be  misunderstood 
and  misrepresented  by  conquered  races. 

It  cannot  be  said  that  the  storm  burst  without 
warning.  Months  before  the  actual  outbreak  of  the 
mutinous  Sepoys,  an  idea  had  taken  hold  of  a  large 
number  of  persons  within  range  of  Hindu  and  Mu- 
hammadan influence  that  a  crisis  in  the  world's  history 
was  near  at  hand,  that  great  events  were  impending, 


12  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

and  that  the  British  Government  was  bent  on  de- 
parting from  its  ancient  principles  of  non-interference 
with  the  customs,  traditions,  and  religions  of  its  Indian 
subjects.  Englishmen  were  warned  by  native  friends 
to  be  on  their  guard ;  and  written  prophecies  ^  were 
spread  broadcast  throughout  the  land,  foretelling 
the  downfall  of  British  power  after  the  centenary  of 
Plassey.  Notwithstanding  these  indications,  however, 
of  ill-feeling  and  imminent  disaster,  the  attitude  of 
the  people  of  India  generally,  during  this  eventful 
period,  was  one  of  neutrality.  When  once  the  out- 
break became  a  fact,  the  only  landholder  who  rebelled 
among  the  hundreds  of  Behar  (one  of  the  most  dis- 
turbed districts  in  Bengal)  was  Koer  Singh,  a  man 
whom  pecuniary  embarrassments  had  rendered  notori- 
ously desperate.  Bengal,  as  a  whole,  remained  tranquil. 
The  Sikhs  of  the  Punjab  aided  us.  In  the  North- 
West  Provinces  the  Hindus  of  Eohilkhand,  forced  for 
a  time  to  submit  to  the  rule  of  a  rebel  Muhammadan, 

^  The  following  is  a  free  translation  of  one  of  such  prophecies  : — 
The  clan  of  Sikhs  will  exercise  over  Muhammadans  great  tyranny 
and  oppression.  For  forty  y^ars  the  tyranny  and  the  heresy  will 
remain  ;  after  this  the  whole  empire  will  be  seized  by  the  Nazarene 
(i.  e.  EnglishX  For  the  space  of  loo  years  their  sovereignty  %vill 
remain  in  Hindustan,  when  in  their  time  heresy  and  tyranny 
shall  become  general.  Then,  the  King  from  the  West  shall  appear. 
Between  these  two  will  be  fought  desperate  battles.  The  King  from 
the  West  shall  be  victorious.  Then,  without  doubt,  the  followers  of 
the  clan  of  Jesias  will  be  broken,  discomfited,  and  dispersed.  For 
forty  years  the  Musalman  power  shall  be  triumphant,  and  after  this 
period  Anti-Christ  shall  be  born  in  Ispahan.  Hear  what  I  am  going 
to  say  about  the  destruction  of  the  followers  of  Anti-Christ.  For 
this  purpose  Jesus  and  the  last  Apostles  will  appear.' 


INTRODUCTION  13 

welcomed  with  joy  the  ultimate  restoration  of  British 
government.  Moreover,  the  Native  States  remained 
staunch.  It  is  true  that  certain  minor  Chiefs  joined 
the  rebellion,  but  the  leading  Princes  of  India  were 
steadfast  in  their  allegiance  to  the  British  Crown. 
Thus  the  principal  assistance  given  to  the  rebel  Sepoys 
came  from  a  small  number  of  disaffected  nobles  and 
deposed  officials,  who  in  their  turn  found  support 
only  from  the  lawless  and  restless  spirits  of  their 
neighbourhoods,  no  longer  restrained  by  a  powerful 
government. 

The  Mutiny  was  thus  primarily  a  military  rising, 
aided  and  abetted  to  a  limited  extent  by  a  proportion 
of  the  hereditary  criminal  classes.  It  was  a  rising, 
moreover,  confined  in  great  measure  to  the  Sepoys  of 
the  Bengal  Regular  Army.  For  many  years  prior  to 
the  outbreak  these  men  had  shown  a  bad  spirit,  to 
be  attributed  in  part  to  discontent  at  changes  affect- 
ing the  condition  of  their  service,  and  in  part  to 
pampering  and  lax  discipline.  The  discipline  of  this 
Army  had  in  fact  been  weakened  by  an  encourage- 
ment to  Sepoys  to  make  frivolous  complaints  to 
head-quarters,  and  to  think  lightly  of  the  authority 
of  those  over  them.  At  the  same  time  there  had 
been  a  marked  deterioration  in  the  character  of  their 
regimental  officers,  while  the  inefficiency  of  not  a  few 
officers  of  higher  rank  in  command  of  divisions 
and  districts  completed  the  evil.  At  this  particular 
juncture,  moreover,  the  proportion  of  British  to  Native 
troops  in  India  was  dangerously  small.    The  warnings 


14  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

given  by  Lord  Dalhousie  had  been  neglected  ;  and 
owing  to  the  paucity  of  European  troops  the  principal 
arsenals  and  military  posts  of  India,  notably  that 
of  Delhi,  were  garrisoned  by  disaffected  Sepoys  ^. 

Under  such  conditions  only  a  touch  was  needed  to 
change  insubordination  into  revolt.  It  was  heed- 
lessly applied.  The  adoption  of  the  Enfield  Eifle  for 
use  in  the  Native  Army  seemed  an  innocent  measure ; 
but  a  cry  of  'greased  cartridges'  was  raised,  and 
the  long-suppressed  agitation  burst  into  active  life. 
Greased  cartridges  were  no  novelty.  They  had  been 
sent  out  to  India  some  years  before  the  Mutiny,  they 
had  been  subsequently  manufactured  by  native  hands 
in  local  arsenals,  and  had  been  issued  without  objec- 
tion to  certain  Sepoy  troops.  But  this  time  it  was 
reported,  and  not  without  foundation,  that  the  grease 
was  made  of  hog's  lard  or  cow's  fat  (a  contamination 
to  Hindus  and  Muhammadans  alike),  and  the  clamour 
spread  far  and  wide.  Everywhere  it  was  proclaimed 
that  the  Native  Army  was  thus  to  be  forced  into  the 
Christian  faith.  The  agitators  hailed  the  grievance 
with  delight.  The  Government  made  weak  explana- 
tions.    The  mischief  was  done. 


^  The  number  of  European  troops  in  the  Bengal  Presidency 
■was  at  this  time  unusually  small.  Two  cavalry  regiments  had 
been  withdrawn  for  service  in  the  Crimea  and  not  replaced  ; 
and  four  infantry  regiments  were  absent  with  the  Persian  expe- 
ditionary force.  The  bulk  of  the  remainder  were  quartered  in 
the  Punjab.  Oudh  was  guarded  by  only  one  weak  British  regi- 
ment ;  while  Delhi  with  its  vast  magazine  was,  as  above  said, 
entrusted  entirely  to  Bengal  Sepoys. 


INTRODUCTION  15 

The  Mutiny  now  became  a  fact,  notwithstanding 
the  indignant  protestations  of  officers  who  sacrificed 
their  lives  to  the  mistaken  conviction  that  their  men 
were  faithful.  Leaders  were  soon  forthcoming  in 
the  persons  of  Bahadur  Shah  (the  titular  King  of 
Delhi)  and  others  who  had  long  watched  for  an 
opportunity ;  and  many  parts  of  India  were  quickly 
plunged  into  a  chaos  of  confusion  and  bloodshed. 
Little  need  be  said  in  regard  to  the  leaders.  There 
were  only  three  of  any  note.  The  titular  King  of 
Delhi  resided  with  his  family  in  the  old  palace  of  the 
Mughals  at  Delhi,  whence  his  sons  had  travelled  freely 
for  many  years  throughout  the  country,  stirring  up 
hopes  of  a  revived  Muhammadan  Empire.  The  Rani 
of  Jhansi,  Ganga  Bai,  had  become  a  bitter  enemy  of 
the  English  on  account  of  the  annexation  of  the 
principality  after  the  death  of  her  husband  without  an 
heir.  The  Nana  Sahib,  Dundhu  Panth,  an  adopted 
son  of  a  deposed  Maratha  Peshwa,  although  permitted 
to  inherit  his  adoptive  father's  personal  property,  in- 
cluding the  estate  of  Bithiir  near  Cawnpur,  had  been 
refused  a  lapsed  pension,  and  he  now  became  one  of 
the  most  infamous  and  active  leaders  of  the  rebellion  ^. 

^  In  connection  with  this  subject,  it  may  not  be  out  of  place  to 
quote  the  opinion  of  Sir  Hugh  Rose  who,  writing  home  in  October, 
1857,  said,  before  the  more  careful  subsequent  enquiries  : — 

'  The  more  events  unroll  themselves  the  3nore  they  seem  to  show 
that  the  revolt  in  India  was  not  'purely  a  military  one,  but  that  the 
origin  of  the  trouble  was  in  some  degree  an  outcome  of  a  political 
conspiracy,  at  the  head  of  which  were  the  King  of  Delhi,  the  King 
of  Oudh,  and  Nana  Sahib,  all  three  candidates  for  kingdoms.' 

Sir  Hugh  Rose's  view,  expressed  in  the  heat  of  the  operations, 


l6  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

With  the  Nana  Sahib  was  associated  the  only  military 
commander  of  any  distinction  on  the  rebel  side, 
Tantia  Topi  had  been  brought  up  in  the  household 
of  the  deposed  Peshwa,  and  regarded  the  Nana,  the 
Peshwa's  adopted  son,  as  a  master  whose  cause  he  was 
bound  to  champion.  He  had  all  the  qualities  of  a 
general  except  daring ;  for  although  he  led  his  troops 
well  more  than  once,  he  was  chiefly  remarkable  for  his 
retreat  after  the  capture  of  Gwalior,  in  June  1858, 
when  for  the  space  of  nine  months  he  eluded  the 
vigilance  of  the  forces  sent  to  capture  him,  covering 
as  much  as  3000  miles  in  his  flight. 

It  may  be  of  interest  to  the  general  reader  to  call 
to  mind  certain  views  expressed  by  one  of  the  most 
eminent  contemporary  authorities  on  the  events  of 
this  period. 

'The  annexation  of  Oudh,'  said  Lord  Lawrence, 
speaking  at  Glasgow  in  i860,  'had  nothing  to  do 
with  the  Mutiny  in  the  first  place,  though  that 
measure  certainly  did  add  to  the  number  of  our 
enemies  after  the  Mutiny  commenced.  The  old 
government  of  Oudh  was  extremely  obnoxious  to  the 
mass  of  our  native  soldiers  of  the  regular  army,  who 
came  from  Oudh  and  the  adjacent  province  of  Behar, 
and  with  whom  the  Mutiny  originated.  These  men 
were  the  sons  and  kinsmen  of  the  Hindu  yeomen  of 
the  country,  all  of  whom  benefited  more  or  less  by 
annexation  ;  while  Oudh  was  ruled  by  a  Muhammadan 

should,  however,  be  corrected  by  Lord  Lawrence's  deliberate  and 
authoritative  decision,  after  considering  the  whole  evidence. 


INTRODUCTION  VJ 

family  which  had  never  identified  itself  with  the 
people,  and  whose  government  was  extremely  oppres- 
sive to  all  classes  except  its  immediate  creatures  and 

.  followers.     But  when  the  introduction  of  the  greased 
V 
cartridges  had  excited    the  Native  Army  to  revolt, 

when  the  mutineers  saw  nothing  before  them  short  of 
escape  on  the  one  hand  or  destruction  on  the  other, 
they,  and  all  who  sympathised  with  them,  were 
driven  to  the  most  desperate  measures.  All  who 
could  be  influenced  by  love  or  fear  rallied  round 
them.  All  who  had  little  or  nothing  to  lose  joined 
their  ranks.  All  that  dangerous  class  of  religious 
fanatics  and  devotees  who  abound  in  India,  all  the 
political  intriguers,  who  in  peaceful  times  can  do  no 
mischief,  swelled  the  numbers  of  the  enemy,  and  gave 
spirit  and  direction  to  their  measures.  India  is  full 
of  races  of  men,  who,  from  time  immemorial,  have 
lived  by  service  or  by  plunder,  and  who  are  ready  to 
join  in  any  disturbance  which  may  promise  them  em- 
ployment. Oudh  was  full  of  disbanded  soldiers  who 
had  not  had  time  to  settle  down.  Our  gaols  furnished 
thousands  of  desperate  men  let  loose  on  society.  The 
cry  throughout  the  country  as  cantonment  after  can- 
tonment became  the  scene  of  triumphant  mutiny  was, 
"  The  English  rule  is  at  an  end.  Let  us  plunder  and 
enjoy  ourselves."  The  industrious  classes  throughout 
India  were  on  our  side,  but  for  a  long  time  feared  to 
act.  On  the  one  side  they  saw  the  few  English  in  the 
country  shot  down  or  flying  for  their  lives,  or  at  the 
best  standing  on  the  defensive,  sorely  pressed;    on 

B 


1 8  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

the  other  side  they  saw  summary  punishment,  in  the 
shape  of  the  plunder  and  destruction  of  their  houses, 
dealt  out  to  those  who  aided  us.  But  when  we 
evinced  signs  of  vigour,  when  we  began  to  assume 
the  offensive  and  vindicate  our  authority,  many  of 
these  people  came  forward  and  identified  themselves 
with  our  cause.' 

No  clearer  outline  could  be  given  of  the  causes 
and  eflfects  of  the  Mutiny.  The  shock  was  a  terrible 
one,  but  it  left  British  power  in  India  more  firmly 
established  than  ever.  Foes  and  friends  rose  up 
where  their  appearance  was  least  expected.  And 
one  lesson  will  ever  be  indelibly  engraved  on  the 
pages  of  its  history,  namely,  that  while  the  Native 
Princes  of  India  whom  we  mistrusted  brought  their 
armies  and  influence  to  our  aid,  the  Sepoy  troops  on 
whom  we  relied  turned  against  us.  From  the  day 
when  this  experience  was  taken  to  heart  dates  the 
consolidation  of  our  Indian  Empire  as  it  now  exists. 


CHAPTER   II 

The  Outbreak 

When  Lord  Dalhousie  gave  up  his  post  in  the  early 
part  of  1856,  he  publicly  warned  the  English  in  India 
that  '  cruel  violence  might  be  suddenly  committed  by 
men  who  up  to  the  last  moment  had  been  regarded  as 
harmless,  even  by  those  who  knew  them  best.'  Lord 
Canning,  at  a  farewell  banquet  given  to  him  by  the 
Court  of  Directors,  when  he  was  leaving  for  Calcutta 
as  the  new  Governor-General,  also  said  :  '  I  wish  for  a 
peaceful  term  of  office.  Eut  I  cannot  forget  that  in 
the  sky  of  India,  serene  as  it  is,  a  small  cloud  may 
arise  no  larger  than  a  man's  hand,  but  which  growing 
larger  and  larger  may  at  last  threaten  to  burst  and 
overwhelm  us  with  ruin.'  Warnings  to  Government 
had  not  been  wanting,  moreover,  from  experienced 
observers  who  had  watched  for  some  time  the  growth 
of  discontent  in  the  Bengal  Sepoy  Army.  At  length 
the  storm  burst.  And  if  the  fearful  disasters,  the 
touching  incidents,  and  the  memorable  exploits  which 
belonor  to  the  first  few  months  of  the  outbreak  are 
too  briefly  summed  up  in  this  chapter,  it  is  because 
the  object  of  the  volume  admits  only  of  such  passing 
reference  to  them  as  may  carry  on  the  reader  intelli- 

B   2 


20  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

gently  to  the  military  operations  connected  with  the 
final  suppression  of  the  revolt  by  Sir  Colin  Campbell 
and  Sir  Hugh  Rose. 

Preceded  in  various  parts  of  India,  as  already  seen, 
by  indications  of  a  mutinous  spirit  in  the  Native 
Army,  a  spirit  of  disaffection  that  grew  stronger  as  it 
was  met  with  increasing  indecision,  the  first  important 
outbreak  of  the  Sepoys  took  place  on  May  loth,  1857, 
at  Meerut.  The  Native  troops  at  that  place  rose  in 
open  rebellion;  and  although  there  were  only  about 
2700  Sepoys  with  1700  Europeans  to  control  them, 
the  mutineers,  without  check  or  hindrance,  released  a 
number  of  desperate  prisoners  from  the  jail,  set  fire 
to  the  cantonments,  and  hurried  away  unmolested 
to  Delhi.  There,  amid  fearful  scenes  of  murder  and 
carnage,  the  titular  King  of  Delhi  was  set  up  as 
Sovereign  Lord  of  Hindustan.  Within  a  few  short 
hours  not  a  vestige  remained  in  the  city  of  British 
authority  except  the  Arsenal ;  and  this  building, 
after  being  defended  for  a  time  by  a  small  and 
devoted  band  of  Englishmen  ^  who  watched  in 
vain  for  succour  from  Meerut,  had  at  length  to  be 
blown  up  to  prevent  its  falling  into  the  hands  of  the 
enemy.  The  first  great  step  in  the  Mutiny  was  thus 
accomplished  in  a  few  hours.  '  Onwards  to  Delhi'  was 
now  the  cry,  and  the  old  Mughal  capital  became  the 

^  Lieutenant  George  Willoughljy  of  the  Bengal  Artillery,  Lieu- 
tenants Forest  and  Kaynor,  Conductors  Buckley,  Shaw,  and  Kelly, 
Sub-Conductor  Crow,  and  Sergeants  Edwards  and  Stuart,  were  the 
nine  heroes  of  the  Delhi  arsenal.  Of  these,  three  only  lived  to  teli 
the  tale. 


THE  OUTBREAK  21 

political  centre  of  the  rebellion.  On  our  part  every- 
thing depended  on  energy  and  resolution.  '  Where  have 
we  failed,'  wrote  John  Lawrence  to  the  Commander- 
in-Chief,  '  when  we  have  acted  vigorously  ?  Where 
have  we  succeeded  when  guided  by  timid  counsels? 
Clive  with  his  1200  men  fought  at  Plassey  in  op- 
position to  the  advice  of  his  leading  officers,  beat 
40,000  men  and  conquered  Bengal.  Monson  retreated 
from  the  Chambal,  and  before  he  gained  Agra,  his 
army  was  disorganised  and  partially  annihilated.'  A 
picked  force  from  Meerut  and  Ambala,  acting  with 
vigour  and  operating  from  both  sides  of  the  Jumna, 
would  in  all  probability  have  recovered  the  possession 
of  the  city  by  a  coup  de  main.  But  it  was  not  so  to 
be.  A  few  days  of  inactivity  allowed  the  flame  to 
blaze  up  beyond  possibility  of  immediate  extinction. 
The  unchallenged  occupation  of  the  Mughal  capital  by 
rebel  sepoys  and  badmashes  was  followed  by  risings 
and  massacres  in  almost  every  station  within  range  of 
the  example  ;  and  from  Firozpur,  Bareilly,  Moradabad, 
Shahjahanpur,  Cawnpur,  and  numerous  other  places 
came  harrowing  tales  of  massacre,  suffering,  and 
heroism. 

When  this  terrible  news  reached  army  head- 
quarters, it  was  received  with  a  perhaps  natural  in- 
credulity. Nevertheless,  a  force  was  hastily  assembled 
at  Ambala;  and  with  the  troops  thus  mobilised, 
General  Anson,  then  Commander-in-Chief,  made  pre- 
parations to  march  against  the  renowned  city  of  the 
Mughal.     The  little  force  had  hardly  started,  however, 


22  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

when  its  leader  died  of  cholera  (May  27th).  It  was 
not  until  the  ist  of  June  that  General  Barnard,  who 
had  succeeded  temporarily  to  the  chief  command, 
advanced  in  earnest  against  the  now  jubilant  rebels. 
Meanwhile,  a  small  body  of  troops  under  Brigadier 
Archdale  Wilson  marched  out  from  Meerut,  after  a 
disastrous  delay  ;  and  the  combined  force,  amounting 
to  about  3000  Europeans  and  one  battalion  of  Gur- 
khas, fought  its  way  onwards  till  it  reached  the  oat- 
skirts  of  the  city  on  the  8th  of  June,  1857. 

We  may  now  refer  to  the  three  great  points  —Delhi, 
Cawnpur,  and  Lucknow,  round  which  the  Mutiny 
was,  so  to  speak,  centred  during  the  earlier  period 
of  the  revolt ;  namely,  from  May  1857,  till  the  arrival 
in  India  of  Sir  Colin  Campbell  in  August  of  that  year. 

The  modern  city  of  Delhi  was  founded  by  the  Em- 
peror Shah  Jehan  in  163 1.  Situated  on  the  right  bank 
of  a  branch  of  the  Jumna  river  it  was,  as  it  still  is, 
surrounded  by  a  high  wall  some  seven  miles  in  extent, 
strengthened  by  bastions  and  by  a  capacious  dry  ditch. 
The  British  force  held  the  elevated  ground  known  as 
the  Ridge,  which  extends  two  miles  along  the  northern 
and  western  faces  of  the  city — a  position  taken  up 
some  centuries  before  by  Timur  Shah  and  his  Tar- 
tar hordes  when  advancing  to  attack  old  Delhi.  At 
intervals  along  the  Ridge  stood  the  Flagstaff  Tower, 
the  Observatory,  a  large  mansion  called  Hindu  Rao's 
house,  and  other  defensible  buildings.  The  space 
between  the  city  and  the  Ridge  was  thickly  planted, 
for  the  most  part  with  trees  and  shrubs ;   in  the  midst 


THE  OUTBREAK  23 

of  which  might  be  seen  numerous  mosques  and  large 
houses,  and  the  ruins  of  older  buildings.  It  soon 
became  evident  that  the  position  held  by  the  British 
force  on  the  Ridge  was  a  false  one ;  and  the  question 
arose  whether  the  city  might  not  be  taken  by  a  (^oup 
de  main,  seeing  that  it  was  impossible  either  to  in- 
vest it  or  to  attempt  a  regular  siege  with  any  chance  of 
success.  A  plan  of  assault,  to  be  carried  out  on  the 
12th  of  June,  was  drawn  up  by  a  young  Engineer 
officer  and  sanctioned.  Had  this  assault  been  de- 
livered the  city  would  in  all  likelihood  have  been 
taken  and  held.  For  there  were  not  more  than  about 
7000  Sepoys  within  the  walls,  while  the  available 
British  troops  numbered  2000  ;  and  since  the  nu- 
merical discrepancy  between  the  contending  forces 
was  no  less  in  proportion  when  the  stronghold  was 
finally  captured,  we  may  not  unfairly  assume  that 
the  columns  detailed  for  the  contemplated  operations 
of  the  12th  of  June  might  have  succeeded  as  well 
as  those  which  made  the  actual  assault  three  months 
later.  But  owing  to  a  series  of  accidents,  the  plan 
fell  through — a  miscarriage  the  more  to  be  regretted 
because  the  early  recapture  of  the  city  would  in 
all  human  probability  have  put  a  stop  to  further 
outbreaks. 

As  matters  stood,  however,  the  gallant  little  force 
before  Delhi  could  barely  hold  its  own.  It  was  an 
army  of  observation  perpetually  harassed  by  an  active 
enemy.  As  time  went  on,  therefore,  the  question  of 
raising  the  siege  in  favour  of  a  movement  towards 


24  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

Agra  was  more  than  once  seriously  discussed,  but 
was  fortunately  abandoned.  On  July  5th,  1857, 
General  Barnard  died,  worn  out  with  fatigue  and 
anxiety.  He  was  succeeded  in  command  by  General 
Archdale  Wilson,  an  officer  who,  possessing  no  special 
force  of  character,  did  little  more  than  secure  the 
safe  defence  of  the  position  until  the  arrival  of 
Brigadier  Nicholson  from  the  Punjab,  August  14th, 
1857  \  with  a  moveable  column  of  2500  men,  Euro- 
pean and  Sikhs.  And  here  we  may  leave  Delhi  for 
the  moment,  deferring  till  later  any  further  details  of 
the  siege. 

The  city  of  Cawnpur,  situated  on  the  south  bank 
of  the  river  Ganges,  forty-two  miles  south-west  of 
Lucknow  and  270  miles  from  Delhi,  lies  about  a  mile 
from  the  river  in  a  large  sandy  plain.  On  the  strip 
of  land  between  the  river  and  the  town,  a  space 
broken  by  ravines,  stretched  the  Civil  Station  and 
cantonments.  A  more  difficult  position  to  hold  in 
an  extremity  cannot  well  be  conceived,  occupied  as 
it  was  by  four  disaffected  Sepoy  regiments  with  but 
sixty  European  artillerymen  to  overawe  them.  There 
was,  moreover,  an  incompetent  commander.  Realis- 
ing after  the  disasters  at  Meerut  and  Delhi  that  his 
native  garrison  was  not  to  be  trusted.  Sir  Hugh 
Wheeler  threw  up  a  make-shift  entrenchment  close 
to  the  Sepoy  lines.     Commanded  on  all  sides,  it  was 

^  Sir  Colin  Campbell  had  arrived  at  Calcutta  from  England  on 
the  previous  day. 


THE  OUTBREAK  25 

totally  unfitted  to  stand  a  siege.  But  a  worse  mistake 
was  to  follow.  Alarmed  as  time  went  on  at  his  growing 
difficulties,  Sir  Hugh  Wheeler  at  length  asked  the 
notorious  Nana  Sahib,  who  lived  a  few  miles  off  at 
Bithur,  to  assist  him  with  troops  to  guard  the 
Treasury.  For  some  months  previously  this  arch- 
traitor's  emissaries  had  been  spreading  discontent 
throughout  India,  but  he  himself  had  taken  care  to 
remain  on  good  terms  with  his  European  neighbours. 
He  now  saw  his  opportunity.  Cawnpur,  delivered 
into  his  hands  by  the  misplaced  confidence  of  its 
defenders,  was  virtually  in  his  keeping.  Of  European 
succour  there  was  no  immediate  hope.  The  place 
was  doomed.  The  crash  came  three  days  before 
General  Barnard's  force  reached  Delhi.  With  the 
exception  of  a  few  devoted  natives  who  remained 
faithful  to  their  salt,  the  whole  Sepoy  force  on  the 
5th  of  June  rose  in  revolt,  opened  the  doors  of  the 
jail,  robbed  the  treasury,  and  made  themselves  masters 
of  the  magazine.  The  Nana  cast  aside  all  further 
pretence  of  friendship  and,  joined  by  the  mutinous 
troops,  laid  siege  to  the  entrenchment  abeady  men- 
tioned, which  with  culpable  military  ignorance  had 
been  thrown  up  in  one  of  the  worst  positions  that 
could  have  been  chosen. 

The  besieging  army  numbered  some  3000  men. 
The  besieged  could  only  muster  about  400  English 
soldiers,  more  than  70  of  which  number  were  in- 
valids. For  twenty-one  days  the  little  garrison 
suffered  untold  horrors  from  starvation,  heat,  and  the 


26  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

onslauo^lits  of  the  rebels ;  until  the  General  in  com- 
mand  listened  to  overtures  for  surrender,  and  the 
garrison  marched  out  on  the  27th  of  June,  to  the 
number  of  about  450  souls,  provided  with  a  pro- 
mise of  safeguard  from  the  Nana,  who  would  allow 
them,  as  they  thought,  to  embark  in  country  boats 
for  Allahabad.  Tantia  Topi,  who  afterwards  be- 
came notorious  in  Central  India,  superintended  the 
embarkation.  No  sooner,  however,  were  the  Euro- 
peans placed  in  the  boats,  in  apparent  safety,  than  a 
battery  of  guns  concealed  on  the  river  banks  opened 
fire,  while  at  the  same  time  a  deadly  fusillade 
of  musketry  was  poured  on  the  luckless  refugees. 
The  Nana  at  length  ordered  the  massacre  to  cease. 
He  celebrated  what  he  called  his  glorious  victory  by 
proclaiming  himself  Peshwa  or  Maratha  Sovereign, 
and  by  rewarding  his  troops  for  their  'splendid 
achievements,'  while  the  wretched  survivors  of  his 
treachery,  numbering  about  5  men  and  206  women 
and  children,  were  taken  back  to  Cawnpur  and  con- 
fined in  a  small  buildinor  for  further  veno-eance  and 
insult. 

On  the  15th  of  July  came  the  last  act  of  this 
tragedy.  The  Nana,  having  sufiered  a  crushing  de- 
feat at  the  hands  of  Brigadier  Havelock's  force  within 
a  day's  march  of  Cawnpur,  as  will  presently  be  re- 
corded, put  the  whole  of  his  prisoners  to  death.  The 
men  were  brought  out  and  killed  in  his  presence, 
while  the  women  and  children  were  hacked  to  pieces 
by  Muhammadan  butchers  and  others  in  their  prison. 


THE  OUTBREAK  27 

Their  bodies  were  thrown  into  what  is  now  known 
as  the  '  Cawupur  Well.' 

Lucknow,  at  the  time  of  the  Mutiny,  was  in  popu- 
lation, in  extent,  and  in  the  number  and  importance 
of  its  principal  buildings,  one  of  the  foremost  cities 
of  India.  Situated  on  the  river  Gumti,  its  beau- 
tiful palaces,  mosques  and  public  buildings,  many 
of  which  soon  became  famous,  rose  in  stately  array 
from  a  maze  of  long  narrow  streets.  The  Residency 
stood  on  a  hill  gently  sloping  towards  the  river,  and 
was  an  imposing  edifice  of  three  stories.  Near  it 
were  the  iron  and  stone  bridges  over  the  river.  The 
southern  and  eastern  quarters  of  the  city  were  bounded 
by  a  canal  Avhich  crossed  the  road  leading  to  Cawn- 
pur,  and  finally  reached  the  Gumti. 

At  the  outbreak  of  the  Mutiny  the  Sepoy  regiments 
were  stationed  in  various  localities  within  the  city ; 
while  the  32ndf  Foot,  the  only  European  regiment  on 
the  spot,  was  quartered  in  a  barrack  about  a  mile  or 
so  from  the  Residency.  As  was  the  case  elsewhere, 
so  it  happened  at  Lucknow.  While  the  population 
and  native  garrison  were  seething  with  sedition,  the 
British  authorities  were  hampered  by  ignorance  of 
popular  feeling,  by  the  want  of  European  troops,  and 
by  divided  counsels.  So,  by  the  end  of  May,  1857, 
the  rebellion  in  Oudh  became  an  accomplished  fact, 
although  matters  went  on  with  comparative  smooth- 
ness in  Lucknow  itself.  At  length,  after  a  serious 
disaster  at  Chinhat,  the  British  garrison  was  forced 


28  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

to  withdraw  to  the  Residency  and  its  adjacent  build- 
ings ;  and  on  the  ist  of  July  commenced  the  famous 
investment  of  this  position  by  the  rebel  forces. 

The  position  was  ill  adapted  for  defence ;  for  the 
lofty  windows  of  the  Residency  itself  not  only  al- 
lowed free  access  to  the  enemy's  missiles,  but  its  roof 
was  wholly  exposed.  On  the  opposite  side  of  the 
street,  leading  from  the  Bailey  Guard  Gate,  was  the 
house  of  the  Residency  Surgeon  ^,  Dr.  (now  Sir  Joseph) 
Fayrer.  It  was  a  large  but  not  lofty  building  with 
a  flat  roof  which,  protected  by  sand  bags,  afforded 
a  good  cover  for  our  riflemen,  and  with  a  tyekhana, 
or  underground  story  that  afforded  good  shelter  for  the 
women  and  children.  But  as  a  whole,  the  defences 
of  the  Residency  were  more  formidable  in  name  than 
in  reality,  and  were  greatly  weakened  by  the  prox- 
imity of  high  buildings  from  which  the  rebels  without 
danger  to  themselves  poured  an  unceasing  fire. 

The  siege  had  an  ominous  commencement.  On 
July  4th  the  much-beloved  Sir  Henry  Lawrence, 
the  Resident,  died  of  a  wound  received  two  days 
before  from  an  enemy's  shell  that  had  fallen  into 
his  room.  Brigadier  Inglis  succeeded  him  in  com- 
mand; and  for  three  months  the  heroic  garrison  of 
about  1700  souls  held  their  weak  position,  amid  in- 
conceivable hardships  and  dangers,  against  thousands 
of  the  rebels  who  were  constantly  reinforced  by  fresh 

^  It  is  impossible  to  speak  too  highly  of  the  services  of  this  dis- 
tinguished officer  then  and  since.  His  name  is  a  household  word 
in  India. 


THE  OUTBREAK  29 

levies.  It  was  well  said  in  a  general  order  by  Lord 
Canning  that  there  could  not  be  found  in  the  annals 
of  war  an  achievement  more  heroic  than  this  defence, 
which  had  exhibited  in  the  highest  degree  a  noble 
and  sustained  courage,  which  against  enormous  odds 
and  fearful  disadvantages,  against  hope  deferred  and 
through  unceasing  toil  and  wear  of  body  and  mind, 
still  held  on  day  after  day  and  triumphed. 

Having  thus  glanced  at  the  more  prominent  features 
and  centres  of  the  Mutiny,  between  May  and  August, 
1857,  some  reference  must  be  made  to  Brigadier 
Havelock's  first  campaign  of  June  and  July  of  that 
eventful  year.  At  the  outbreak  of  the  revolt  few 
soldiers  in  India  had  seen  more  active  service  than 
Henry  Havelock.  'He  was  the  man  of  greatest  mili- 
tary culture  then  in  India.  He  was  a  veteran  of  war, 
very  few  of  whose  contemporaries  had  seen  so  much 
fighting.  In  Burma  he  had  been  in  the  field  from 
Rangoon  to  Pagan.  He  had  taken  part  in  hill  war- 
fare in  the  passes  of  Khurd  Kabul,  and  Jugdulluk. 
He  had  graduated  in  sortie-leading  and  defence  work 
as  a  prominent  member  of  the  illustrious  garrison  of 
Jalalabad.  At  Maharajpur  he  had  helped  to  beat  a 
Maratha  army ;  at  Mudki,  Firozshah,  and  Sobraon 
he  had  fought  against  the  old  battalions  of  the  Khalsa 
in  the  full  flush  of  warlike  pride.  The  dust  of  his 
Persian  campaign  was  still  in  the  crevices  of  his 
sword  hilt^'      His  religious  enthusiasm  was  bound- 

^  Havelock,  by  Archibald  Forbes. 


30  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

less  ;  and  although  reserved  and  unbending  in  manner, 
he  was  respected  by  all  who  served  under  him.  If 
he  had  a  human  passion  it  was  to  command  a  force  in 
the  field. 

On  arriving  at  Bombay  in  the  latter  part  of 
May,  1857,  from  the  Persian  expedition,  he  heard 
the  astounding  news  of  the  disasters  at  Meerut  and 
Delhi.  Unable  to  start  for  Delhi  by  the  land  route, 
he  proceeded  to  Calcutta  by  sea,  and  shortly  after  his 
arrival  in  Bengal  received  the  command  he  so  much 
desired.  Eight  da^'s  later,  he  left  Calcutta,  charged 
with  the  relief  of  Cawnpur  and  Lucknow.  'After 
quelling  all  disturbances  at  Allahabad,'  his  orders 
said,  'he  should  lose  not  a  moment  in  supporting 
Sir  Henr}^  Lawrence  at  Lucknow  and  Sir  Hugh 
Wheeler  at  Cawnpur,  and  he  should  take  prompt 
measures  for  dispersing  all  mutineers  and  insur- 
gents.' 

On  June  30th,  or  three  days  after  the  massacre  of 
the  Cawnpur  garrison  at  the  Ghats,  he  reached  Allah- 
abad, where  Colonel  Neill  had  been  employed  in 
organising  the  preparations  for  an  advance  on  Cawn- 
pur. Leaving  Allahabad  on  the  7th  of  July  at  the 
head  of  about  1500  European  troops,  he  reached  Fateh- 
pur  by  forced  marches,  defeating  a  large  body  of  the 
enemy  there  and  capturing  eleven  guns  without 
the  loss  of  a  single  British  soldier.  On  July  i6th 
he  arrived  at  the  outskirts  of  Cawnpur,  turned  the 
enemy's  flank  by  a  clever  and  rapid  movement,  and 
obtained  virtual  possession  of  the  town   after  hard 


THE  OUTBREAK  31 

fighting;  only  to  find,  as  already  narrated,  that  the 
Nana  on  the  previous  day  had  butchered  in  cold  blood 
all  his  helpless  prisoners.  To  add  to  his  sorrows  the 
news  reached  him,  on  the  day  he  entered  Caw^npur, 
of  the  death  of  Sir  Henry  Lawrence  at  Lucknow. 

By  this  time,  the  difficulties  that  beset  Havelock's 
advance  on  Lucknow  were  becoming  insuperable.  The 
British  ranks  had  been  thinned  not  only  in  fight  but 
by  sickness ;  and  it  was  plain  that  the  task  assigned 
to  him  was  one  of  unforeseen  magnitude.  The  first 
attempt  was  a  complete  failure ;  but  five  days  after- 
wards (July  20th),  Neill  arrived  from  Allahabad,  and 
Havelock  made  a  fresh  endeavour  to  advance  on 
Lucknow.  Crossing  the  Ganges  into  Oudh,  he  suc- 
cessfully encountered  the  enemy  at  Unao ;  but 
although  within  thirty-eight  miles  of  his  destination, 
cholera,  fatigue,  and  exposure  had  made  such  inroads 
on  his  sadly  reduced  force  that  he  was  compelled  once 
more  to  fall  back  on  Cawnpur.  Twice  again  did  the 
gallant  little  force  advance,  but  on  each  occasion  had 
to  fall  back ;  and  thus  terminated  Havelock 's  first 
campaign  for  the  relief  of  Lucknow.  He  had  fought 
five  actions  against  an  enemy  greatly  superior  in 
numbers,  only  to  find  that  although  he  could  gain 
victories  he  could  not  follow  them  up. 

And  now  his  wearied  and  exhausted  troops  enjoyed 
a  month's  rest  at  Cawnpur,  full  of  disappointment 
at  the  result ;  while  further  preparations  were  made 
for  the  next  move  in  relief  of  the  beleagured  garrison 
of  the  Lucknow  Residency. 


32  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

Writing  some  years  afterwards  (November  30th, 
i860),  Sir  Hugh  Rose  said  : — 

*I  am  now  with  the  camp  on  the  march  to  Luck- 
now,  and  going  over  the  scene  of  Sir  H.  Havelock's 
successive  advances  from  Cawnpur  to  Lucknow.  It 
is  very  interesting,  and  the  more  so  because  I  have 
an  officer  with  me  who  was  with  him.  Too  much 
praise  cannot  be  given  to  him.  He  had  the  greatest 
difficulties  to  contend  with,  the  rain  came  down  in 
torrents,  the  country  was  flooded  so  that  he  could 
scarcely  move  his  artillery  off  the  roads.  And  besides 
his  losses  from  the  enemy,  his  men  were  carried  off 
by  dysentery  and  cholera,  in  consequence  of  their 
having  no  tents  and  being  exposed  to  all  the  incle- 
mency of  the  weather,  with  insufficient  food  and 
very  hard  work.* 


CHAPTER    ni 

The  Situation 

We  have  endeavoured  in  the  previous  pages  to  indi- 
cate the  progress  of  affairs  in  the  North -West  of  India 
from  the  first  outbreak  of  the  Mutiny  up  to  the  date  of 
Sir  Colin  Campbell's  arrival  at  Calcutta  (August  13th, 
1857).  So  unforeseen  was  the  storm,  that  for  a  time 
few  realised  its  import  and  extent.  In  fact,  as  late  as 
June  23rd,  1857  (the  centenary  of  Plassey),  the  perfect 
serenity  of  the  Indian  sky  formed  the  subject  of 
general  comment  in  London,  both  in  leading  journals 
and  at  political  meetings ;  although  at  that  very 
moment,  unknown  to  the  British  public,  Delhi  was  in 
the  hands  of  rebels,  Oudh  was  in  mutiny,  and  British 
power  in  the  North- West  was  only  represented  within 
the  range  of  the  guns  and  rifles  of  scattered  detach- 
ments of  troops.  But  when  England  at  last  awoke  to 
the  facts,  the  nation  made  one  of  those  characteristic 
efforts  which  have  so  often  marked  her  progress. 
Within  a  few  weeks,  30,000  men  of  all  arms  were  on 
the  high-road  to  India. 

In  that  country  itself  anarchy  and  confusion  pre- 


34  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

vailed  in  its  most  vulnerable  parts.  The  besieging 
force  before  Delhi  could  do  little  more  than  hold  its 
own.  The  small  band  of  heroes  defending  the  Resi- 
dency at  Lucknow  was  closely  invested  and  sore  beset ; 
while,  harassed  by  sickness  amongst  his  troops  and 
by  losses  in  the  field.  Havelock  had  been  compelled 
to  abandon  for  the  moment  all  hope  of  relieving 
the  place.  Communications  throughout  the  country 
were  interrupted.  The  action  of  the  responsible 
authorities,  at  one  time  vacillating  and  at  another 
distinguished  by  attempts  to  preserve  some  show 
of  authority,  was  more  or  less  futile.  Agra  was 
invested  by  mutineers  from  Nimach.  Allahabad 
was  in  danger.  Cawnpur  was  lost  and  regained  by 
turns.  And  in  the  North- West  Provinces  generally 
there  was  little  else  to  record  than  local  risings, 
murders  of  refugees^,  and  general  disorder.  In  Bengal 
Proper,  the  Province  of  Behar  was  chiefly  infected. 
Its  districts  were  overrun  by  the  rebel  landholder, 
Koer  Singh ;  while  some  of  its  principal  towns  were 
the  scenes  of  massacre  and  plunder,  only  relieved  by 
glorious  achievements  of  British  courage. 

Three  Sepoy  regiments,  for  instance,  quartered  at 
Dinapur,  a  place  situated  about  220  miles  from  Calcutta, 
mutinied  and  surrounded  the  civil  station  of  Arrah, 
to  the  south-west  of  it.  For  a  whole  week  (July, 
1857)  Arrah  was  held  by  two  civilians,  Messrs.  Wake 
and  Boyle,  with  a  small  band  of  Sikhs  and  English 
refugees.  Besieged  in  an  open  bungalow,  they  fought 
against  upwards  of  3000  rebels,  until  on  August  2nd, 


THE  SITUATION  35 

Major  (afterwards  Sir)  Vincent  Eyre  effected  their 
relief  with  a  force  of  200  men  ;  an  exploit  which, 
like  the  defence,  will  bear  comparison  with  the  finest 
achievements  of  the  time.  '  The  rout  of  the  rebels 
was  complete,  and  the  road  to  Arrah  w^as  left  as  clear 
as  though  there  had  been  no  mutiny  at  Dinapur,  no 
revolt  in  Behar.' 

Notwithstanding  such  exceptional  episodes,  there 
was  little  to  relieve  the  prevailing  gloom  in  Bengal ; 
for  the  districts  immediately  in  the  neighbourhood  of 
Calcutta,  and  even  the  Presidency  town  itself,  had 
not  only  been  subject  to  serious  panics  but  had 
witnessed  instances  of  w^eakness  and  indecision  on 
our  part  which  may  well  be  left  uni-ecorded. 

In  Madras  matters  remained  comparatively  quiet. 
When  the  outbreak  occurred,  the  military  resources  of 
the  Southern  Presidency  were  seriously  reduced  by  the 
absence  on  service  in  Persia  of  the  greater  part  of  its 
European  regiments,  although  the  previous  proportion 
of  European  to  Native  troops  was  smaller  than  it  had 
been  since  the  beginning  of  the  century.  There  were 
barely  five  European  infantry  and  one  cavalry  corps, 
distributed  by  wings  at  various  places,  to  protect  this 
large  and  important  part  of  India.  Considerations  of 
a  political  nature  increased  the  anxiety  caused  by 
military  weakness.  In  Nagpur,  only  lately  annexed, 
there  were  many  persons  of  influence  who  were  dis- 
afiected.  Haidarabad  was  a  source  of  grave  anxiety; 
while  within  British  territory  the  Muhammadans  of 
Karnul,Cuddapah,and  Malabar  w^ere  greatly  ex  cited  by 


36  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

the  proclamation  of  a  Muhammadan  Empire  at  Delhi. 
From  many  quarters  came  rumours  of  plots  and  trea- 
sonable preparations.  Seditious  emissaries  and  Sepoy 
deserters  entered  the  Presidency  in  large  numbers,  with 
the  object  of  tampering  with  the  army  and  of  exciting 
disloyalty  towards  the  Government.  But  it  is  satis- 
factory to  record  that  their  evil  purpose  was  not 
fulfilled.  With  one  solitary  exception,  the  conduct  of 
the  Madras  Native  Army  furnished  an  example  of 
loyalty  and  fidelity,  during  this  time  of  trial,  which 
did  it  infinite  honour.  While,  therefore,  a  considerable 
portion  of  these  troops  were  employed  in  the  thick  of 
the  fight  in  Oudh,  in  Bengal,  and  in  Central  India,  it 
was  nowhere  necessary  to  call,  within  the  limits  of  the 
Madras  Presidency,  for  their  active  services. 

In  Bombay  the  Government  had  to  deal  with  some- 
what more  turbulent  races,  and  local  risings  took 
place  at  points  within  the  Presidency.  Here,  as  else- 
where, however,  the  Native  Princes  and  States  were 
generally  conspicuous  for  their  fidelity.  The  peace 
of  Kathiawar  for  instance — a  country  containing  i(S8 
separate  States  and  as  large  as  Greece— was  pre- 
served without  the  presence  of  a  single  European 
soldier.  Moreover,  although  the  mutinous  spirit  which 
infected  the  Sepoys  of  Bengal  was  also  exhibited 
under  one  form  or  another  in  the  Western  Presi- 
dency, its  progress  was  promptly  checked.  To  the 
judgment  and  resolution  of  Lord  Elphinstone,  and  to 
the  energy,  discretion,  and  vigilance  of  his  lieutenants, 
was  due  the  safety  of  this  vital  part  of  India ;  so  that 


THE  SITUATION  37 

Bombay  was  able  to  afford  material  assistance  to  her 
hard  beset  neighbours  in  the  north,  and  yet  to  take  care 
of  herself.  It  is  true  that  the  Bombay  Native  Army 
could  not  rival  the  fidelity  of  that  of  Madras  ;  for  the 
Bombay  Sepoys  had  been  to  a  certain  extent  recruited 
from  Oudh  and  Behar,  and  were  tainted  with  disaf- 
fection. Nevertheless,  instances  of  overt  mutiny  were 
exceptional,  while  it  is  a  significant  fact  that  the  Pre- 
sidency authorities  had  sufficient  confidence  in  their 
Native  Army  as  to  increase  its  numbers.  Moreover, 
Bombay  was  able  to  organise  an  efficient  military 
transport,  and  to  procure  from  various  places,  within 
a  short  time,  many  thousand  horses  of  all  kinds  for 
general  use  in  the  campaign.  Unfortunately  for  the 
Western  Presidency,  the  withdrawal  of  a  large  por- 
tion of  its  army  for  service  in  the  Persian  expedition 
had  necessitated  the  occupation  of  certain  places 
within  its  limits  by  Bengal  Sepoys,  whose  mutinous 
conduct  disturbed  the  peace  and  afforded  a  dangerous 
example  to  their  fellows-soldiers. 

Although  the  Punjab  was  a  comparatively  new 
province  of  British  India,  bordered  on  one  side  by  tribes 
of  wild,  fanatical  hill-men,  and  itself  inhabited  by  a 
warlike  people  sorely  tempted  to  take  advantage  of 
existing  difficulties,  j^et  in  the  hands  of  such  officers 
as  Lawrence,  Montgomery  and  others,  the  country 
west  of  the  Sutlej  remained  for  the  most  part  tran- 
quil during  the  progress  of  the  rebellion.  Moreover, 
although  about  36,000  Sepoys,  recruited  from  Oudh 
and  Behar,  were  scattered  in  various  stations  through 


38  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

this  province,  there  were  within  its  limits  fortunately 
about  lOjCoo  European  troops,  besides  a  trustworthy 
force  of  9000  military  police,  to  overawe  them. 
Happily  also,  for  India,  the  self-reliance  and  varied 
experience  of  the  civil  and  military  officers  of  the 
Punjab  enabled  them  to  realise,  sooner  than  the 
authorities  in  other  parts  of  India,  the  gravity  of 
the  public  danger. 

John  Lawrence  and  his  lieutenants  allowed  neither 
sentiment  nor  fear  of  responsibility  to  stand  in  the  way 
of  instant  and  resolute  activity.  Offences  touching 
the  public  safety  were  punished  summarily  with  death. 
Strong  parties  of  police  were  placed  in  defensible  posi- 
tions at  the  principal  ferries  of  the  'Punjab,'  or  'five 
rivers,'  which  cut  off  the  province  from  Hindustan. 
All  State  treasure  was  placed  in  security.  A  strict 
censorship  was  maintained  over  the  press  ;  and  letters 
to  Sepoys  ^  were  opened  at  the  chief  post-offices.  The 
population  in  the  Cis-  and  Trans-Indus  territory  was 
disarmed,  and  fines  were  promptly  inflicted  on  villages 
and  townships  for  local  outbreaks.  The  prisoners 
in  jail  were  employed  in  making  cartridges,  sand- 
bags, and  commissariat  gear,  for  the  troops  operating 
before  Delhi.  In  short,  everywhere  in  the  Punjab 
an  example  was  set,  which  can  never  be  forgotten, 

^  The  seditious  papers  thus  discovered  were  generally  couched 
in  figurative  or  enigmatical  language.  They  yield  ample  evidence 
that  the  Sepoys  and  other  rebels  verily  believed  that  the  destruction 
of  their  caste  and  religion  was  intended  by  the  English,  and  that 
the  moment  for  rising  was  a  favourable  one.  All  this  was  made 
manifest  in  letters  never  intended  for  European  eyes. 


THE  SITUATION  39 

of  courage,  energy,  and  far-sightedness  in  time  of 
peril. 

The  Chiefs  of  Patiala,  Jind,  Nabha,  Kapurthala, 
and  other  Sikh  States  came  forward,  moreover,  with 
offers  of  military  assistance  ;  and  not  only  provided 
guards  for  English  ladies  in  out-stations,  but  as- 
sisted materially  in  the  siege  of  Delhi  and  in  the 
subsequent  re-occupation  of  the  disturbed  territory 
surrounding  that  city.  Beyond  the  Punjab  border 
the  Amir  of  Afghanistan,  Dost  Muhammad,  although 
urged  by  his  advisers  to  invade  India  with  2o,coo 
Afghans,  refused  to  do  so,  stoutly  declaring  that  he 
sympathised  with  the  British  authorities  in  their  mis- 
fortunes and  would  be  faithful  to  his  allia>nce. 

There  is  not  the  least  doubt  but  that  the  Hin- 
dustani troops  in  the  Punjab  wanted  only  means 
and  opportunity  to  side  with  their  fellow  Sepoys 
in  lower  India.  Serious  risings,  promptly  suppressed, 
took  place  at  Firozpur,  Peshawar,  Jalandhar,  Jeh- 
1am,  Sialkot,  Meean  Meer,  and  other  places.  Yet,  in 
spite  of  dangers  and  anxiety  near  at  hand,  the 
reinforcement  of  the  little  army  before  Delhi  was  an 
object  of  paramount  importance  with  the  Punjab 
authorities.  The  first  body  of  troops  despatched 
from  the  province  was  that  which  accompanied 
General  Anson  in  his  march  towards  Delhi.  Then 
further  large  reinforcements  followed.  Some  300  ar- 
tillerymen of  the  old  Sikh  army  were  also  enlisted 
for  our  service ;  and  with  a  newly-raised  Sapper  and 
Miner  company  of  Sikhs,  1200  strong,  and  a  body  of 


40 


CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 


PuDJabi  horse,  these  men  were  sent  to  the  same  des- 
tination ;  while  wagon-trains  were  organised  to  convey 
troops,  stores,  and  material  to  the  besieging  force.  It 
was,  arranged,  moreover,  that  the  contingents  of  the 
Maharclja  of  Patiala,  and  the  Kajas  of  Jind  and 
Nabha — in  all  7000  men — should  co-operate  with  our 
troops,  and  that  an  irregular  force  numbering  about 
1000  men  under  General  Van  Courtland,  formerly  in 
Kanjit  Singh's  service,  should  clear  the  western  part  of 
the  Delhi  territory.  Subsequently,  when  only  6000 
Europeans  (half  of  them  locked  up  in  the  Peshawar 
Valley  and  prostrated  by  fever),  remained  behind  to 
keep  in  check  the  fierce  tribes  of  the  North -West 
Frontier  and  the  thousands  of  armed  and  disarmed 
Sepoys,  the  last  available  white  troops  were  sent  to 
Delhi  under  Colonel  Nicholson,  leaving  only  about 
4000  European  soldiers  to  hold  the  province.  The 
die  was  finally  cast.  The  supreme  effort  had  been 
made.  Thenceforward  on  the  capture  of  Delhi 
depended  the  existence  of  the  Punjab  as  a  British 
possession. 

The  following  table  shows  in  chronological  order 
the  dates  of  the  principal  actions  and  events  which 
this  volume  endeavours  to  describe. 


Date. 


1857- 
10  May. 


Northern  Operations. 


Outbreak  at  Meerut  and 
seizure  of  Delhi  by  the 
rebels  on  the  12th  idem, 
followed  by  risings  in  the 
Punjab,  Bengal,  and  else- 
where. 


Southern  Operations. 


THE  SITUATION 


41 


Date. 

1857- 
30  May. 

5  June. 
8  June. 

27  June. 


I  Julv. 


15  July. 


29  July 
to  Aug. 
16. 


2  Aug. 
17  Aug. 


14  Sept. 

25  Sept. 

27  Oct. 
16  Nov. 


Northern  Operations. 


General  Mutiny  at  Luck- 
now. 

Mutiny  at  Cawnpur. 

Arrival  of  British  force  be- 
fore Delhi. 

Massacre  by  Nana  Sahib  of 
the  Cawnpur  garrison 
when  embarking  in  boats 
for  Allahabad  under  pro- 
mise of  safe  condvict. 

Sioge  of  Lucknow  Residency 
by  rebels  after  our  re- 
verse at  Chinhat  on  29th 
of  June,  followed  on  4th 
July  by  the  death  of  Sir 
Henry  Lawrence. 

Massacre  by  Nana  Sahib  of 
the  remainder  of  Cawnpur 
garrison  and  others,  viz. 
5  men  and  206  women  and 
children  ;  their  corpses 
thrown  into  the  'Cawn- 
pur Well.' 

Havelock  having  reached 
Cawnjjur  on  i6th  of  July, 
moves  on  to  the  relief  of 
Lucknow,  but  after  a 
series  of  severe  actions 
is  obliged  to  fall  back 
again  on  Cawnpur. 

Relief  of  Ai-rah  by  Eyre. 

Sir  Colin  Campbell  having 
reached  Calcutta  on  the 
13th  inst.  assumes  chief 
command  of  the  army. 

Assault  and  capture  of 
Delhi,  which  is  completely 
occupied  by  British  troops 
on  the  20th  inst. 

First  relief  of  Lucknow  by 
Havelock,  who  remained 
with  Residency  garrison. 

Sir  Colin  Campbell  leaves 
Calcutta  for  the  front. 

Second  relief  of  Lucknow 
by  Sir  Colin  Campbell, 
followed   by   withdrawal 


Southern  Operations. 


42 


CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 


Date. 


1857. 


1858. 
16  Jan. 


3  Feb. 
13  Feb. 
3  Mar. 


14  Mar. 

30  Mar. 
3  April. 

19  April. 

6  May. 
23  May. 
17  June. 

20  June. 
2  Aug. 


Northern  Operations. 


of  garrison  from  Eesi- 
dency  and  death  of  Sir 
Henry  Havelock  at  Alam- 
bagh  on  24tli  inst. 
General  interregnum  till 
March,  1858. 


Siege  and  capture  of  Luck- 
now,  followed  by  com- 
plete occupation  on  20th 
inst.  after  a  series  of 
operations  dating  from 
8th  inst. 


Bareilly  re-occupied  by  Sir 
Colin  Campbell. 


Transfer  of  East  India  Com- 
pany to  Crown,  followed 


Southern  Operations 


Advance  of  Sir  Hugh  Rose 
from  Mhow  and  capture 
of  Rathgarh  on  28th  inst. 

Relief  of  Sagar  garrison. 

Capture  of  Garhakota  fort. 

Forcing  of  Muiidinpur  Pass 
and  occupation  of  Bundel- 
khand,  followed  by  cap- 
ture of  fort  of  Chandari 
on  17th  inst. 


Taking  of  Kotah  in  Raj- 
putana  (by  Roberts). 

Storm  and  capture  of  Jhansi 
preceded  by  action  of 
Betwa  on  ist  inst.  against 
25 ,000  rebels  under  Tantia 
Topi. 

Occupation  of  Banda  (Whit- 
lock). 

Action  of  Kunch. 

Capture  of  Kalpi  after  a 
series  of  operations. 

Seizure  by  rebels  of  Gwalior, 
and  deposition  of  Maha- 
raja Sindhia. 

Recapture  of  Gwalior  by 
Sir  Hugh  Rose.  Central 
India  Field  Force  now 
broken  up. 


THE  SITUATION 


43 


Date, 

Northern  Operations. 

Southern  Operatiuns. 

1858. 

by  Queen's  Proclamation 
on  1st  November. 

I  to  30 

Further  operations  in  Oudh 

Nov. 

under    Sir   Colin   Camp- 
bell. 

1859. 

7  April. 

Tantia    Topi    captured    in 
South-Western  India  and 
hanged  on  i8th  April. 

Oct.  to 

Final     operations     against 

Dec. 

rebels  in  Northern  Oudh 
and    Nepal,  and  capture 
in    December  of  4000  of 
Ncina    Sahib's   adherents 
by   a    force    (20th    Eegt. 
and  detachments)   under 
Brigadier  (afterwards  Sir 
Edward)  Holdich. 

CHAPTER  IV 

The  Northeen  Oper.vtioxs  to  the  Relief 
of  lucknow 

'  When  will  you  be  ready  to  start  ? '  said  Lord 
Panmure  to  Sir  Colin  Campbell,  as  he  offered  him 
the  chief  command  in  India  in  succession  to  General 
Anson.  '  To-morrow,'  replied  the  war-worn  veteran; 
and  on  the  morrow  accordingly  (July  12th,  1857),  he 
left  London,  saying  that  he  would  get  his  outfit  in 
Calcutta.  Thus  started  the  new  Commander-in-Chief 
at  the  age  of  sixty-five,  with  all  the  readiness  and 
ardour  of  a  young  soldier. 

Colin  Macliver,  better  known  as  Colin  Campbell, 
was  born  at  Glasgow  on  the  20th  of  October,  1792. 
Entering  the  army  in  1808  as  Colin  Campbell,  which 
name  he  took  from  his  mother's  family,  he  served 
with  distinction  in  the  Peninsular  War  and  with  the 
Walcheren  expedition.  He  led  a  forlorn  hope  at  the 
storming  of  San  Sebastian,  and  was  greatly  dis- 
tinguished in  his  earlier,  as  in  his  later  career,  for 
personal  gallantry.  '  I  hereby  certify,'  says  an  official 
memorandum  signed  by  Lord  Lynedoch, '  that  Captain 
Colin  Campbell,  then  Lieutenant  of  the  9th  Foot,  under 
my  command,  behaved  with  the  utmost  gallantry  and 


THE  NORTHERN  OPERATIONS  45 

intrepidity  at  the  storming  of  the  convent-redouht 
in  advance  of  San  Sebastian,  and  afterwards  at  the 
assault  of  that  fortress,  on  both  which  occasions  he 
was  severely  w^ounded ;  also  in  the  action  near  Irun, 
at  the  forcing  of  the  enemy  from  their  strong  position 
on  the  Bidasoa,  on  the  7th  of  October,  1813.'  In 
order  to  take  part  in  the  last-named  fight,  young 
Campbell  had  left  hospital,  his  wounds  still  unhealed, 
without  leave  ;  for  which  breach  of  discipline  he  was 
severely  reprimanded,  being  given  to  understand  that 
the  offence  would  have  met  with  a  heavier  punish- 
ment but  for  his  conduct  in  the  field.  Some  years 
later,  when  Sir  Charles  Napier  presented  new  colours 
to  the  98th  Eegiment,  he  referred  in  glowing  terms  to 
Colin  Campbell's  exploits  in  the  Peninsula.  After 
reading  to  the  men  an  account  of  the  storming  of  San 
Sebastian  he  said  : — '  There  stands  Lieutenant  Camp- 
bell ' — who  was  now  a  Lieutenant-Colonel — *  and  well 
I  know  that,  should  need  be,  the  soldiers  of  the  98th 
would  follow  him  as  boldly  as  did  those  gallant  men 
of  the  glorious  9th  who  fell  fighting  around  him  in 
the  breaches  of  San  Sebastian.' 

Although  he  had  reached  the  rank  of  Captain  in 
five  years  it  was  nearly  thirty  before  Colin  Campbell 
attained  his  Colonelcy.  During  this  interval  and 
afterwards  he  served  in  the  American  War  of  1814,  in 
the  West  Indies,  in  the  China  War  of  1 842 ;  and, 
afterwards,  in  the  second  Sikh  War  of  1 848-49,  which 
latter  campaign  gained  him  the  honour  of  a  K.C.B.,  as 
well  as  high  praise  for  *'  steady  coolness  and  military 


46  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

precision.'  Referring  to  the  Sikh  War,  he  wrote :  '  I 
had  the  good  fortune  to  be  employed  and  present 
in  every  affair  in  which  there  was  anything  to  do 
during  the  late  campaign,  including  the  pursuit  of 
Dost  Muhammad  and  his  Afghans  to  the  Khaibar  Pass.' 
The  notification  of  his  promotion  to  a  Knight  Com- 
mandership  of  the  Bath  was  conveyed  to  him  in  a 
letter  from  Sir  Charles  Napier,  who  said  '  no  man  has 
won  it  better.' 

At  this  period  of  his  career  the  great  wish  in  Colin 
Campbell's  mind  was  to  return  to  England  and  retire 
from  the  service,  since  he  was  now  in  a  position  to 
'  save  his  family  from  privation.'  '  I  am  growing  old 
and  only  fit  for  retirement/  he  wrote  in  his  journal 
on  October  20th,  1849.  'I  neither  care,'  he  said  to 
Sir  Hope  Grant,  '  nor  do  I  desire,  for  anything  else 
but  the  little  money  in  the  shape  of  haita  to  make  the 
road  between  the  camp  and  the  grave  a  little  smoother 
than  I  could  otherwise  make  it  out  of  the  profession. 
For  I  long  to  have  the  little  time  that  may  remain  to 
me  to  myself,  away  from  barracks  and  regimental  or 
professional  life,  with  the  duties  that  belong  to  it  in 
peace.'  Persuaded,  however,  to  remain  a  few  years 
longer  in  India,  he  was  employed  for  a  while  in  the 
harassing  work  of  a  frontier  post  and  in  operations 
against  the  hill  tribes  of  the  Afghan  border.  He 
returned  tO'  England  in  the  early  part  of  1853  ;  but  it 
was  not  to  enjoy  the  repose  to  which  he  had  been 
looking  forward  so  earnestly. 

In  1854,  on  the  outbreak  of  the  Crimean  War,  Sir 


THE  NORTHERN  OPERATIONS  47 

Colin  Campbell  was  offered,  and  accepted,  the  com- 
mand of  what  was  afterwards  known  as  the  '  Highland 
Brigade.'  It  was  he,  it  has  been  said,  who  secured 
the  victory  of  the  Alma.  Leading  his  Highlanders 
against  a  redoubt  which  had  been  retaken  by  the 
enemy,  after  being  carried  by  our  Light  Division,  he 
succeeded  in  breaking  the  last  compact  columns  of 
the  Kussians.  *  The  42nd  continued  its  advance,'  he 
wrote  in  a  letter  to  Colonel  H.  Vincent,  '  followed  as 
I  had  previously  ordered,  by  the  other  two  regiments 
(93rd  and  79th)  in  echelon,  forming  in  that  order  as 
they  gained  in  succession  the  summit  of  the  left  bank 
of  the  Alma.  On  gaining  the  height,  we  found  the 
enemy,  who  had  retreated  from  the  redoubt,  attempt- 
ing to  form  upon  two  large  masses  of  troops  that 
were  advancing  over  the  plateau  to  meet  the  attack 
of  the  42nd.  The  men  were  too  much  blown  to 
think  of  charging,  so  they  opened  fire  advancing  in 
line,  at  which  they  had  been  practised,  and  drove 
with  cheers  and  a  terrible  loss  both  masses  and 
the  fugitives  from  the  redoubt  in  confusion  before 
them.  .  ,  .  The  Guards  during  these  operations  were 
away  to  my  right,  and  quite  removed  from  the  scene 
of  this  fight  which  I  have  described.  It  was  a  fight 
of  the  Highland  Brigade.'  When  the  fight  was  over 
and  Lord  Raglan  sent  for  him,  he  begged  that  he 
might  be  allowed  as  a  special  favour  to  wear  the 
Highland  bonnet,  instead  of  the  cocked  hat  of  a 
general  officer,  throughout  the  remainder  of  the  cam- 
paign ;  '  which  pleased  the  men,'  he  wrote,  ^  very  much.' 


48  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

During  the  latter  part  of  the  Crimean  campaign,  Sir 
Colin  Campbell,  now  a  Major- General,  was  placed  in 
charge  of  the  position  at  Balaclava.  His  biographer  ^ 
tells  us  that  even  '  in  the  worst  times  of  that  weary 
winter,  the  experienced  old  soldier  had  never  taken 
a  desponding  view  of  matters.  He  was  quick  to 
recognise  Lord  Raglan's  difficulties,  and  to  see  that 
the  work  cut  out  for  him  was  not  rendered  the  less 
onerous  by  the  fact  of  England  being  embarked  on 
such  a  serious  operation  as  the  invasion  of  the  Crimea 
after  a  peace  of  forty  years'  duration,  wdth  her  army 
reduced  in  numbers,  the  administrative  services  calcu- 
lated for  peace  and  colonial  requirements,  and  a  total 
deficiency  of  that  organisation  which  can  alone 
ensure  success  in  war.  In  spite  of  the  murmurs  and 
complaints,  which  Sir  Colin  Campbell  never  suflfered 
in  his  hearing  without  rebuke,  he  felt  confident  that 
ultimate  success  would  crown  the  endeavours  of  the 
Allied  Armies.  Above  all,  he  had  unbounded  confidence 
in  Lord  Raglan  whom  he  served  with  single-hearted 
devotion.' 

Taking  leave  of  the  Highlanders  just  before  his 
final  departure  for  England,  after  the  proclamation 
of  peace,  Sir  Colin  said : — '  I  am  now  old,  and  shall 
not  be  called  to  serve  any  more,  and  nothing  will 
remain  to  me  but  the  memory  of  my  campaigns 
and  of  the  enduring,  hardy,  generous  soldiers  with 
whom  I  have  been  associated,  whose  name  and  glory 
will  long  be  kept  alive  in  the  hearts  of  our  country- 

*  Shadwell's  Life  of  Colin  Campbell,  Lord  Chjde. 


THE  NORTHERN  OPERATIONS  49 

men.  .  .  .  Though  I  shall  be  gone,  the  thought  of  you 
will  go  with  nie  wherever  I  may  be,  and  cheer  my 
old  age  with  a  glorious  recollection  of  dangers  con- 
fronted and  hardships  endured.  A  pipe  will  never 
sound  near  me  without  carrying  me  back  to  those 
bright  days  when  I  was  at  your  head,  and  wore  the 
bonnet  which  you  gained  for  me,  and  the  honourable 
decorations  on  my  heart,  many  of  which  I  owe  to 
your  conduct.' 

Sir  Colin  Campbell  was  created  a  G.C.B.  in  1855; 
and  two  years  later,  as  abeady  stated,  he  was  offered 
the  post  of  Commander-in-Chief  in  India.  '  Never,'  he 
said,  '  did  a  man  proceed  on  a  mission  of  duty  with 
a  lighter  heart  and  a  feeling  of  greater  humility ;  nor 
yet  with  a  juster  sense  of  the  compliments  that  had 
been  paid  to  a  mere  soldier  of  fortune  like  myself  in 
being  named  to  the  highest  command  in  the  gift  of 
the  Crown.'  We  have  seen  how  promptly  he  started. 
At  Ceylon,  he  heard  of  the  deaths  of  Sir  Henry  Law- 
rence and  Sir  Hugh  Wheeler.  Beaching  Calcutta 
early  in  August,  1857,  he  assumed  command  of  the 
army  on  the  17th  of  that  month.  But  instead  of 
proceeding  at  once  up  country,  he  conceived  it  to  be 
his  duty  to  remain  for  a  time  at  the  Presidency  town, 
where  he  was  joined  by  Major-General  Mansfield 
(afterwards  Lord  Sandhurst)  for  whose  services  as 
Chief  of  the  Staff  he  had  made  a  special  request.  He 
learned  from  Sir  Patrick  Grant,  who  up  to  this  time 
had  been  in  temporary  chief  command  of  the  army, 
that  until  a  force  could  be  collected  at  Allahabad  of 


50  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

sufficient  strength,  irrespective  of  the  garrison  neces- 
sary for  the  security  of  that  place,  the  Commander-in- 
Chief  would  be  more  usefully  employed  in  superin- 
tending the  reception  and  despatch  to  the  front  of  the 
reinforcements  as  they  arrived  from  England,  and  in 
collecting  stores  and  supplies  ^,  without  which  it 
would  be  impossible  to  put  an  army  in  the  field,  than 
as  the  chief  of  an  isolated  position  the  communications 
of  which  with  the  capital  were  cut  off.  'However, 
annoying,'  he  wrote  to  a  friend,  '  here  I  must  remain 
for  the  present.' 

This  delay  at  Calcutta  was  not  altogether  accept- 
able to  the  army  at  large.  It  was  thought  that  the 
Commander-in-Chief  would  have  done  better  to  leave 
the  arrangements  at  Calcutta  to  subordinate  officials, 
and  to  push  on  to  the  front  himself  in  order  to  reani- 
mate, by  his  presence,  the  wearied  and  harassed  troops 
operating  in  the  North-West.  But  when  Sir  Colin 
Campbell  once  made  up  his  mind  to  a  fixed  course  of 
action  he  was  not  easily  diverted  from  it.  In  other 
respects  his  stay  in  Calcutta  was  doubtless  an  advan- 
tage both  to  himself  and  to  the  Government,  insomuch 
as  it  facilitated  the  establishment  of  cordial  relations 
with  the  Viceroy,  Lord  Canning,  whose  ever  ready 
co-operation  and  advice  in  the  subsequent  movements 
of  the  army  were  of  no  small  value. 

^  During  the  Peninsular  War,  the  Duke  of  Wellington,  who  was 
necessarily  much  occupied  with  the  question  of  food  and  supply, 
used  humorously  to  say  that  he  did  not  know  that  he  was  much  of 
a  general,  but  he  prided  himself  on  being  a  first-rate  commissariat 
officer. 


THE  NORTHERN  OPERATIONS  51 

With  characteristic  simplicity,  the  gallant  old 
Scotchman  lamented,  at  this  time,  that  he  found 
officers  of  every  rank  anxious  to  be  at  least  Divisional 
Commanders  at  the  head  of  small  columns,  inde- 
pendent of  control.  This,  no  doubt,  was  rank  heresy 
from  the  Commander-in-Chief's  point  of  view.  At 
the  same  time,  it  is  a  matter  for  grave  doubt  whether 
they  were  not  more  in  the  right  to  wish  it  than  their 
Chief  was  in  condemning  their  ambition.  Sir  Colin 
Campbell  began,  indeed,  at  this  early  period  to  display 
signs  of  an  excessive  prudence  and  tenacity  of  au- 
thority, which  became  more  marked  as  time  went  on. 
His  soldiers  called  him  '  Old  Khabardar '  (Old  Take 
Care)  as  the  truest  expression  they  could  apply  to  one 
whom  they  could  not  help  respecting,  even  when 
criticising  him. 

Had  there  been  real  armies  acting  under  real 
generals  on  the  rebel  side,  or  had  the  war  been  waged 
anywhere  else  than  in  India,  few  military  critics 
would  have  found  fault  with  the  large  forces  occa- 
sionally employed  for  small  operations,  or  with  the 
delays  and  combinations  which  too  often  characterised 
the  movements  of  the  North-Western  army.  But  the 
operations  of  the  rebel  Sepoys  were  in  truth  somewhat 
of  the  nature  of  a  guerilla  warfare.  The  mutineers, 
while  formidable  behind  stone  walls,  were  not  so 
when  scattered  about  the  country  in  disorganised 
mobs  under  indifferent  leaders.  Being  fleet  of  foot 
and  short  of  courage,  they  required  to  be  met,  beaten, 
and  pursued  without  hesitation,  by  lightly  equipped 

D  2 


5a  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

columns  actinoj  under  energetic  and  bold  leaders, 
without  too  close  a  regard  to  maps,  compasses,  or 
strategical  combinations.  Moreover,  in  a  climate  in 
which,  during  a  prolonged  campaign,  more  casualties 
arise  from  disease  and  sunstroke  than  from  fights, 
stormings,  or  pursuits,  it  is  especially  the  duty  of 
Commanders,  if  need  be,  to  risk  a  loss  of  life  in  order 
to  gain  momentous  objects.  When  Dundonald  asked 
Nelson,  just  before  a  famous  naval  action,  what 
tactics  he  should  pursue  on  coming  up  to  the  enemy's 
fleet,  he  is  said  to  have  received  the  characteristic 
reply,  '  Tactics  be  hanged,  go  straight  at  'em.'  And 
such  considerations  naturally  occurred  to  many 
military  men  in  India,  who  without  desiring  to  omit 
proper  precautions  or  to  ignore  necessary  rules  of 
strategy  and  tactics,  nevertheless  longed  to  see  active 
columns  under  energetic  commanders  moving  about 
the  revolted  provinces,  while  forces  of  moderate 
dimensions  laid  siege  to  foi'tified  positions  of  import- 
ance, such  as  Delhi,  Lucknow  and  Jhansi. 

The  Indian  Mutiny  of  thirty-four  years  ago  called 
for  dash  and  dariug.  No  real  success  was  ever 
achieved  at  that  time  in  the  field  except  by  rapid 
movement  and  bold  attack  against  heavy  numerical 
odds ;  and  no  failure  was  possible  except  from  ex- 
cessive caution,  or  from  a  too  rigid  preference  on  the 
part  of  those  in  command  for  cumbersome  orders, 
cumbersome  columns,  and  cumbersome  movements. 
Sir  Colin  Campbell,  as  all  who  served  under  him  were 
well  aware,  was  not  a  heaven-born  leader,  nor  was 


THE  NORTHERN  OPERATIONS  r^'^ 

he  gifted  with  much  military  genius.  But  he  never- 
theless possessed  sterling  abilities,  and  all  those  good 
and  bad  qualities  of  temper  and  habit  that  endear  a 
general  to  the  rank  and  file  of  the  army.  His  very 
care  in  controlling  the  direction  of  a  large  number  of 
columns  operating  over  an  extensive  area  indicated 
by  itself  a  deep  sense  of  responsibility,  however 
much  it  may  have  shown  a  defective  appreciation  of 
the  exact  nature  of  the  forces  arrayed  against  him. 

In  calling  to  mind  his  true  and  simple  life,  we  can- 
not but  admire  his  patience,  rectitude,  and  resolution. 
As  remarked  by  a  faithful  historian  (Holmes)  of  the 
Mutiny :  '  He  had  not  the  wonderful  dash,  the  power 
to  put  everything  to  the  hazard  for  a  great  end,  the 
absolute  fearlessness  of  responsibility,  which  belonged 
to  some  other  well-known  leaders  of  that  time.  Yet 
for  any  work  requiring  methodical  and  precise  move- 
ments, extraordinary  care  for  details  and  close  super- 
vision of  distant  operations,  few  were  better  fitted.  .  .  . 
He  had  fought  his  life's  battle,  too,  right  gallantly. 
Harassed  by  poverty  for  many  years,  he  had  wel- 
comed the  tardy  accessions  to  his  fortune,  mainly 
because  they  enabled  him  to  provide  better  for  a 
dearly  loved  sister.  He  had  never  married ;  but  his 
relations  with  his  sister  and  with  his  old  tried  friends 
show  what  a  power  of  love  he  had.  No  Commander- 
in-Chief  more  acceptable  to  the  mass  of  Anglo-Indian 
officers  could  at  that  moment  have  been  selected. 
Many  of  them  already  knew  his  appearance  well,  his 
strong,  spare,  soldierly  figure,  his  high  rugged  fore- 


54  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

head,  crowned  by  masses  of  crisp  grey  hair,  his  keen, 
shrewd,  but  kindly  honest  eyes,  his  firm  mouth  with 
its  short  trim  moustache,  his  expression  denoting  a 
temper  so  excitable  yet  so  exact ;  so  resolute  to  en- 
force obedience  yet  so  genial ;  so  irascible  and  so 
foroi'ivino^.' 

It  will  be  remembered  from  what  has  already  been 
said,  that  between  May  and  August,  1857,  in  which 
latter  month  Sir  Colin  Campbell  arrived  at  Calcutta 
and  assumed  command  of  the  army,  almost  the  whole 
Bengal  Regular  Native  troops  were  in  open  revolt 
against  the  Government.  All  the  military  contin- 
gents in  the  neighbouring  Native  States  of  Gwalior, 
Indore,  and  Bhopal,  and  many  elsewhere,  had  more- 
over joined  the  mutineers, — the  Gwalior  Contingent 
alone  amounting  to  five  companies  of  artillery,  with 
a  magazine  and  siege  train,  two  cavalry  and  seven 
infantry  regiments.  A  large  mass  of  police,  had- 
Tnctshes,  prisoners  escaped  from  jails,  and  hereditary 
tribes  of  robbers  and  thieves  had  from  time  to  time 
swelled  the  rebel  band.  Some  idea  of  the  enemy's 
strength  may  be  gathered  from  the  fact  that  the 
regular  and  irregular  troops  investing  Lucknow  were 
at  one  period  estimated  at  no  fewer  than  200,000  men. 
Lower  Bengal,  Madras,  and  Bombay  were,  as  already 
mentioned,  comparatively  quiet.  The  Punjab  remained 
in  our  hands.  But  the  North- Western  Provinces  and 
Oudh,  comprising  a  territory  of  about  100,000  square 
miles,  with  a  population  of  38,000,000,  were  for  the 
moment  in  possession  of  the  rebels  ;  while  we  had  lost 


THE  NORTHERN  OPERATIONS  ^^ 

our  hold  over  Bundelkband  ^  and  the  neighbouring 
districts  of  the  Sagar  and  Narbada  territories.  Delhi 
was  as  yet  uncaptured  by  the  British  forces.  The 
little  garrison  of  the  Liicknow  Residency  was  hard 
beset,  and  the  communications  between  Allahabad  and 
Calcutta  were  at  times  interrupted  or  entirely  cut  off. 
Fortunately,  Allahabad,  with  its  magazine  of  warlike 
stores,  situated  at  the  confluence  of  the  Jumna  and 
Ganges,  had  been  successfully  held  against  the  enemy, 
and  could  be  reached  from  Calcutta  by  the  river  (809 
miles)  or  by  the  Grand  Trunk  Eoad  (503  miles).  The 
relief  of  Lucknow,  the  re-conquest  of  Oudh^  and 
Rohilkhand,  and  the  re-establishment  of  order  in  the 
Gangetic  Doab,  a  large  tract  of  country  lying  between 
the  Ganges  and  the  Jumna,  were  achievements  yet  to 
be  accomplished.  It  will  be  seen,  therefore,  that  the 
situation  was  full  of  difiiculties. 

General  Sir  James  Outram,  who  on  his  return  from 
the  Persian  expedition  at  the  age  of  fifty-four,  had 
been  appointed  to  the  combined  command  of  the  Cawn- 
pur  and  Dinapur  divisions,  as  well  as  to  the  Chief 

^  A  high  plateau  and  hill  district  of  about  200  miles  in  length 
and  150  in  breadth,  held  by  a  great  number  of  petty  Chiefs  under 
British  supremacy  ;  a  roadless  country  of  fastnesses  and  forts,  filled 
with  a  turbulent  population,  the  name  Bundela  having  to  the 
Lowland  Hindu  much  the  same  signification  as  a  cateran  in  Scot 
land  or  a  moss  trooper  on  the  border. 

^  Some  idea  of  the  military  resources  of  Oudh  may  be  gathered 
from  the  return  of  arms  collected  up  to  Augxist,  1859,  ^iz.  684 
cannon,  186,177  firearms,  565,321  swords,  50,311  spears,  and  636,683 
weapons  of  sorts.  During  the  same  period  1569  forts  were  de- 
stroyed. 


56  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

Commissionership  of  Oudh,  had  left  Calcutta  on  the 
1 6th  of  August  for  the  upper  provinces,  in  company 
with  Colonel  Robert  Napier  (afterwards  Field  Marshal 
Lord  Napier)  of  the  Bengal  Engineers,  as  Chief 
Divisional  Staff  Officer.  Brigadier  Havelock  was 
fruitlessly  endeavouring,  as  we  have  already  seen,  to 
push  his  way  to  Lucknow,  while  Brigadier  Neill  was 
holding  the  country  in  his  rear.  '  We  received  in- 
telligence last  night,'  Sir  Colin  wrote  on  the  17th 
of  August,  '  of  the  decision  arrived  at  by  Havelock 
after  his  affair  with  the  enemy  on  the  5th  instant 
at  Baseratgauj.  It  is  most  distressing  to  think  of 
the  position  in  which  our  poor  friends  are  placed  at 
Lucknow,  but  with  the  very  small  force  under  Have- 
lock's  command,  and  in  the  presence  of  such  numbers 
of  troops  as  he  had  opposed  to  him,  and  the  whole 
population  of  Oudh  arrayed  in  arms  for  the  defence 
of  their  villages,  he  must  have  lost  his  little  detach- 
ment in  attempting  to  force  his  way  through  such 
numbers  and  difficulties  as  he  had  to  encounter 
and  surmount  before  he  could  reach  the  walls  of 
Lucknow.' 

In  the  meantime  the  new  Commander-in-Chief  gave 
earnest  attention  to  the  measures  which  he  proposed  to 
adopt  for  stamping  out  the  revolt.  These  measures 
comprised,  briefly  speaking,  three  separate  movements, 
so  as  to  combine  the  advance  of  two  columns  from  the 
Madras  and  Bombay  Presidencies  respectively,  in  co- 
operation with  the  great  central  movement  which  he 
resolved  to  lead  in  person  in  the  direction  of  Oudh  and 


THE  NORTHERN  OPERATIONS  57 

Rohilkhand  ^.  After  assuming  the  chief  command, 
he  spared  no  pains  to  push  on  reinforcements  of 
British  troops  up  country  as  they  arrived  day  by  day 
at  Calcutta.  Some  days  before  he  reached  Calcutta, 
H.  M.  S.  Shannon,  having  on  board  Lord  Elgin  in 
diplomatic  charge  of  the  Expedition  to  China,  had 
sailed  up  the  Hugli,  followed  by  H.M.S.  Pearl.  On 
the  20th  of  August,  Captain  Peel,  R.N.,  of  the  Shan- 
non, with  his  500  Eritish  sailors  and  ten  8-inch  guns, 
left  for  Allahabad,  and  was  followed  a  few  days  later 
by  further  reinforcements  of  all  arms.  Thus  the 
Commander-in-Chief  was  doing  all  that  lay  in  his 
power  to  support  the  troops  destined  for  the  relief 
of  Lucknow ;  while  Brigadier  Nicholson  had  fortu- 
nately reinforced  the  tired-out  little  army  before 
Delhi  with  a  welcome  contingent  of  about  3500  men, 
European  and  Native,  from  the  Punjab. 

The  British  army  before  Delhi  now  (August)  ex- 
ceeded 6000  men,  of  whom  about  one-half  were  Euro- 
peans. 'At  Delhi,'  Sir  Colin  wrote  on  the  12th  of 
September, '  things  are  much  as  I  expected.  Whatever 
might  have  been  our  hopes  and  wishes  to  the  con- 
trary, it  is  an  incontrovertible  fact  that  hitherto  the 
vso-called  besieging  force  had  never  been  in  sufficient 
strength  to  attack  with  a  wall,  with  due  reofard  to  the 


^  Shadwell  states  that  Colonel  Mansfield,  when  passing  through 
London  on  his  way  to  India  to  take  up  his  post  as  Chief  of  the 
Staff,  was  consulted  by  the  Government,  and  submitted  a  plan 
based  on  the  same  principles  which  underlay  that  put  forward  by 
Sir  Colin  Campbell. 


58  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

safety  of  the  camp  and  ordinary  military  considera- 
tions. I  have  so  little  reliable  information  on  the 
nature  of  the  position,  the  feeling  in  the  town  and 
the  state  of  health  of  the  troops,  that  I  dare  not 
venture  an  opinion  as  to  what  is,  or  is  not,  in  the 
power  of  Wilson.  But  I  hope  to  have  a  good  report, 
and  that  the  last  success  we  have  accounts  of,  since 
the  arrival  of  his  reinforcements  under  Brigadier 
General  Nicholson,  has  been  followed  by  increased 
confidence  on  our  side  and  an  early  prospect  of  de- 
cided results.  More  we  cannot  hope  for,  and  we 
must  make  every  allowance  for  the  difficulties  of  the 
General.'  But  encouraged  by  the  arrival  of  the  heroic 
Nicholson,  General  Wilson  was  now  about  to  begin 
the  siege  in  real  earnest.  What  happened  may  best 
be  re-told  almost  in  the  w^ords  of  a  narrative  written 
at  the  time  ^. 

On  the  morning  of  the  25th  of  August,  1857,  a 
strong  body  of  the  enemy  was  observed  to  issue 
from  the  Ajmere  Gate  and  take  the  road  to  Bohtak. 
Lieutenant  Hodson,  formerly  of  the  Guides  (better 
known  afterwards  as  Hodson,  of  Hodson's  Horse),  was 
despatched  with  300  irregular  horsemen  to  watch 
their  movements.  Pushing  forward  a  little  too  in- 
cautiously, he  was  surrounded  by  a  superior  force, 
but  was  speedily  rescued  from  this  critical  position 
by  a  body  of  the  Jind  Baja's  levies,  with  whose  aid 
he  attacked  and  routed  the  enemy.  A  far  more 
serious   contest  came   off  on  the  same  date  at  Na- 

^  Allen's  Indian  Mail,  1857. 


THE  NORTHERN  OPERATIONS  59 

jafgarh.  Nearly  7000  mutineers  with  eighteen  guns 
quietly  proceeded  from  the  city  in  order  to  intercept 
the  siege  train  of  heavy  guns  expected  from  Fii'oz- 
pur.  No  sooner  was  this  known  in  camp  than 
Nicholson  was  instructed  to  march  with  a  moveable 
column  of  1000  Europeans  and  2000  natives  to  over- 
take the  enemy.  At  five  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  he 
came  up  with  them,  after  a  march  of  twenty  miles, 
and  at  once  advanced  to  the  attack.  A  sarai  (walled 
enclosure)  with  four  guns  in  position  was  carried  by 
a  brilliant  charge,  and  four  more  guns  were  captured 
at  a  bridge  a  little  further  on.  After  destroying  the 
bridge^  the  troops  bivouacked  all  night  upon  the 
ground,  and  next  day  returned  to  camp  with  thirteen 
guns.  Their  loss,  however,  had  been  considerable ; 
1 20  of  their  number  being  killed  and  wounded,  most 
of  whom  fell  in  an  attack  upon  a  handful  of  Sepoys 
in  occupation  of  a  small  village.  The  enemy  made 
another  attempt  on  the  outposts  on  the  26th,  but  were 
repulsed  by  a  volley  of  grape  from  the  centre 
battery. 

The  engineers  were  now  assiduously  engaged  in 
clearing  the  ground  for  the  breaching  batteries,  and 
on  the  4th  of  September,  1857,  over  thirty  pieces  of 
heavy  ordnance,  with  ample  supplies  of  ammunition, 
arrived  in  camp.  From  this  date  until  that  of  the 
grand  assault,  reinforcements  continually  poured  in, 
Europeans,  Kashmirians,  and  Sikhs-  following  one 
another  in  rapid  succession,  until  at  last  an  army 
of    some    strength   was   encamped    before    the    long 


6o  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

beleagured  city.  Strange  to  say,  the  enemy  made  no 
attempt  to  disturb  the  men  while  constructing  the 
first  parallel,  nor  were  they  once  fired  upon  until 
their  labours  were  completed  and  their  guns  were  in 
position.  It  is  said,  indeed,  that  the  attention  of  the 
rebels  was  diverted  by  a  heavy  fire  from  the  Ridge, 
and  that  the  first  intimation  they  received  of  the 
existence  of  this  new  battery  of  ten  guns  was  in  the 
shape  of  a  huge  missile.  The  battery  was  known  as 
Brind's ;  it  was  only  650  yards  from  the  walls  and 
was  mainly  instrumental  in  silencing  the  formidable 
Kashmir  and  Mori  bastions.  The  British  batteries 
were  now  completed,  and  on  the  morning  of  the  nth 
a  cannonade  from  the  first  battery,  commencing  with 
a  salvo  of  nine  twenty -four  pounders,  brought  down 
large  fragments  of  masonry.  The  second  battery 
opened  soon  afterwards,  knocking  to  pieces  the  cur- 
tain between  the  Kashmir  and  water  bastions.  Next 
morning  the  third  battery  came  into  play.  And 
from  that  moment  until  the  assault,  fifty  heavy  guns 
and  mortars  poured  an  incessant  storm  of  shot  and 
shell  upon  the  walls  of  the  city.  The  rebels,  however, 
stood  bravely  by  their  crumbling  walls,  keeping  up 
a  continuous  roll  of  musketry  until  the  Engineers 
reported  two  practicable  breaches  near  the  Kashmir 
and  Water  bastions,  and  arrangements  were  made  for 
an  assault  at  daybreak  of  the  14th  of  September. 

The  attack  was  made  by  four  columns,  with  a  fifth 
held  in  reserve.  The  first,  commanded  by  Nicholson, 
consisted  of  H.M.'s  75th,  the  1st  Bengal  Fusileers, 


THE  NORTHERN  OPERATIONS  61 

and  2nd  Punjab  Infantry.  The  second  included 
H.M.'s  8th  and  6ist  Regiments  and  the  4th  Sikh 
Infantry.  The  third  consisted  of  H.M.'s  52nfl,  the 
2nd  Bengal  Fusileers,  and  ist  Punjab  Infantry.  The 
fourth  was  made  up  of  detachments  of  European  regi- 
ments, the  Sirmur  battalion  of  Gurkhas,  the  Guides 
Infantry,  and  the  Kashmirian  levies.  The  Reserve 
was  composed  of  the  60th  Rifles,  the  Kumaun  bat- 
talion of  Gurkhas,  and  the  4th  Punjab  Infantry. 

The  fourth  column  was  the  first  to  advance.  It 
was  directed  against  the  Kishenganj  and  Tahari- 
pur  suburbs,  and  was  intended  as  a  diversion  in 
favour  of  the  real  attacks.  This,  at  least,  was  all  it 
succeeded  in  doing;  for,  notwithstanding  the  gallantry 
displayed  by  the  commander,  his  troops  failed  to  dis- 
lodge the  enemy.  The  other  three  columns  were 
more  successful.  Up  to  the  moment  of  their  advance 
into  the  open,  the  batteries  kept  up  a  heavy  fire,  and 
swept  the  walls  of  the  city.  The  Rifles  were  the  first 
to  rush  forward,  skirmishing  along  the  front.  The 
first  column  was  under  orders  to  storm  the  breach 
near  the  Kashmir  Bastion,  the  second  that  in  the 
Water  Bastion,  and  the  third  to  assault  by  the  Kash- 
mir Gate,  as  soon  as  it  should  be  blown  open. 
With  a  fierce  exultant  shout,  the  first  and  second 
columns  dashed  onward,  scrambled  into  the  ditch, 
applied  their  ladders  to  the  scarp  of  the  wall,  and 
swarmed  up  into  the  breach  under  a  murderous  fire 
of  musketry. 

Nicholson  quickly  effected  a  lodgment  in  the  main- 


62  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

guard,  and  swept  the  ramparts  as  far  as  the  Mori 
Bastion.  The  second  column  also  made  good  its  hold 
of  the  Water  Bastion,  and  proceeded  to  give  a  hand 
to  the  others  ;  the  third  column  likewise  entered  the 
city  through  the  Kashmir  Gate.  The  blowing  open 
of  that  gate  was  the  most  perilous  exploit  of  the  day. 
The  explosion  party,  under  Lieutenants  Home  and 
Salkeld,  R.E.,  was  composed  of  Sergeant  John  Smith, 
Sergeant  A.  B.  Carmichael,  and  Corporal  F.  Burgess, 
all  of  the  Sappers  and  Miners  ;  Bugler  Hawthorne,  of 
the  52nd  Foot,  and  twenty-four  Native  Sappers  and 
Miners.  As  the  foremost  hastily  advanced  with  the 
powder  bags,  the  rebels  partially  opened  the  wicket, 
and  fired  at  them  from  under  secure  shelter.  The 
bags,  nevertheless,  were  attached  to  the  iron  spikes 
with  which  the  gate  was  studded.  Sergeant  Car- 
michael was  the  first  slain,  as  he  laid  the  train : 
Lieutenant  Salkeld  then  stepped  forward  to  fire  it, 
but  was  shot  in  the  arm  and  leg,  and  fell  into  the 
ditch.  As  he  was  falling,  he  threw  the  match  to  Cor- 
poral Burgess,  who  was  mortally  wounded  after  he 
had  accomplished  the  dangerous  feat.  One  of  the 
natives  also  was  killed,  and  two  were  wounded. 
Home  then  made  the  bugle  sound  the  advance  three 
times.  The  column  obeyed  the  call,  and,  springing 
forward  with  a  British  cheer,  rushed  through  the 
ruined  gateway,  over  the  rebels  who  had  been  killed 
by  the  explosion.  The  first  spectacle  that  met  their 
eyes  was  said  to  be  the  dead  body  of  a  European 
chained  to  a  stake,  at  which  he  had  apparently  been 


THE  NORTHERN  OPERATIONS  63 

roasted.  Three  other  Europeans  had  been  here  sacri- 
ficed, and  an  English  woman,  naked  and  covered 
with  sores,  was  said  to  be  chained  to  the  bastion,  gib- 
bering and  shrieking,  a  hopeless  maniac^.  Nothing- 
could  now  withstand  the  fury  of  the  onslaught.  The 
Church,  the  CoUei^e,  and  Skinner  s  house  were  soon  in 
possession  of  our  troops  ;  but  as  they  diverged  into  the 
narrow  streets,  their  progress  was  checked  by  double 
discharges  of  grape-shot  from  pieces  of  heavy  artillery 
placed  to  bear  upon  every  avenue.  While  encouraging 
his  men  to  make  a  second  rush  at  a  gun,  the  heroic 
John  Nicholson  ^  received  a  wound  which  proved  to  be 
mortal.  That  night '  St.  George's  banner,  broad  and  gay,' 
waved  over  the  Kashmir  Gate,  and  the  headquarters 
of  the  army  were  established  in  Skinner's  house. 

The  next  day  was  consumed  in  making  good  this 
position,  and  in  battering  the  outer  wall  of  the  maga- 
zine, in  which  a  practicable  breach  was  effected  before 
sunset.    At  dawn  of  the  following  morning  (September 


^  Subsequent  investigation  has  shown  these  stories  of  murder 
and  outrage  to  be  exaggerated. 

^  Nicholson  was  one  of  those  political  soldiers  of  whom  India  has 
produced  so  many  distinguished  types.  He  lingered  in  great  agony 
long  enough  to  catch  a  glimpse  of  the  accomplishment  of  that  task 
to  which  he  had  so  sternly  and  zealously  laboured  to  contribute, 
and  expired  on  the  13th  of  September,  in  the  thirty- fifth  year  of 
his  age.  '  Nicholson  is  dead,'  was  the  hushed  whisper  that  struck  all 
hearts  with  grief.  His  grave  now  lies,  it  is  said,  but  little  cared 
for.  But  'the  hoofs  of  his  war-horse  are  to  be  heard  ringing  at 
night  over  the  Peshawar  valley '  by  his  superstitious  frontier  men, 
who  believe  that  '  until  that  sound  dies  away,  the  rule  of  the 
Feringis  in  the  valley  will  endure.' 


64  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

i6th)  a  detachment  of  the  6ist  regiment  suddenly 
sprang  forward  with  a  ringing  shout,  and  the  terror- 
stricken  rebel  artillerymen  threw  down  their  lighted 
port  fires  and  fled  without  discharging  a  single  shot ; 
six  heavy  guns,  loaded  with  grape,  frowned  upon  the 
breach.  On  the  17th  the  Bank  and  its  extensive 
gardens,  together  with  the  Jama  Masjid,  fell  into  the 
hands  of  the  victors,  and  guns  were  placed  to  bear 
upon  the  palace  and  the  bridge  of  boats. 

Two  hundred  and  six  pieces  of  ordnance,  besides  a 
vast  supply  of  ammunition,  were  the  prize  of  con- 
quest ;  in  addition  to  an  immense  amount  of  plunder. 
It  was  not,  however,  until  the  20th  of  September 
that  the  city  and  palace  were  entirely  evacuated 
by  the  enemy,  and  Delhi  became  the  undisputed 
trophy  of  British  pluck  and  perseverance.  On  the 
following  day,  General  Archdale  Wilson  and  his  gal- 
lant comrades  pledged  the  health  of  the  Queen  in 
the  famous  Diwan-i-Khas,  and  loud  and  prolonged 
cheering  proclaimed  the  re-establishment  at  Delhi  of 
British  supremacy.  The  aged  monarch  and  his  sons 
had  tied  for  refuge  to  Humayun's  tomb,  where  they 
were  discovered  and  arrested  by  Hodson,  at  the  head 
of  a  handful  of  troops.  The  king's  hoary  head  was 
duly  revered,  but  the  princes  were  shot.  Tried  after- 
wards by  a  military  commission,  the  king  was  sen- 
tenced to  imprisonment  for  life,  and  was  transported  to 
Rangoon,  where  he  subsequently  died. 

Thus  Delhi  fell,  although  not  without  a  loss  to  our- 
selves of  about  60  oificers  and  1085  men  killed  and 


THE  NORTHERN  OPERATIONS  65 

wounded^.  By  courage  and  endurance  the  gallant 
little  army  had  restored  British  supremacy  in  the  very 
focus  of  the  revolt,  and  so  made  the  first  real  step, 
unaided  by  the  presence  or  assistance  of  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief, towards  the  suppression  of  the 
Mutiny.  To  sum  up  the  position  of  affairs  briefly, 
it  may  be  said  that  till  the  capture  of  Delhi  the 
prestige  of  British  supremacy  was  still  trembling  in 
the  balance.  Had  the  storming  failed,  all  might  have 
gone.  It  was  a  struggle  feebly  begun  but  nobly 
ended,  and  its  record  will  ever  find  a  foremost  place 
in  the  history  of  the  Mutiny. 

The  news  of  the  fall  of  Delhi  reached  Calcutta  on 
September  26th.  Writing  to  General  Wilson  three 
days  afterwards^,  the  Commander-in-Chief  said:  — 
'Pray  accept  my  congratulations  on  your  brilliant 
success.  The  determined  character  of  the  resistance 
you  have  encountered  in  the  town  is  an  unmistakable 
answer  to  the  unprofessional  authorities  who  would 
have  tried  to  hurry  you  on  to  a  rash  attack  before 
your  military  judgment  was  satisfied  of  the  sufiiciency 
of  your  means.' 

From  the  moment  that  Delhi  fell,  Lucknow  became 
the  centre  of  interest  to  which  all  eyes  were  turned  ; 
more  especially  since,  about  this  time,  afifairs  to  the 
southward  w^ere  complicated  by  the  revolt,  as  we 
have  seen,  on  the  22nd  of  September  of  the  famous 

^  The  loss  of  the  Delhi  Field  Force  in  killed,  wounded,  and 
missing,  from  May  30  to  Sept.  20,  1857,  amounted  to  2151  Europeans 
and  1686  natives. 

E 


66  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

Gwalior  State  Contingent,  which  from  that  date 
played  so  prominent  a  part  at  Cawnpur  and  in 
Central  India.  There  were  now  about  14.000  troops 
in  Bengal,  the  North- West  Provinces  and  Oudh  at 
Sir  Colin  Campbell's  disposal,  while  the  bulk  of  the 
reinforcements  from  England  were  still  pouring  in. 
General  Outram  reached  Cawnpur  on  the  i6th  of 
September,  1857,  with  sufficient  reinforcements  to 
raise  the  force  available  for  the  relief  of  Lucknow 
to  about  3179  men.  By  virtue  of  his  rank  and  ap- 
pointment, Outram  unwillingly  superseded  Brigadier 
Havelock.  '  But  to  you,'  he  wrote  to  that  distin- 
guished officer,  '  shall  be  left  the  glory  of  relieving 
Lucknow,  for  which  you  have  already  struggled  so 
much.  I  shall  accompany  you  only  in  my  civil 
capacity  as  Commissioner,  placing  my  military  ser- 
vice at  your  disposal  should  you  please,  and  serving 
under  you  as  a  volunteer.'  And  here  we  find  the 
key  to  the  whole  career  of  the  '  Bayard  of  India.' 
'  Outram,'  said  the  Commander-in-Chief, '  has  behaved 
very  handsomely.'  He  was  indeed  one  of  India's  most 
famous  political  soldiers.  Calm  in  action,  chivabous 
in  conduct,  simple  in  character,  he  had  passed  suc- 
cessfully through  the  ordeal  of  a  long  and  varied 
career,  and  now  ended  that  career,  so  far  as  active 
duty  in  the  field  was  concerned,  by  a  noble  act  of 
self-abnegation,  followed  by  service  as  arduous  as 
ever  fell  to  the  lot  of  a  military  officer. 

On  the  19th  and  20th  of  September,  1857,  Have- 
lock's   little   army  of  3000    men   again   crossed  the 


THE  NORTHERN  OPERATIONS  6'j 

Ganges  for  Lucknow,  with  better  chances  of  success 
than  before ;  and,  pushing  on  in  the  teeth  of  vigorous 
opposition,  occupied  the  Alanibagh,  four  miles  from 
the  city,  three  days  later.  Here  was  received,  with 
great  rejoicing  by  the  force,  the  news  of  the  fall  of 
Delhi ;  while  '  the  guns  of  the  defenders  of  the  Resi- 
dency, answering  those  of  the  besiegers,  made  it  known 
that  all  was  still  well  with  them.'  Leaving  the  sick 
and  wounded  in  the  Alambagh  under  a  strong  guard, 
the  force  moved  on  Lucknow  on  the  morning  of  the 
25th  of  September  in  two  brigades,  the  first  under 
Outram  and  the  second  under  Havelock.  It  was 
decided  to  cross  the  Charbagh  bridge,  then  to  go  east- 
ward along  a  lane  skirting  the  canal,  and,  finally,  north- 
wards to  the  east  side  of  the  Residency.  The  bridge 
was  found  to  be  strongly  defended  by  guns,  while  a 
sharp  musketry  fire  was  poured  from  the  adjoining 
houses.  But  the  position  was  gallantly  taken  by  the 
Madras  Fusileers^  serving  in  the  brigade  under  Neill, 
and  Lucknow  was  entered  ^. 

At  length,  amid  an  incessant  storm  of  shot,  in 
which  the  gallant  Neill  fell  mortally  wounded,  the 
troops  reached  the  Residency  and  entered  the  en- 
trenchment, after  a  series  of  operations  which  were 
as  difiicult  as  they  were  creditable  to  all  concerned. 

^  For  a  detailed,  and  graphic  description,  see  Malleson,  vol.  i.  pp. 
536  et  seq.  In  all  these  and  other  operations,  '  Billy '  (now  Sir 
William)  Olpherts,  took  a  distinguished  part.  *  Believe  me,  my 
dear  heroic  Olpherts,'  wrote  Outram  to  him  on  the  28th  of  March, 
1858,  'bravery  is  a  poor  and  insufficient  term  to  apply  to  a  valour 
such  as  yours.' 

E   2 


/^^  liwaT?; 


68  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

On  the  morning  of  September  27th,  when  the  rear- 
guard was  brought  into  the  Residency,  there  was 
a  serious  and  deplorable  misadventure.  Certain 
*  doolis '  carrying  wounded  men  were  taken  by  mis- 
take into  a  courtyard  occupied  by  the  enemy,  after- 
wards known  as  '  Dooli  Square,'  and  some  forty 
wounded  men  were  ruthlessly  murdered  by  the  rebels. 
The  total  loss  sustained  by  the  relieving  force  on  the 
march  to  Lucknow,  and  in  fighting  its  way  into  the 
Residency,  amounted  to  not  less  than  31  officers 
and  540  men  killed,  wounded,  and  missing. 

Once  fairly  in  the  Residency  enclosure,  the  long 
pent-up  feelings  of  anxiety  and  suspense  endured  by 
the  garrison  are  said  by  an  eye-witness  to  have  burst 
forth  in  a  succession  of  deafening  cheers.  It  was  a 
moment  never  to  be  forgotten.  The  delight  of  the 
gallant  Highlanders  (the  78th)  who  had  fought  twelve 
actions  to  enjoy  that  supreme  moment  of  ecstasy,  and 
who  in  the  last  few  days  had  lost  a  third  of  their 
numbers,  knew  no  bounds.  As  Outram  and  Have- 
lock  entered  Fayrer's  house,  the  'rough -bearded  war- 
riors shook  the  ladies  by  the  hand  and  took  the 
children  up  in  their  arms ;  anxious  questions  were 
asked,  actions  were  fought  over  again,  news  were 
retailed  from  one  to  another,  and  satisfaction  and 
joy  filled  all  hearts.' 

With  the  arrival  of  Havelock's  relieving  force,  the 
siege  of  the  Lucknow  Residency,  properly  so  called, 
terminated.  The  two  generals  had  entered  the  en- 
trenchment with  the  determination  of  withdrawing 


THE  NORTHERN  OPERATIONS  69 

the  garrison  to  a  place  of  safety.  But  the  difficulties 
in  the  way  were  so  insuperable  that  they  resolved, 
after  much  anxious  deliberation,  to  remain  there  until 
the  Commander-in-Chief  could  come  to  the  rescue. 
The  relieving  force  had  now  indeed  to  share  with  the 
original  garrison  the  perils  and  hardships  of  an  in- 
vestment. It  was  virtually  a  blockade.  But  the 
position,  extended  by  the  seizure  of  certain  palaces 
on  the  banks  of  the  river,  was  successfully  held  in 
communication  with  the  small  force  at  the  Alambagh 
during  the  many  anxious  days  which  intervened 
between  the  25th  of  September  and  the  long  delayed 
relief  by  the  Commander-in-Chief  on  the  27th  of 
November  following.  The  original  garrison  of  the 
Residency  was  1692  strong,  of  whom  937  were  Euro- 
peans and  765  natives.  It  lost  in  killed  350  Euro- 
peans and  133  natives,  while  of  the  latter  230  deserted, 
making  a  total  loss  of  713.  There  remained  of  the 
original  garrison,  when  relieved  by  Havelock,  a  total 
number  of  979,  of  whom  577  were  Europeans  and  402 
natives. 

The  following  quotation  from  a  despatch  by  Sir 
James  Outram  gives  some  idea  of  the  nature  and 
extent  of  the  operations  carried  on  during  the  second 
siege  of  Lucknow : — '  I  am  aware  of  no  parallel  to 
our  series  of  mines  in  modern  war  ;  twenty-one  shafts, 
aggregating  200  feet  in  depth,  and  3291  feet  of  gallery, 
have  been  executed.  The  enemy  advanced  twenty 
mines  against  the  palaces  and  outposts  ;  of  these  they 
exploded  three  which  caused  us  loss  of  life,  and  three 


70  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

which  did  no  injury ;  seven  had  been  blown  in ;  and 
out  of  seven  others  the  enemy  had  been  driven  and 
the  galleries  taken  possession  of  by  our  miners — 
results  of  which  the  engineer  department  may  well 
be  proud.' 


CHAPTER  V 

The  Northern  Operations  (continued) 
TO  THE  Reduction  of  Oudh 

On  the  28th  of  September,  1857,  three  days  after 
Havelock  had  entered  Lucknow,  Sir  Colin  Campbell 
informed  General  Outram  of  his  intention  to  '  proceed 
shortly  to  Cawnpur,  in  order  to  be  at  the  centre  of 
operations.'  '  No  advance  will  take  place  without 
me,'  he  added  with  characteristic  tenacity  and  caution, 
'  even  if  it  be  made  with  a  single  regiment.  ...  It  is 
absolutely  necessary  for  me  to  get  into  the  right  place 
for  directing  the  movements  of  the  army  and  restore 
something  like  ensemble  to  them.'  Nevertheless  the 
Commander-in-Chief  still  tarried  at  Calcutta  for  the 
arrival  of  further  reinforcements,  while  Havelock  and 
Outram  were  blockaded  in  Lucknow.  On  the  26th  of 
October,  Colonel  Greathed's  flying  column  from  Delhi, 
in  all  1800  Infantry,  600  Cavahy  and  16  guns,  after 
a  series  of  successful  engagements  with  detached 
bodies  of  the  rebels,  reached  Cawnpur,  and  its  arrival 
was  most  opportune.  Both  Cavalry  and  Field 
Artillery  were  sorely  needed,  and  Colonel  Greathed's 
force  gave  the  Commander-in-Chief  the  elements 
requisite  for  the  organisation  of  an  army  in  the  field 


72  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

strong  enough,  in  his  opinion,  to  justify  the  com- 
mencement of  operations  under  his  personal  super- 
vision. He  therefore  started  from  Calcutta  for  the 
front  on  the  27th  of  October,  1857,  his  stay  at  the 
Presidency  town  having  lasted  since  the  14th  of 
August,  or  upwards  of  two  months.  He  reached 
Cawnpur  on  the  3rd  of  November.  Keinforcements 
soon  swelled  the  number  of  his  force  to  5000  men 
with  39  guns  and  howitzers,  besides  moi-tars  and 
rocket  tubes.  Writing  to  the  Duke  of  Cambridge, 
just  before  he  left  Calcutta,  he  had  said : — '  I  have 
made  up  my  mind  not  to  hazard  an.  attack  which 
would  compromise  my  small  force.  A  road  must  be 
opened  by  heavy  guns,  and  the  desperate  street  fight- 
ing so  gallantly  conducted  by  Sir  James  Outram  and 
General  Havelock — the  only  course  open  to  them — 
must  if  possible  be  avoided  in  future.  Short  as  the 
time  is,  there  must  be  no  undue  haste  on  my  part.' 

On  the  9th  of  November,  1857,  the  Commander-in- 
Chief  moved  forward  into  Oudh  with  a  month's 
supply  for  all  hands.  On  the  next  day  he  was  joined 
by  Mr.  Kavanagh  of  the  Uncovenanted  Civil  Service, 
who,  disguised  as  a  native,  made  his  way  out  of  the 
Residency  to  the  British  camp  to  act  as  guide  ^. 
Sir  Colin  Campbell's  communications  were  now  not 
a  little  threatened  by  the  Gwalior  Contingent  and 
other  rebel  forces  at  or  near  Kalpi ;  but  he  left 
General  Wyndham  in   command  at  Cawnpur,  with 

^  The  Victoria  Cross  was  conferred   on   Mr.   Kavanagh  for  his 
gallantry. 


THE  NORTHERN  OPERATIONS  73 

orders  to  strengthen  the  defences  and  to  show  the 
best  front  he  could  to  the  rebels,  but  not  to  move 
out  to  attack  unless  compelled  to  do  so  by  a  threat 
of  bombardment.  The  Cawnpur  garrison  consisted  of 
500  British  soldiers  and  550  Madras  Infantry  and 
Gunners  ;  and  further  detachments  were  expected  and 
arrived  within  the  week. 

On  November  i6th,  after  some  preliminary  skirmish- 
ing in  the  outskirts  of  Lucknow,  the  Commander- 
in-Chief,  who  had  divided  his  force  into  three  Brigades 
under  Adrian  Hope,  Greathed,  and  Russell,  began  his 
advance  on  the  city  by  the  line  of  the  right  bank  of 
the  Gumti  where  the  ground  favoured  an  approach 
to  the  Secundra  Bagh,  a  large  brick  building  some 
450  feet  square  with  strong  loop-holed  walls.  When 
the  attack  on  this  building  had  gone  on  for  about  an 
hour  and  a  half,  it  was  determined  to  take  it  by 
storm.  Gallantly  rushing  onwards,  the  93rd,  53rd, 
and  4th  Punjab  Rifles  forced  their  entrance  through 
the  breaches,  gateway  and  windows ;  and  no  less 
than  2000  of  the  enemy,  who  fought  with  the  courage 
of  despair,  were  slain  in  the  building.  This  done,  the 
next  point  of  attack  was  the  Shah  Najaf,  a  domed 
mosque  with  a  garden  around  it,  enclosed  by  a 
high  loop-holed  wall.  The  position  was  defended  by 
the  rebels  with  great  resolution  against  a  heavy 
cannonade  which  lasted  three  hours. 

Of  Sir  Colin' s  Staff  the  two  brothers  Alison  ^  were 

^  One  is  now  General  Sir  Archibald  Alison,  whose  distinguished 
career  is  well  known. 


74  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

wounded ;  and  many  of  the  mounted  officers  had 
their  horses  shot  under  them.  Indeed  at  one  time 
the  enemy  clearly  had  the  advantage.  But  Captain 
PeeP,  commanding  the  Naval  Brigade,  brought 
up  his  heavy  guns  'as  if  he  had  been  laying  the 
Shannon  alongside  an  enemy's  frigate ; '  while  Adrian 
Hope  with  a  party  of  fifty  men  crept  through  the  sur- 
rounding jungle  and  brushwood,  and  entering  the  enclo- 
sure one  by  one  through  a  fissure  in  the  wall,  found 
the  rebels  in  full  retreat.  The  enemy  had  lost  heart, 
and  abruptly  abandoned  a  position  in  which  the  wearied 
troops  were  only  too  glad  to  rest  during  the  night. 

There  was  now  no  doubt  but  that  Sir  Colin 
Campbell's  operations  had  so  far  been  crowned  with 
success.  On  the  morning  of  November  17th  the 
struggle  re-opened  with  a  heavy  cannonade  on  the 
Mess  House,  which,  after  some  six  hours  firing,  was 
carried  with  a  rush  by  a  company  of  the  90th,  led  by 
Captain  Wolseley^,  and  a  detachment  of  the  53rd. 
Only  one  building  (the  Moti  Mahal)  now  intervened 
before  Outram's  position  was  reached.  The  enemy 
oflfered  but  slight  resistance  so  that  Hope  Grant  was 
able  to  meet  Outram,  Havelock,  his  son  (now  Sir 
Henry  Havelock),  Colonel  Robert  Napier,  Major  Eyre 

1  This  gallant  officer  was  afterwards  wounded  at  the  final  capture 
of  Lucknow,  in  March,  1858,  and  died  at  Cawnpur  on  the  27th  of 
April  of  small  pox. 

2  Now  General  Viscount  Wolseley.  He  was  well  known  in  the 
Mutiny  for  dash  and  activity.  He  had  a  brother  in  the  20th  Eegi- 
ment,  who  served  in  the  Crimea  and  elsewhere,  and  was  never 
content  unless  he  found  himself  in  the  thick  of  the  fight. 


THE  NORTHERN  OPERATIONS  75 

and  others.  In  a  few  moments  more,  under  a  sharp 
fire,  Havelock  and  Outram  joined  Sir  Colin  Campbell 
and  were  able  to  congi-atulate  him  upon  the  successful 
accomplishment  of  the  second  relief  of  Lucknow. 

Great  was  the  feeling  of  satisfaction  among  the 
garrison,  only  to  be  followed  by  something  like  con- 
sternation when  it  was  announced  that  within  twenty- 
four  hours,  and  against  the  advice  of  Havelock  and 
Outram,  the  Residency  position  was  to  be  altogether 
abandoned.  The  Commander-in-Chief  had  decided 
on  this  step  because  in  his  opinion  the  position  was  a 
false  one,  and  could  not  be  reached  afterwards  by  a 
relieving  army  without  incurring  severe  loss.  There 
was  much  to  be  said  for  and  against  this  view.  On 
the  one  hand  it  was  argued  that  the  enemy,  if  attacked, 
would  be  quite  ready  to  abandon  the  key  of  their 
position,  the  Kaisar  Bagh  ;  and  that  when  they  had 
done  so,  the  capture  of  the  rest  of  the  city  would  not 
be  difficult,  while  our  prestige  would  undoubtedly  be 
injured  by  withdrawal.  On  the  other  hand  it  was 
said  that  the  force  then  at  Lucknow  could  hardly 
have  maintained  its  position  without  neglecting 
military  operations  of  greater  importance  elsewhere, 
besides  which,  the  mutineers  of  the  city  could  be  held 
in  check  by  a  force  stationed  at  the  Alambagh. 
General  Outram  was  of  opinion  that  an  attack  should 
be  made  on  the  Kaisar  Bagh,  after  which  two  Bri- 
gades, he  thought,  of  600  men  would  suffice  to  hold 
the  city.  Sir  Colin  Campbell  was  convinced  that 
four  Brigades  would  be  necessary  for  this  duty.     He 


76  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

held  moreover  that  to  lock  up  another  garrison  in 
the  city  would  be  only  repeating  a  military  error. 
The  only  proper  way  of  holding  Lucknow,  in  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chiefs opinion,  was  to  have  a  strong  move- 
able column,  in  a  good  military  position  outside  the 
city.  Writing  on  December  1 2th,  Lord  Canning  agreed 
with  the  Commander-in-Chief.  By  this  time,  however, 
the  withdrawal  from  Lucknow  had  been  effected. 

On  the  whole  it  must  be  admitted  that  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief had  some  grounds  for  preferring 
a  retrograde  movement,  although  in  India  retreat  is 
generally  followed  by  disaster,  and  in  this  particular 
instance  it  appeared  to  many  to  prolong  unnecessarily 
the  difficult  operations  of  the  Mutiny.  Be  this  as  it 
may,  General  Wyndham's  unfortunate  and  unexpected 
failure  at  Cawnpur  strengthened  the  arguments  in 
favour  of  the  withdrawal ;  while  viewed  merely  as  a 
military  operation,  whether  rightly  or  wrongly  con- 
ceived, that  withdrawal  did  credit  to  all  concerned. 
For  every  member  of  the  garrison,  European  and  na- 
tive, including  the  women  and  children,  was  brought 
away  from  the  Residency  without  the  loss  of  a 
single  life,  and  '  little  was  left  to  the  enemy  but  the 
bare  walls  of  the  Residency  buildings.'  In  the  words 
of  the  Commander-in-Chief,  who  had  charged  Outram 
with  the  execution  of  this  measure,  '  the  movement 
of  the  retreat  was  admirably  executed  and  was  a 
perfect  lesson  in  such  combinations.'  The  whole  force 
was  withdrawn  at  night,  and  reached  the  Dilkusha 
at  daylight  on  the  morning  of  November  23rd.  1857. 


THE  NORTHERN  OPERATIONS  77 

Here  a  great  sorrow  overshadowed  the  success  of  the 
operation.  At  9.30  a.m.  on  November  24,  Sir  Henry 
Havelock,  who  had  been  gradually  sinking  since  his 
arrival  at  the  Dilkusha,  expired,  at  the  age  of  62.  He 
had  lived  just  long  enough  to  see  the  accomplishment 
of  that  for  which  he  had  so  nobly  fought,  and  to  hear 
that  his  services  had  been  appreciated  by  his  Queen 
and  country.  He  had  the  satisfaction,  moreover,  of 
being  tended  during  his  last  moments  by  a  beloved 
son^.  But  far  higher  consolations  than  these  the 
warrior  had,  for  he  had  lived  a  Christian  and  he  died 
a  hero.  His  remains  were  conveyed  to  the  Alambagh 
and  there  interred  with  marked  demonstrations  of 
respect  and  sorrow  on  the  part  of  the  troops. 

On  November  27th,  1857,  leaving  Outram  in  occupa- 
tion of  the  Alambagh  until  he  himself  should  be  able 
to  return  and  finally  expel  the  rebels  from  Lucknow, 
Sir  Colin  Campbell  started  with  the  relieved  garrison 
and  a  force  of  some  3000  men  for  Cawnpur.  Here  he 
found  that  the  rebels,  led  by  Tantia  Topi,  had  ad- 
vanced from  Kalpi,  forty-six  miles  distant,  and  had  not 
only  occupied  all  the  salient  positions  between  that 
place  and  the  Ganges,  but  had  closed  in  upon  General 
Wyndham  and  had  compelled  him  to  fall  back  to  a 
weak  position  near  the  town  with  the  loss  of  both 
camp  and  baggage.     Nothing  could  be  done  till  the 

^  The  present  Sir  Henry  Havelock-Allan,  V.C.  He  was  at  that 
time  suffering  from  a  severe  woimd.  A  gallant  soldier  and  a  good 
son  ;  his  is  a  record  of  service  of  which  any  one  might  be  proud 
even  in  a  period  of  '  heroic  deeds.' 


78  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

Cominander-in-Chief  had  provided  for  the  safety  of 
the  women  and  wounded  whom  he  had  brought  from 
Lucknow ;  but  quickly  getting  the  convoy  across  the 
Ganges,  en  route  for  Allahabad,  he  attacked  the  rebel 
forces,  and  without  difficulty  drove  them  back  again 
to  Kalpi. 

It  would  be  tedious  as  well  as  inconsistent  with 
the  scope  of  this  volume  to  relate  in  detail  the  further 
events  of  that  period.  It  may  be  said,  however,  that 
after  successful  operations  directed  against  Fatehgarh, 
a  question  arose  as  to  whether  the  subjection  of  Oudh 
or  an  immediate  advance  into  Rohilkhand  should  be 
the  next  move.  Lord  Canning  advocated  the  former 
course,  and  Sir  Colin  Campbell  the  latter.  The  views 
of  the  Governor- General  prevailed,  and  were  loyally 
carried  out  by  the  Commander-in-Chief.  But  the 
progress  made  was  slow  and  became  very  trying  to  the 
army.  From  one  cause  or  another  valuable  time  was 
lost,  and  the  few  precious  months  of  the  cold  weather 
were  allowed  to  slip  away  almost  unawares.  There 
was  still  a  tendency,  from  causes  which  no  one  could 
fathom,  but  from  which  all  caught  a  certain  contagion, 
to  assemble  large  bodies  of  troops^  and  to  move  about 
unwieldy  brigades,  charged  with  orders  to  risk 
nothing  and  to  act  '  according  to  the  rules  of  war.' 

The  mutineers  took  advantage  of  these  tactics  to 
spread  themselves  over  the  country  and  defy  the 
*  bull-dogs  who  were  unable  to  catch  jackals,'  while 
all  this  time  the  rebels  left  unmolested  in  Lucknow 
had  ample  leisure  to  devote  their  energies  to  the  task 


THE  NORTHERN  OPERATIONS  79 

of  strengthening  their  position.  This  they  did  by- 
defending  it  with  three  strong  ramparts,  mounted  with 
about  1 30  guns  and  mortars,  besides  erecting  bastions, 
barricades  and  loop-holed  walls  to  command  the 
streets.  The  first  line  of  defence  consisted  of  a 
battery  of  heavy  guns  and  other  formidable  works  ;  the 
second  of  bastioned  ramparts  and  parapets,  while  the 
third  or  inner  line  covered  the  front  of  the  Kaisar 
Bagh.  Fortunately  the  rebel  garrison  neglected  to 
provide  for  the  defence  of  the  northern  side  of  the 
position,  and  of  this  neglect  Sir  Colin  Campbell 
took  full  advantage  when  he  finally  captured  the 
city. 

In  a  letter  to  Sir  Hugh  Rose,  dated  Cawnpur,  Feb. 
28th,  1858,  after  congratulating  him  on  the  success 
that  had  attended  his  operations  in  Central  India,  the 
Commander-in-Chief  said  : — '  I  have  been  detained 
here,  by  desire  of  the  Governor-General,  very  much 
longer  than  was  convenient  with  reference  to  the 
service  we  are  about  to  commence,  to  enable  Jang 
Bahadur  to  join  and  take  part  in  the  siege  of  Luck- 
now.  .  .  My  siege  train  will  be  collected  by  to-morrow 
at  Bantira,  about  six  miles  from  Alambagh,  my  own 
troops  will  be  assembled  in  that  neighbourhood  on 
the  1  st  proximo,  and  if  Brigadier  Franks  should  make 
his  appearance  about  the  4th,  I  hope  to  begin  to  break 
ground  the  same  night  or  following  day.  The  place 
has  been  gTeatly  strengthened  since  I  was  there  in 
November,  but  I  hope  to  reduce  it  speedily ;  for  the 
weather  is  getting  hot,  and  the  heat  will  destroy  and 


8o  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

render  ineffective  more  men  than  even  the  fire  of  the 
enemy.  Until  the  place  falls  I  cannot  give  you  any 
assistance  in  troops.  I  am  told  the  71st  Highlanders 
are  on  their  way  from  Bombay  by  bullock  train  to 
Mhow.  If  they  should  be  required  to  march  through 
Central  India  after  arrival  at  Mhow  they  will  lose 
many  men.  The  mutineers  at  Kalpi  are  threatening 
to  cross  the  Jumna  into  this  Doab  the  moment  I 
advance  towards  Lucknow.  I  cannot  afford  to  leave 
the  force  that  would  be  sufficient  for  the  protection  of 
the  Doab_,  and  it  must  therefore  take  its  chance,  as 
well  as  Cawnpur,  which  may  be  again  occupied  by  the 
enemy,  until  I  have  disposed  of  Lucknow.' 

Lucknow  was  at  length  captured  in  March,  1858. 
Early  in  the  month  the  Commander-in-Chief  with  a 
force  amounting  in  the  aggregate  to  some  31,000  men 
and  180  guns  moved  on  the  Dilkiisha,  which  he 
occupied  with  but  slight  opposition.  The  task  of 
operating  separately  from  the  left  or  northern  bank 
of  the  Giimti  had  been  confided  to  Outram,  who 
crossed  the  river  and  took  up  a  position  three  miles 
to  the  north  of  the  city.  Under  the  orders  of  the 
Commander-in-Chief,  Outram  was  to  take  the  rebel 
position  in  reverse,  enfilading  it  with  a  heavy  fire 
from  the  left  bank  of  the  river,  while  Sir  Colin  Camp- 
bell was  to  move  directly  on  the  city.  On  March  nth 
our  Nepalese  ally,  Jang  Bahadur,  after  long  delays, 
joined  the  British  force  with  about  9000  men  and  24 
guns.  On  the  same  day  the  Begam's  Palace  was 
captured  with  but  slight  loss  to  the  besieging  force, 


THE  NORTHERN  OPERATIONS  8i 

although  all  mourned  the  fiery  Hodson  ^,  who  here 
fell  mortally  wounded,  shot  by  an  unseen  foe,  whilst 
he  and  others  were  searching  in  the  Palace  for  lurking 
rebels.  On  this  day  also  the  Secundra  Bagh,  the 
Shah  Najaf,  and  other  strongholds  of  the  enemy,  fell 
into  our  hands.  At  length  on  March  14th,  1858,  when 
the  Engineers  under  the  gallant  Napier  had  completed 
their  dangerous  work  of  sapping  through  the  houses 
in  the  line  of  the  enemy's  fire.  General  Franks  was 
ordered  to  attack  the  Kaisar  Bagh  and  Imambara. 
These  buildings  were  rightly  considered  to  be  the 
keystones  of  the  enemy's  position,  and  they  were 
stormed  with  such  vigour  and  success  that  before 
night  Lucknow  had  virtually  fallen  into  our  hands. 

In  this  operation  the  20th  Regiment,  now  the  Lan- 
cashire Fusileers  (supported  by  some  companies  of 
the  38th  Regiment),  bore  an  honourable  part.  In  a 
desperate  hand  to  hand  struggle  a  strong  position 
called  the  Engine-house  was  taken  by  these  gallant 
men  under  Major  (now  Sir  Pollexfen)  Radcliffe,  with 
a  loss  to  the  enemy  of  some  350  men.  The  fact 
deserves  special  mention,  since  for  some  unaccountable 
reason  this  and  other  services  were  left  unnoticed  in 
public  despatches,  and  some  surprise  was  felt  in  the 
army  at  the  omission  ^.     The  20th  Regiment  had  the 

^  'The  whole  army,'  Sir  Colin  wrote  to  Hodson's  widow, 
'which  admired  his  talents,  his  bravery,  and  his  military  skill, 
deplored  his  loss,  and  sympathised  with  her  in  her  irreparable 
bereavement.' 

^  It  was  characteristic  of  Sir  Colin  Campbell  that  here  and 
elsewhere,  while  drawing  special  attention  to  the  service  of  High- 

F 


So,  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

satisfaction  of  remembering  that  it  had  previously 
marched  up  country  as  a  part  of  General  Franks's 
force,  which  in  thirteen  days  had  covered  a  long 
distance,  beaten  a  superior  enemy  in  four  actions,  and 
taken  34  guns.  It  performed  admirable  service  after 
the  siege  in  various  parts  of  Oudh  in  frequent  opera- 
tions against  the  rebels  up  to  November,  1859. 

By  March  21st,  1858,  the  city  of  Lucknow  itself, 
after  a  series  of  desultory  fights,  was  completely  in 
our  hands.  '  It  was  late  in  the  evening,'  wrote  Dr. 
Kussell,  the  Times  correspondent,  '  when  we  returned 
to  camp  through  roads  thronged  with  at  least  20,000 
camp  followers  all  staggering  under  loads  of  plunder — 
the  most  extraordinary  and  indescribable  spectacle 
I  ever  beheld.  Coolies,  Syces,  Kitmutgars,  Dooli 
bearers.  Grass-cutters,  a  flood  of  men  covered  with 
clothing  not  their  own,  carrying  on  head  and  shoulders 
looking-glasses,  mirrors,  pictures,  brass  pots,  swords, 
firelocks,  rich  shawls,  scarves,  embroidered  dresses, 
all  the  loot  of  ransacked  palaces.  The  noise,  the 
dust,  the  shouting,  the  excitement,  were  almost 
beyond  endurance.  Lucknow  was  borne  away  piece- 
meal to  camp,  and  the  wild  Gurkhas  and  Sikhs,  with 
open  mouths  and  glaring  eyes,  burning  with  haste 
to  get  rich,  were  contending  fiercely  against  the  current 
as  they  sought  to  get  to  the  sources  of  such  unexpected 
wealth.' 

land  regiments,  he  left  others,  which  did  equally  good  work, 
unnoticed.  Few,  however,  grudged  the  honour  done  to  the  High- 
landers, for  they  always  behaved  splendidly. 


THE  NORTHERN  OPERATIONS  83 

Amidst  all  this  excitement  and  jubilation  much 
regret  was  felt  at  the  escape  of  the  greater  part  of  the 
rebels  across  the  river  Gumti.  That  Outram  desired 
to  cross  over  the  river  from  the  northern  to  the 
southern  bank  by  the  famous  Iron  Bridge  on  March 
14th,  to  complete  the  effect  of  the  capture  of  the  Kaisar 
Bagh  by  a  crushing  rear  attack  on  the  rebels  in 
the  city,  is  a  matter  of  history.  But  this  move  was 
not  permitted,  for  General  Outram  was  forbidden  to 
act  if  he  thought  that  by  so  doing  he  would  '  lose  a 
single  man  ; '  and  thus  a  great  chance  was  thrown 
away.  This  lost  opportunity,  followed  by  failure  a 
few  days  later  on  the  part  of  the  cavalry  in  the  pur- 
suit of  further  bands  of  the  flying  enemy,  prevented 
the  fall  of  Lucknow  from  proving  the  final  and  crush- 
ing blow  to  the  rebels  that  it  ought  to  have  been. 

Instead  of  securing  the  virtual  pacification  of  Oudh 
at  one  stroke,  'it  left  the  province  swarming  with 
armed  rebels  still  capable  of  resistance  ; '  although 
after  the  preparations,  delays,  and  large  number  of 
troops  employed,  every  one  expected,  with  some  show 
of  reason,  the  annihilation  of  the  enemy  as  an  armed 
and  organised  body.  As  it  turned  out,  the  rebels  who 
escaped  on  the  14th  and  again  on  the  21st  of  March 
were  the  very  men  who  fell  back  on  the  forts  and 
strongholds  of  Oudh  and  Rohilkhand,  there  to  renew 
the  resistance  which  had  so  hopelessly  broken  down 
in  the  capital.  The  '  saving  of  life,'  however  well 
intended  on  Sir  Colin  Campbell's  part,  did  not  always 
fulfil  his  anticipations,  and  proved  the  cause,  both  now 

F  2 


84  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

and  at  other  times,  of  unnecessary  and  prolonged 
operations,  and  too  often  of  losses  to  worn-out  troops 
from  exposure  and  disease. 

Such  was  the  termination  of  the  series  of  operations 
before  Lucknow,  which  lasted  about  twenty  days,  with 
a  loss  of  19  officers  and  608  men  killed,  wounded,  and 
missing.  By  the  end  of  March  the  British  army  was 
broken  up,  and  a  complete  redistribution  was  effected. 
It  had  been  intended  by  the  Viceroy  that  the  re- 
conquest  of  Rohilkhand  should  follow  the  re-taking 
of  Lucknow,  and  the  hoped-for  capture  of  its  rebel 
garrison  ;  but  the  plan  of  the  campaign  was  now  neces- 
sarily changed.  Immediate  action  of  some  kind  was 
requisite  on  account  of  the  escape  of  the  rebels.  The 
Commander-in-Chief  was  anxious  to  restrict  operations 
for  the  moment  to  the  clearing  of  the  country  around 
Lucknow.  He  desired  to  postpone  an  advance  into 
Rohilkhand  till  the  autumn.  But  Lord  Canning 
would  not  hear  of  this  ;  and  indeed  it  seemed  impos- 
sible to  remain  thus  inactive  without  considerable  risk. 

Immediate  action,  both  in  Rohilkhand  and  in  Oudh, 
was  therefore  resolved  on  ;  and  as  the  rapid  movements 
of  Sir  Hugh  Rose  in  Central  India  during  the  period 
culminating  in  the  capture  of  Jhansi,  in  April,  had 
freed  the  Commander-in-Chief  from  any  special 
anxiety  in  that  direction,  he  was  enabled  to  turn  his 
individual  attention  to  those  two  provinces.  Though 
disorganised,  and  to  some  extent  demoralised,  the 
rebels  were  resolved  not  to  surrender  at  discretion, 
and  it  became  imperative  that  no  time  should  be  lost 


THE  NORTHERN  OPERATIONS  85 

in  following  them  up.  By  insisting  that  this 
should  be  done  Lord  Canning  once  more  displayed 
a  military  knowledge  and  instinct  of  which  few  at 
that  time  were  aware.  Three  columns,  under  Bri- 
gadiers Walpole,  Penny,  and  Jones,  were  ordered  to 
penetrate  Bohilkhand  from  different  points,  supported 
by  a  fourth  column  under  Colonel  Seaton,  who  had 
been  protecting  the  country  around  Fatehgarh.  All 
four  columns  were  to  converge  upon  Bareilly,  where, 
it  was  hoped,  the  main  body  of  the  rebels  under 
Khan  Bahadur  Khan  would  be  met,  defeated,  and 
captured. 

Leaving  Oudh  for  the  moment  to  take  care  of  itself, 
the  Commander-in-Chief  quitted  Lucknow,  April  7th, 
1858,  four  days  after  Sir  Hugh  Kose  had  stormed 
and  taken  Jhansi.  Joining  Walpole's  brigade,  which 
(with  the  exception  of  an  unfortunate  reverse  at 
Ruyah,  when  Adrian  Hope  was  killed)  had  done  well, 
the  Commander-in-Chief  pushed  on  with  a  force 
amounting  to  about  7500  men  and  19  guns  to  Ba- 
reilly. On  May  the  4th  he  was  close  to  the  place. 
Khan  Bahadur  Khan,  alive  to  his  danger,  determined 
to  show  a  bold  front.  Between  the  town  and  the 
Commander-in-Chief's  force  ran  a  stream,  which  the 
rebel  leader  crossed  with  the  first  line  of  his  troops, 
leaving  the  second  line  to  defend  the  cantonments 
and  the  town.  Early  the  next  morning  Sir  Colin 
Campbell  moved  forward,  and  after  an  action  which 
lasted  six  hours,  under  a  hot  sun,  practically  gained 
possession  of  this  position.     With  his  usual  solicitude 


86  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

for  his  wearied  troops  he  allowed  them  to  halt  in  the 
hope  of  completing  his  victory  on  the  next  day. 
But  during  the  night  Khan  Bahadur  Khan  evacuated 
the  town  with  the  greater  part  of  his  army. 

Thus  that  portion  of  the  rebel  garrison  which 
had  escaped  from  Lucknow  into  Bohilkhand  got  back 
again  into  Oudh;  and  in  this  way  the  termination  of 
the  Kohilkhand  campaign  was  not  more  satisfactory 
than  the  result  of  the  operations  in  Oudh.  Once 
more  this  latter  province  claimed  the  attention  of 
the  military  authorities,  and  for  many  months  to  come 
it  was  the  scene  of  extended  movements .  under  the 
supervision  of  the  Commander-in-Chief  himself  Beach- 
ing Fatehgarh  on  May  25th,  1858,  Sir  Colin  Campbell 
remained  there  till  June  5th,  while  Brigadier  Lugard 
and  others  had  meanwhile  been  eno-ao-ed  under  his 
orders  in  clearing  Behar  of  rebel  bands ;  the  opera- 
tions resulting  in  the  death  of  Koer  Singh,  one  of 
the  ablest  of  their  leaders^  and  the  gradual  pacifica- 
tion of  the  province.  A  notable  incident  in  these 
operations  was  the  relief  of  Azamgarh,  on  the  6th 
April,  1858,  by  Colonel  (now  General)  Lord  Mark 
Kerr,  who,  with  the  headquarters  of  the  13th  Light 
Infantry,  a  troop  of  cavalry,  and  two  guns,  forced 
his  way  through,  and  defeated,  an  ambuscade  of 
many  thousand  Sepoys  under  Koer  Singh. 

Sir  Colin  Campbell  now  considered  that  the  British 
troops  in  Oudh  should  remain  on  the  defensive  until 
the  return  of  the  cold  weather ;  but  being  continually 
harassed  by  small  bands  of  rebels  they  were  kept  in 


THE  NORTHERN  OPERATIONS  87 

incessant  movement.  What  was  done  in  Rohilkhand 
with  two  brigades  required,  in  the  Commander-in- 
Chiefs  opinion,  six  brigades  in  Oudh,  independent  of 
the  garrison  of  Lucknow.  A  large  force,  moreover, 
of  military  police  was  raised  to  assist  the  troops ; 
w^hile  ari-angements  were  made  to  move  the  various 
detachments  on  a  general  plan  and  with  one  common 
object.  This  object  was  an  advance  into  Oudh  from 
two  points  simultaneously  ;  that  is  to  sa}^,  from  the 
frontier  of  Rohilkhand  in  order  to  drive  the  rebels 
in  a  north-east  direction  towards  the  Rapti  river, 
and  at  the  same  time  from  the  south-east  agfainst 
the  districts  situated  south  of  Lucknow  between  the 
Ganges  and  the  Gogra. 

By  the  end  of  October,  1858,  the  two  columns  had 
reached  their  respective  positions,  and  were  enabled 
to  establish  the  civil  power  as  they  advanced,  while 
pushing  the  rebels  northwards  into  Nepal.  Thus  the 
Commander-in-Chief  moved  northwards  from  Lucknow 
with  a  force  acting  in  concert  with  the  troops  under 
Hope  Grant.  The  Nana  and  his  brother  Bala  Rao, 
flying  from  the  pursuit,  escaped  eventually  into  Nepal 
with  many  thousand  Sepoys.  Sir  Hope  Grant  was  then 
left  in  Oudh  with  instructions  to  watch  matters  on 
this  frontier,  while  Sir  Colin  Campbell,  glad  of  rest, 
rejoined  the  Governor-General  at  Simla. 

The  series  of  petty  although  harassing  operations 
which  were  carried  on  in  Oudh  and  Rohilkhand  at 
this  period,  although  very  creditably  performed  by  our 
troops,  need  only  be  lightly  touched  upon.     To  trace 


88  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

in  detail  the  work  of  the  detached  columns  ^  would  be 
tiresome  and  superfluous.  Nevertheless  the  duty  was 
most  arduous  and  trying.  The  courage  of  the  officers 
and  the  endurance  of  the  men  were  more  severely 
tested  in  these  minor  operations  than  in  the  greater 
achievements  of  the  campaign.  The  march  of  each 
column  and  the  commencement  of  each  attack  was 
guided  from  headquarters,  and  watched  with  vigi- 
lance and  solicitude.  As  the  different  commanders 
depended  one  upon  another  their  movements  were 
ordered  and  arranged  accordingly,  so  that  while  the 
number  of  small  affairs  was  considerable,  on  no 
occasion  was  a  particular  Commander  under  the 
necessity  of  fighting  against  odds  which  he  could  not 
easily  overcome.  Sometimes,  however,  during  this 
anxious  period,  in  which  the  behaviour  of  the  troops, 
both  British  and  native,  was  all  that  could  be  desired, 
the  various  columns  halted,  occasionally  for  weeks, 
while  the  enemy  escaped  or  reformed  in  new  positions. 
Nor  was  it  until  November,  1 859,  that  the  last  body  of 
rebels  in  Northern  Oudh,  to  the  number  of  about  4000 
men,  surrendered  to  a  force  mainly  composed  of  the 
20th  Eegiment  under  Brigadier  (now  Sir  Edward) 
Holdich.  One  of  the  more  prominent  leaders  here 
taken  was  Jawala  Parshad  (the  Nana's  principal 
adviser  at  the  Cawnpur  massacre),  who,  before  being 

*  Brigadier  Evelegli's  column  was  specially  noted  at  the  time 
for  its  rapid  and  successful  movements,  and  for  the  able  manner 
in  which  the  Brigadier  directed  its  operations  and  taught  selected 
men  of  the  column  to  act  as  mounted  infantry  and  to  become 
practised  artillery  men. 


THE  NORTHERN  OPERATIONS  89 

executed,  named  to  the  writer  of  this  volume  the  place 
where  the  Nana  was  hiding  in  Nepal. 

With  this  brief  sketch  of  the  operations  in 
Northern  India  we  leave  Sir  Colin  Campbell  and  his 
gallant  troops  in  order  to  review  those  movements 
which  had  been  carried  out,  during  some  part  of  the 
same  period,  southwards  in  Central  India.  It  only- 
remains  to  say  that  Sir  Colin  Campbell,  after  staying 
in  India  long  enough  to  see  the  embers  of  the  great 
Sepoy  revolt  smoulder  away,  left  Calcutta  on  June 
4th,  i860.  He  had  been  raised  to  the  peerage  for  his 
services  in  India,  and  as  Field-Marshal  Lord  Clyde 
died  at  Chatham  on  August  14th,  1863,  generally 
beloved  and  regretted.  On  the  stone  that  marks  the 
spot  where  he  lies  in  Westminster  Abbey  he  is 
worthily  named  as  one  'who  by  his  own  deserts 
through  fifty  years  of  arduous  service,  from  the  earliest 
battles  of  the  Peninsular  War  to  the  pacification  of 
India  in  1858,  rose  to  the  rank  of  Field-Marshal  and 
the  peerage.  He  died  lamented  by  the  Queen,  the 
Army,  and  the  people,  on  the  14th  of  August,  1863, 
in  the  71st  year  of  his  age.' 


CHAPTER  VI 

The  Southekn  Operations  to  the  Fall  of 
Jhansi 

'In  five  months,  the  Central  India  Field  Force 
traversed  1085  miles,  crossed  numerous  large  rivers, 
took  upwards  of  150  pieces  of  artillery,  one  en- 
trenched camp,  two  fortified  cities  and  two  fortresses 
all  strongly  defended,  fought  sixteen  actions,  captured 
twenty  forts  ;  and  never  sustained  a  check  against 
the  most  warlike  and  determined  enemy,  led  by  most 
capable  commanders  then  to  be  found  in  any  part  of 
India  1/ 

Were  it  possible  to  follow  the  example  of  Gibbon, 
who  summarised  in  half  a  dozen  lines  a  campaign 
that  extended  from  Gaul  to  Constantinople,  the  above 
sentence  would  be  a  sufficient  record  of  the  operations 
in  Central  or  Southern  India  under  Sir  Hugh  Rose. 
But  a  somewhat  fuller  account,  taken  in  great  part 
from  Sir  Hugh  Rosens  own  correspondence,  will  be 
more  in  consonance  with  the  object  of  the  present 
volume,  and  may  not  be  without  interest  for  the 
general   reader,   even    though  the   story  has  ah-eady 

^  Earl  of  Derby's  speech,  House  of  Lords,  April  19th,  1859. 


^\  % 


/»    '^-tC^      \/^.<^1.jt. 


UNIVERSITY 


■} 


THE  SOUTHERN  OPERATIONS  91 

been  graphically  told  by  Colonel  Malleson  and  other 
writers. 

Hugh  Henry  Kose  was  born  at  Berlin  on  the  6th 
of  April,  1801.  He  was  a  son  of  Sii*  George  Rose, 
G.C.B.,  then  Minister  Plenipotentiary  at  the  Prussian 
Court;  and  it  was  at  Berlin  that  he  acquired  the 
rudiments  of  a  military  education.  Entering  the 
British  Army  in  1820,  he  quickly  rose  in  his  pro- 
fession ;  obtaining  his  majority  within  a  few  years,  in 
recognition  of  the  tact  and  intelligence  with  which  he 
performed  responsible  duties  in  Ireland  during  the 
Ribbon  and  Tithe  disturbances.  At  a  later  period, 
when  at  Malta,  in  command  of  the  92nd  Highlanders, 
he  gained  high  praise  from  his  superior  officers,  not 
only  for  his  military  qualifications,  but  also  for 
courage  and  humanity  during  an  outbreak  of  cholera 
among  the  troops.  He  had  visited  every  man  of  his 
regiment  who  fell  ill,  and  encouraged  all  around  him 
by  his  activity  and  cheerfulness. 

In  1 84 1,  when  serving  on  special  duty  with  Omar 
Pasha''s  Brigade  in  Syria,  during  the  operations 
against  Mehemet  Ali  and  the  Egyptian  Army,  he 
greatly  distinguished  himself  in  the  field.  On  one 
occasion,  during  a  reconnaissance  in  the  neighbour- 
hood of  Ascalon,  he  put  himself  at  the  head  of  a 
regiment  of  Arab  cavalry,  successfully  routed  the 
Egyptian  advanced  guard,  and  thus  saved  Omar 
Pasha  from  a  surprise  which  might  have  entailed 
heavy  loss.  For  this  and  other  services,  besides  re- 
ceiving a  sword  of  honour  and  the  Nialian  Iftihar 


92  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

from  the  Sultan,  he  was  made  a  Companion  of  the 
Bath.  He  was  also  allowed  to  accept  the  Cross  of 
St.  John  of  Jerusalem,  which  Frederick  William  of 
Prussia  presented  to  his  '  former  young  friend '  for  his 
gallant  conduct. 

Soon  after  these  events,  Colonel  Rose  was  appointed 
British  Consul-General  in  Syria.  The  position  of 
affaii's  in  the  Lebanon  was  exceedingly  complicated. 
The  French  and  Egyptians  still  remembered  that 
Syria  had  once  been  theirs  ;  the  Christian  Maronites 
and  Muhammadan  Druses  were  still  divided  by  their 
hereditary  feuds.  Local  disturbance  culminated  in 
civil  war  ;  and  during  these  troubles  Colonel  Rose 
displayed  his  accustomed  coolness  and  indifference  to 
personal  danger.  On  one  occasion,  in  1841,  when  he 
found  the  Maronites  and  Druses  drawn  up  in  two 
lines,  and  firing  at  each  other,  he  rode  between  them, 
at  imminent  risk  to  his  life,  and  by  the  sheer  force  of 
a  stronger  will  stopped  the  conflict.  At  another  time 
he  proceeded  by  himself — after  all  the  consular 
officers  of  the  other  Powers  had  declined  to  move — to  a 
district  where  civil  war  was  actually  raging  ;  and  by 
his  personal  influence  saved  the  lives  of  some  700 
Christians,  whom  he  conducted  in  safety,  after  a  long 
and  arduous  journey,  to  Beyrout ;  lending  his  own 
horse  to  the  way-worn  women  while  he  himself  went 
on  foot. 

At  a  subsequent  period  during  which  cholera  raged 
with  great  fury  in  Beyrout,  when,  to  use  the  words  of 
an  address  presented  to  him  by  grateful  eye-witnesses. 


THE  SOUTHERN  OPERATIONS  93 

'the  terror-stricken  Christian  population  abandoned 
their  houses  and  tied  to  the  country ' — he  alone  of  all 
the  Europeans,  with  the  exception  of  one  medical 
otficer  and  some  sisters  of  charity,  remained  behind 
to  visit  the  huts  of  the  diseased  and  dying,  'Language 
faintly  conveys,'  says  the  address,  'the  impression 
created  by  conduct  so  generous  and  humane  ;  but  the 
remembrance  of  it  will  never  be  effaced  from  the 
hearts  of  those  who  were  the  objects  of  such  kindness, 
nor  will  such  devotion  easily  be  forgotten  by  those 
who  witnessed  it.' 

In  recognition  of  his  services  in  Syria,  Lord  Pal- 
merston  appointed  Colonel  Kose  in  January,  1851, 
to  be  Secretary  of  Embassy  at  Constantinople.  Two 
years  afterwards,  when  acting  as  Charge  cV Affaires 
in  Lord  Stratford  de  RedclifFe's  absence,  he  completely 
baffled  the  intrigues  of  the  Russian  envoy,  Prince 
Menschikoff. 

Sir  Hugh  Rose's  own  account  of  the  incident  was 
as  follows.  Early  one  morning  he  received  an  urgent 
message  from  the  Turkish  Minister  for  Foreio-n 
Aflfairs,  requesting  his  immediate  attendance  at  the 
Porte  on  a  matter  of  importance.  On  meeting  the 
Minister  and  the  Grand  Vizier  he  learnt  that  they 
had  just  received  a  demand  from  Prince  Menschikoff, 
requiring  that  the  Sultan  should  sign  a  Secret  Treaty, 
vesting  in  Russia  the  protection  of  all  Christians  in 
Turkey.  Such  a  demand,  the  Grand  Vizier  said,  was 
completely  subversive  of  the  sovereign  rights  of  the 
Porte,  and   totally  opposed  to   the   policy  to    which 


94  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

England  and  the  other  five  Powers,  including  Russia 
herself,  were  pledged, — they  having  signed  treaties 
guaranteeing  the  Sultan's  independence  and  the 
integrity  of  his  dominions.  In  these  circumstances, 
the  Grand  Vizier  wished  to  know  what  Colonel  Rose 
was  prepared  to  do,  as  agent  for  Her  Majesty's 
Government,  to  assist  the  Porte.  He  replied  that 
it  was  for  the  Porte  to  specify  the  assistance  re- 
quired, but  that  he  would  immediately  send  off  an 
express  message  to  Belgrade  or  Vienna,  or  a  steamer 
to  Malta,  with  the  intelligence  to  Her  Majesty's 
Government. 

'  Oh,'  replied  the  Grand  Vizier,  '  special  messengers 
and  steamers  are  too  late.  We  must  sign  the  Secret 
Treaty  by  sunset  this  evening,  or  Prince  Menschikoff 
will  demand  his  passports.  We  wish  to  see  the 
British  Fleet  in  Turkish  waters.' 

Colonel  Rose  rejoined  that  as  Charge  cV Affaires  he 
had  no  right  to  demand  the  appearance  of  Admiral 
Dundas  and  his  Fleet  in  Turkish  waters ;  his  powers 
only  allowed  him  to  point  out  to  the  Admiral,  as 
quickly  as  possible,  the  gravity  of  the  situation  at 
Constantinople,  and  the  serious  responsibility  which 
would  devolve  on  him  were  he  to  decline  to  appear, 
as  requested,  with  the  Fleet.  The  Grand  Vizier  ob- 
served that  the  Sultan's  Ministers  would  be  quite 
satisfied  if  Colonel  Rose  wrote  a  letter  to  the  Admiral 
in  that  sense,  and  to  this  the  Charge  cT Affaires  as- 
sented ^. 

^  The  letter  was  dated  March  8th,  1853,    Admiral  Dundas,  on  the 


THE  SOUTHERN  OPERATIONS  95 

Not  long  after  sunset,  the  Porte's  chief  Dragoman 
came  to  Colonel  Rose  at  Therapia  to  inform  him  that 
Prince  MenschikofF  had  presented  his  demand  for 
their  signature  of  the  treaty,  and  that  they  had 
refused  it.  The  despatch  sent  to  Admiral  Dundas, 
though  not  acted  on,  had  gained  its  object. 

On  the  outbreak  of  the  war  with  Russia  in  the 
following  year  Colonel  Rose  was  appointed  Queen's 
Commissioner  at  the  headquarters  of  the  French 
Army,  with  the  local  rank  of  Brigadier-General. 

During  the  progress  of  the  campaign  he  was 
repeatedly  thanked  by  the  French  commanders,  and 
was  recommended  by  Marshal  Canrobert  for  the 
Victoria  Cross,  for  conspicuous  gallantry  on  three 
occasions  during  the  siege  of    Sebastopol.     He  had 

14th  idem,  replied  to  the  eifect  that  he  did  not  feel  justified  in 
sending  the  Fleet  up  to  Vourla  without  directions  from  home. 
Suppoi-ted  by  the  opinion  of  Lord  Stratford  de  Eedcliffe,  then  on 
leave  in  England,  Her  Majesty's  Government,  believing  that  Colonel 
Eose  had  acted  hastily,  approved  of  Admiral  Dundas's  refusal. 
Lord  Stratford  himself  seems  to  have  laboured  under  the  erroneous 
impression  that  no  one  knew  how  to  act  at  Constantinople  except 
himself.  He  had  his  own  way  ;  and  hastily  returning  to  that 
place  on  April  5th,  he  commenced  a  series  of  futile  negotiations 
which  ended  in  his  being  himself  compelled  to  summon  the  Fleet, 
on  October  20th  ;  too  late  by  seven  months  for  any  practical 
purpose,  and  too  late,  alas,  to  prevent  the  unfortunate  Crimean 
War,  which  had  then  become  inevitable.  As  Kinglake  has  justly 
said  (^Crimea,  vol.  i,  p.  99),  '  Colonel  Rose  being  a  firm,  able  man, 
was  not  afraid  of  responsibility,  and  was  therefore  not  afraid  to  go 
beyond  the  range  of  common  duty.*  Although  disavowed  by  the 
Government  at  home,  his  mere  consent  to  call  up  the  Fleet  allayed 
the  panic  and  intrigue  which  at  that  moment  was  endangering 
the  very  life  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  ;  and  it  is  as  certain  that  had 
his  wishes  been  attended  to,  there  would  have  been  no  war. 


g6  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

distinguished  himself  both  at  the  Alma  and  at  In- 
kerman.  In  1885  Sir  Kobert  Morier,  now  Her 
Majesty's  Ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg,  told  the 
present  writer  that  he  had  recently  met  the  officer 
who  had  commanded  the  Russian  pickets  along  the 
Inkerman  heights.  This  officer  mentioned,  as  one 
of  the  most  remarkable  incidents  of  the  day,  that  he 
had  seen  through  the  mist  a  tall,  gaunt  figure  riding 
leisurely  down  the  Tchernaya  road  under  a  withering 
fire  from  the  whole  line  of  pickets.  The  horseman 
turned  neither  to  the  right  nor  to  the  left,  nor  could 
the  Russians  hit  him.  Suddenly  they  saw  him  fall 
headlong  with  his  horse.  After  a  few  minutes,  paying 
no  attention  to  the  firing,  the  mysterious  horseman 
got  up,  shook  himself,  patted  his  horse,  and  led  the 
animal  leisurely  back  up  the  road.  The  Russians 
were  so  awe-struck,  that  an  order  was  sent  along  the 
line  to  cease  firing  on  the  man,  who  we  '  afterwards 
learnt/  said  the  Russian  officer,  '  was  Colonel  Rose.' 

Lord  Clarendon  warmly  commended  'the  way  in 
which  Colonel  Rose  maintained  the  best  relations 
with  the  French  Commander-in-Chief  and  his  Staff", 
and  the  advice  he  had  tendered  at  different  times 
in  a  highly  becoming  tone  and  spirit,  in  conformity 
with  the  wishes  and  opinions  of  Her  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment.' For  his  services  in  the  Crimea  he  was  promoted 
to  be  a  Major- General,  was  made  a  Knight  of  the 
Bath,  and  a  Commander  of  the  Legion  of  Honour. 

Such  were  the  antecedents  of  the  man  whose  work 
in  India  we  have  now  to  record.     Ever  at  the  post  of 


THE  SOUTHERN  OPERATIONS  97 

danger,  he  never  spared  himself  or  others.  What 
he  did  was  always  done  courageously  and  thoroughly. 
His  whole  career  was  an  example  of  earnestness  amid 
which  certain  weaknesses  of  temper  and  disposition 
may  well  be  forgotten.  If  at  times  he  seemed  to 
show  too  little  consideration  for  those  immediately 
around  him,  he  was  nevertheless  devoted  to  the  army 
generally.  Any  scheme  for  the  benefit  of  the  soldiers 
invariably  received  support  from  his  pen  and  purse. 
A  strict  military  disciplinarian,  he  was  just  and 
unflinching.  Never  was  there  an  army  equal  to 
the  Central  India  Field  Force,  either  for  fighting 
powers  or  discipline,  when  engaged  in  the  field ;  and 
never  was  the  army  in  India  in  such  order  as  when 
he  commanded  in  chief  ^. 

In  the  field,  the  rebel  Sepoys  of  the  Mutiny  could 
make  nothing  of  the  general  Avho  routed  and  de- 
stroyed them.  His  rapid  marches  and  indomitable 
energy  struck  terror  into  their  hearts.  Who  could 
withstand  a  leader  who — ignoring  all  traditions  of 
ordinary  tactics,  and  spite  of  cautions  and  reproofs 
— regarded  himself  and  his  troops  as  bullet  and  heat- 
proof ?  He  surprised  both  friend  and  foe  by  grasping 
instinctively,  with  the  genius  of  a  born  soldier,  the 
great  principle  of  Indian  warfare,  '  When  your  enemy 
is  in  the  open,  go  straight  at  him,  and  keep  him 
moving ;  and  when  behind  ramparts,  still  go  at  him. 
and  cut  ofi"  chances  of  retreat,  when  possible  ;  pursue 

^  For  fuller  details  see  an  article  on  Lord  Strathnairn  by  Sir 
Owen  Burne,  in  the  Asiatic  Quarterly  Review,  of  January,  1886. 

G 


98  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

him  if  escaping  or  escaped.'  To  his  mind  simplicity 
was  the  first  condition  of  sound  strategy,  more 
especially  in  operations  against  the  armed  mobs  of 
the  Indian  Mutiny.  Complex  combinations  were 
rejected  by  him  because  he  found,  as  others  found, 
that  they  were  unsuitable  to  this  peculiar  warfare. 

His  whole  career  exemplified  the  truth  of  Napoleon's 
favourite  maxim — that  a  General  is  the  head  and 
soul  of  his  army.  It  was  Caesar,  not  the  Roman 
legion,  who  conquered  Gaul.  It  was  Hannibal,  not 
the  Carthaginians,  who  carried  terror  to  the  gates 
of  Rome.  It  was  Alexander,  not  the  Macedonian 
phalanx,  who  found  a  way  to  the  Indus.  It  was 
Turenne,  and  not  the  French,  who  reached  the  Weser 
and  the  Inn.  It  was  Frederick  the  Great,  not 
the  Prussian  army,  who  defended  Prussia  during 
seven  years  against  the  three  chief  Powers  of  Europe. 
In  all  that  Sir  Hugh  Rose  did,  in  or  out  of  the  field 
in  India,  he  inspired  officers  and  men  under  him  to 
be  like  himself.  Every  man  of  his  force  was  a  hero  ; 
and  his  troops  in  Central  India  fought  their  way  to 
victory  with  a  courage  and  devotion  that  threw  many 
other  operations  of  the  Mutiny  comparatively  into 
the  shade.  And  like  Outram  and  Nicholson,  Sir 
Hugh  Rose  showed  that  military  talent  may,  after  all, 
be  sometimes  preserved  under  the  black  coat  of  the 
diplomatist,  and  that  peaceful  avocations  do  not 
necessarily  rust  the  faculties  of  a  true  soldier  ^. 

'  Speaking  of  Sir  Hugh  Rose  two  years  afterwards,  in  the  House 
of  Lords,  the  Duke  of  Cambridge,  who  accorded  him  a  generous 


THE  SOUTHERN  OPERATIONS  99 

But  it  is  time  to  consider  the  part  he  took  in  the 
Indian  Mutiny  Campaign.  After  the  Crimean  War, 
being  desirous  of  serving  in  India,  Major-General  Sir 
Hugh  Rose  was  given  by  the  Duke  of  Cambridge 
a  division  in  the  Bombay  Presidency.  Reaching 
Bombay  on  September  19th,  1857,  ^^  ^^^  shortly 
afterwards  placed  in  command  of  a  field  force,  with 
orders  to  march  through  Central  India  to  Kalpi  and 
'  to  give  a  hand,'  as  it  were,  to  Sir  Colin  Campbell's 
army,  then  operating  on  the  lines  of  the  Jumna  and 
Ganges.  At  this  time  the  whole  of  the  difficult 
country  to  the  north  of  the  Narbada  was  in  the 
hands  of  the  rebels.  The  Gwalior  Continocent  held 
Kalpi ;  the  redoubtable  Rani  of  Jhansi  was  in  undis- 
puted possession  of  the  large  tract  of  country  sur- 
rounding her  fortress ;  while  Tantia  Topi  and  the 
revolted  Gwalior  Contingent  were  close  at  hand  to 
assist  her  in  opposing  the  advance  of  Sir  Hugh  Rose's 
little  force.  In  all  that  part  of  India  the  mass  of  the 
population  had  been  able  for  nearly  twelve  months  to 

encouragement  and  support  in  his  operations  in  the  field,  said  : 
'  Certainly  if  any  officer  ever  performed  acts  of  the  greatest  valour, 
daring,  and  determination,  those  acts  were  performed  by  Sir  Hugh 
Rose.  I  personally  had  an  opportunity  in  the  Crimea  of  seeing 
what  manner  of  man  my  gallant  friend  was,  and  of  what  stuff  he 
was  made  ;  and  I  was  satisfied  at  the  time  that  if  ever  the  right 
occasion  presented  itself,  he  would  be  found  to  distinguish  himself 
in  the  extraordinary  manner  which  he  has  lately  done.  Permit 
me  to  say  that  he  was  at  the  head  of  a  very  small  European  force, 
and  that  a  very  large  proportion  of  the  troops  under  his  command 
were  natives,  regular  Sepoys  ;  and  I  have  reason  to  believe  that 
these  troops  on  all  occasions  conducted  themselves  with  a  valour 
and  bearing  equal  to  that  displayed  by  the  Europeans.' 

G  2 


100  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

do,  without  let  or  hindrance,  whatsoever  was  right  in 
their  own  eyes.  After  the  second  relief  of  Lucknow, 
in  November,  1857,  ^^1  were  encouraged  to  still 
greater  boldness  by  the  lull  in  the  movements  of  the 
Northern  army,  and  by  the  knowledge  that  while  mili- 
tary operations  in  that  direction  had  been  conducted 
in  an  open  country,  those  undertaken  in  Central  India, 
on  the  contrary,  would  have  to  be  carried  on  in  the 
jungles,  ravines,  and  broken  ground  of  the  Vindhya 
range  and  Bundelkhand,  where  the  people,  secure  in 
their  mountain  fastnesses  and  strong  forts,  had  defied 
the  efforts  of  Muhammadan  Emperors  to  subdue  them, 
and  had  not  yet  settled  down  under  British  rule. 

Sir  Hugh  Rose's  force  was  composed  of  two  bri- 
gades ;  the  first  under  Brigadier  Stuart,  of  the  Bombay 
army;  the  second  under  Brigadier  Steuart,  of  the  14th 
Light  Dragoons,  the  whole  amounting  to  about  4500 
men,  of  whom  four  regiments  were  native.  He  had 
many  difficulties  to  contend  with  on  assuming  com- 
mand. Supplies  were,  and  would  be,  scarce ;  and 
there  was  very  little  carriage.  None  of  the  batteries 
of  artillery  were  complete,  either  in  men  or  horses ; 
while  the  siege  artillery  was  altogether  inadequate  for 
the  work  before  it.  In  fact,  there  was  much  to  be 
done  to  fit  the  force  for  the  field ;  but  the  General 
was  not  a  man  to  brook  delay.  Everj'thing  was 
ready  in  an  incredibly  short  space  ;  and  those  who 
had  called  him  a  griff  soon  had  to  confess  that  '  griffs' 
were  sometimes  the  very  best  leaders. 

Having  taken  severe  measures,  with  the  approval 


THE  SOUTHERN  OPERATIONS  loi 

of  Government,  to  punish  revolt  and  restore  order  in 
the  State  of  Indore,  Sir  Hugh  Rose,  early  in  January, 
marched  to  the  relief  of  Sagar.  This  duty  had 
been  assigned  to  the  Madras  Column  under  Bri- 
gradier  Whitlock  ;  but  the  Madras  Column  was  hope- 
lessly in  the  rear,  and  could  not  reach  its  objective 
under  two  months,  while  on  the  other  hand  the 
situation  at  Sagar  was  extremely  critical.  The 
garrison  of  the  fort  was  composed  of  one  weak 
company  of  European  Artillery  and  about  forty  officers 
of  the  covenanted  and  uncovenanted  services.  To 
this  handful  of  men  was  entrusted  the  protection  of 
a  large  arsenal  and  the  lives  of  some  170  European 
women  and  children.  In  the  cantonments  were  1000 
Bengal  Sepoys  and  about  100  irregular  cavalry. 
Though  mistrusted  by  the  authorities  and  not  allowed 
to  take  up  any  duties  inside  the  fort,  the  Sepoys  had 
so  far  behaved  well.  But  a  large  body  of  mutineers 
were  moving  towards  the  cantonment  with  a  view 
of  attacking  it,  and  unless  help  should  arrive  quickly 
a  disaster  was  inevitable.  In  response,  therefore,  to 
the  urgent  appeals  of  the  civil  and  military  authorities 
of  the  district,  Sir  Hugh  Rose  moved  rapidly  forward 
with  a  portion  of  his  force  and  reached  Sagar  from 
Indore  in  34  days,  after  taking  the  Fort  of  Rathgarh 
on  the  way. 

The  Fort  of  Rathgarh,  24  miles  from  Sagar,  was 
garrisoned  by  Valaitis  (Afghan  mercenaries)  and 
Pathans,  as  warlike  as  they  were  desperate.  It 
was  hardly  less  formidable  than  the  famed  strong- 


I02  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

hold  of  Miiltan.  The  east  and  south  faces  were 
almost  perpendicular,  the  rock  being  scarped  and 
strengthened  by  a  deep,  rapid  river,  running  close 
beneath  the  walls  from  east  to  west  ^.  Here  for 
four  days,  without  a  relief  of  guards,  the  British 
troops  defended  their  camp  against  a  numerous  enemy 
on  their  flanks  and  rear  ;  while  they  attacked  the 
fortress  in  their  front.  On  the  night  before  the  pro- 
jected assault,  the  rebel  garrison,  dispirited  by  the 
loss  of  Muhammad  Fazl  Khan  and  other  leaders  of 
note,  evacuated  the  place  by  an  ancient  sally-port. 
They  were  hotly  pursued,  and  a  considerable  number 
were  taken  prisoners. 

About  15  miles  or  so  from  Kathgarh  was  Barodia,  a 
strong  village  surrounded  by  dense  jungle.  Here  the 
rebels  concentrated  under  the  Raja  of  Banpur,  one 
of  the  most  determined  leaders  of  the  Mutiny.  It 
was  necessary  to  attack  him  at  once,  and  this  opera- 
tion was  successfully  carried  out  on  January  30th 
after  a  forced  march.  The  enemy  made  a  determined 
resistance  and  lost  some  500  men.  The  loss  on  the 
British  side  included  both  officers  and  men  killed 
and  wounded.  Among  the  officers  killed  was  Captain 
Neville  ^,  R.E.,  who  was  hit  by  a  round  shot  as  he 
was  speaking  to  the  General. 

1  In  1810,  the  Maharaja  Sindhia,  -with  a  force  at  least  four  times 
as  strong  as  that  under  Sir  Hugh  Kose,  only  took  Rathgarh  after  a 
siege  of  seven  months. 

^  This  officer  had  been  seventy  times  in  the  trenches  before 
Sebastopol  without  being  touched.  He  had  passed  the  previous 
night  in  writing  a  letter  to  his  mother  expressing  the  certainty  he 


THE  SOUTHERN  OPERATIONS  103 

The  immediate  result  of  these  successes  was  the 
relief  of  Sagar  on  February  3rd,  1858,  after  the  place 
had  been  invested  by  the  rebels  for  upwards  of  seven 
months.  One  of  the  besieged  garrison,  writing  on  that 
day,  said — '  Sagar  was  relieved  this  morning  by  the 
force  under  Sir  Hugh  Rose.  Who  can  imagine  the 
gladness  that  then  filled  the  hearts  of  the  Europeans, 
shut  up  for  eight  weary  and  anxious  months  ?  For 
many  a  month  and  week  during  this  period  we  heard 
of  relief  being  near,  till  we  grew  sick  with  expecting 
and  watching  for  its  realisation.  It  was  about  eight 
days  ago  that  we  knew  Sir  Hugh  Rose's  force  had 
arrived  in  the  district.  It  heralded  its  approach  by 
the  bombardment  of  Rathgarh,  one  of  the  strono-est 
forts  in  Bundelkhand.  This  bombardment  continued 
for  four  days  and  nights  unintermittingly.  During 
the  last  three  da^^s  it  was  sharp  and  quick,  and  the 
guns  seemed  to  have  been  replaced  by  those  of  heavier 
calibre.  The  rebels  inside  the  fort,  among  whom 
were  some  of  the  most  daring  and  troublesome  leaders, 
could  not  have  had  a  wink  of  sleep  from  this  constant 
booming,  which  was  distinctly  heard  at  Sagar.  But  to 
us  it  brought  sweet  slumbers  and  a  happy  sense  of  ap- 
proaching security.  At  last  to  our  joy  it  was  reported 
that  the  fort  had  been  taken,  and  that  Sir  Hugh 
Rose  was  close  at  hand.  .  .  .  His  troops  marched 
right  through  the  city  of  Sagar  in  a  long  line,  and 
you  can  imagine  the  impression  their  number  made 

felt  of  death  in  the  coining  action  ;  yet  he  pressed  Sir  Hugh  Rose 
with  much  earnestness  to  let  him  act  as  his  A.D.C.  at  Barodia. 


'<0- 


I04  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

on  the  natives  of  the  place.  Such  a  thing  as  a 
European  regiment  had  never  been  seen  in  Sagar, 
and  we  certainly  never  expected  to  see  Her  Majesty's 
14th  Dragoons.  These  men,  and  the  large  siege-guns 
dragged  by  elephants,  were  a  source  of  much  curiosity 
and  awe  to  the  natives.  You  can  hardly  realise 
our  feelings  after  eight  months  of  anxiety  and  im- 
prisonment.' 

Having  thus  opened  the  roads  to  and  from  the 
West  and  North,  Sir  Hugh  Rose  set  himself  to  clear 
the  way  towards  the  East.  This  entailed  the  capture 
of  the  Fort  of  Garhakota,  about  25  miles  east  of  Sagar, 
where  the  mutinous  51st  and  52nd  Bengal  Regiments, 
with  other  large  bodies  of  rebels,  had  established 
themselves,  and  were  devastating  the  country  around. 
The  fort  was  a  strong  one,  built  by  French  engineers ; 
so  strong,  indeed,  that  in  181 8  a  British  force  of 
1 1,000  men  with  28  siege-guns  only  gained  possession 
of  it,  after  a  long  investment,  by  allowing  the  garrison 
to  march  out  with  the  honours  of  war. 

Sir  Hugh  Rose  occupied  the  fort  on  the  13th 
February,  1858^  after  a  trying  march  through  dense 
jungle,  under  a  hot  sun,  with  the  enemy  keeping  up  a 
running  fight  all  the  way.  Within  was  found  a  large 
quantity  of  supplies  and  war  material,  pointing  to  the 
belief  that  the  rebels  had  intended  to  make  Garhakota 
a  central  rendezvous. 

The  GeneraVs  next  object,  after  the  capture  of 
Garhakota,  was  to  reach  Jhansi  as  quickly  as  possible. 
The  capture  of  Jhansi  was  considered   of  so   much 


THE  SOUTHERN  OPERATIONS  105 

importance  by  Sir  Colin  Campbell  that  his  chief  of 
the  staft'  had  written  on  January  24th,  1858:  'Sir 
Colin  will  be  glad  to  learn  if  Jhansi  is  to  be  fairly 
tackled  during  your  present  campaign.  To  us  it  is  all 
important.  Until  it  takes  place,  Sir  Colin^s  rear  will 
always  be  inconvenienced,  and  he  will  be  constantly 
obliged  to  look  back  over  his  shoulder  as  when  he 
relieved  Lucknow.  The  stiff  neck  this  gives  to  the 
Commander-in-Chief  and  the  increased  difficulty  of 
his  operations  in  consequence  you  will  understand.' 

But  it  was  no  easy  task.  Writing  to  Lord  El- 
phinstone  from  Sagar  on  February  29th,  1858,  Sir 
Hugh  said :  '  I  am  unfortunately  detained  here  by 
want  of  supplies  and  carriage,  to  the  great  disad- 
vantage of  the  public  service :  I  have  lost  nine  pre- 
cious days,  doubly  precious  not  only  on  account  of 
lost  time  at  a  season  when  every  hot  day  endangers 
the  health  and  lives  of  the  European  soldiers,  but 
because  every  day  has  allowed  the  rebels  to  recover 
the  "morale  they  had  lost  by  my  operations,  which 
I  had  made  as  rapidly  and  efficiently  as  possible, 
knowing  that  any  success  with  Orientals  produces 
twice  as  good  a  result  if  one  acts  promptly  and  follows 
up  one  success  with  another.  Nothing  requires 
system  so  much  as  transport.  Laying  in  supplies,  as 
it  is  called,  is  perfectly  easy  in  a  fertile  and  peaceful 
country,  but  this  will  not  do  in  my  case,  where  a 
country  has  been  devastated  or  is  in  the  hands  of  the 
enemy.  Then  appears  all  the  risk  of  a  civil  or 
occasional  system   of  supply.     Why   don't  you  put 


lo6  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

yourself  at  the  head  of  the  great  question  of  Indian 
military  transport?  You  would  do  your  country 
more  good  than  all  your  generals  put  together/ 

The  rebels  took  advantage  of  this  enforced  delay  to 
occupy  certain  forts  and  difficult  passes  in  the  moun- 
tainous ridges  which  separate  Bundelkhand  from  the 
Sagar  district.  The  passes  were  three  in  number — 
Narut,  Mundinpur,  and  Dhamoni.  Sir  Hugh  Rose 
resolved  to  force  them  without  loss  of  time ;  more 
especially  as  it  was  necessary  to  unite  his  first  and 
second  brigades  for  the  attack  on  Jhansi.  He  had 
accordingly  sent  orders  to  his  First  Brigade  to  march 
by  the  trunk  road  towards  Jhansi,  and  by  this  turning 
movement  to  clear  his  left  flank,  while  he  himself 
moved  direct  towards  the  fortress.  On  the  way  he 
heard  heavy  firing  to  his  left.  This  was  the  First 
Brigade  taking  the  Fort  of  Chandari  on  March  1 7th. 
The  enemy  here  offered  a  desperate  resistance ;  but 
the  fort  was  carried  by  storm,  with  a  less  on  our  side 
of  2  officers  and  27  men. 

The  Pass  of  Narut  was  by  far  the  most  difficult  of 
the  three  just  named;  and  the  enemy,  under  the  im- 
pression that  Sir  Hugh  Hose  must  move  through  it, 
increased  its  natural  difficulties  by  barricading  the 
road  with  alattis  and  parapets  of  boulders.  The 
Raja  of  Banpur  superintended  the  defence.  The 
next  most  difficult  pass  was  Dhamoni.  Very  little 
was  known  about  Mundinpur,  the  third  pass,  which 
was  about  twenty  miles  from  that  of  Narut ;  but  a 
reconnaissance   forcee    induced    Sir   Hugh   Rose  to 


THE  SOUTHERN  OPERATIONS  107 

select  this  as  the  point  of  attack.  Although  found  to 
be  the  least  inaccessible  of  the  three  passes,  it  was 
still  difficult ;  and  was  defended  by  the  Sepoys  of  the 
50th  Native  Infantry,  as  well  as  by  a  large  number  of 
picked  Eundelas. 

In  order  to  deceive  the  enemy  as  to  his  intention, 
and  to  prevent  the  Raja  of  Banpur  coming  to  the 
assistance  of  the  Raja  of  Shahgarh,  who  defended 
Mundinpur,  Sir  Hugh  Rose  ordered  a  feint  to  be  made 
against  Narut ;  whilst  he  himself  attacked  Mundinpur. 
He  even  marched  some  miles  towards  Narut,  with  his 
whole  force ;  and  then  counter-marching,  fell  unex- 
pectedly on  Mundinpur.  The  fight  was  precipitated 
by  the  ardour  of  an  artillery  officer,  who  galloped  his 
guns  to  the  right  front,  to  drive  the  enemy  from  the 
heights.  Just  as  he  came  into  action  the  50th  Native 
Infantry,  showing  merely  their  caps,  opened  a  heavy 
fire  on  the  battery. 

This  brought  matters  to  a  speedy  conclusion  ;  for  it 
was  now  necessary  to  make  a  rapid  advance.  The 
fire  was  extremely  hot,  ''as  rapid  and  hot  a  fire  as 
ever  I  saw,^  wrote  Sir  Hugh  Rose  to  Sir  Colin  Camp- 
bell. The  casualties  were  numerous.  The  General 
himself  had  a  spur  shot  off,  and  his  best  horse 
wounded.  But  the  infantry  of  the  Haidarabad  Con- 
tingent dashed  down  the  glen  with  a  cheer,  and 
completely  routed  the  surprised  enemy.  Driven  with 
loss  from  their  position,  the  rebels  endeavoured  to 
join  another  large  body  of  their  comrades  who  oc- 
cupied the  hills  on  the  left  of  the  road.     Before  they 


Io8  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

could  do  this,  however,  Sir  Hugh  Rose  ordered  the 
heights  to  be  stormed,  under  cover  of  two  guns  of  the 
Haidarabad  Contingent;  and  the  enemy  was  driven 
successively  from  all  the  hills  commanding  the  pass. 
Thus  repulsed  in  flank  and  front,  the  rebels  retreated 
through  the  jungle  to  the  Fort  of  Sarai,  and  were 
pursued  for  a  considerable  distance. 

The  results  of  this  success  were  most  satisfactory. 
The  next  day  the  Fort  of  Sarai  fell  into  Sir  Hugh 
Rose's  hands  ;  and  the  day  after  that,  the  Fort  of 
Marowra.  So  complete  was  the  discomfiture  of  the 
rebels  that  Sir  Robert  Hamilton,  who  had  accompanied 
the  force  as  Agent  to  the  Governor-General  for  Central 
India,  annexed  the  whole  district  to  our  Indian  pos- 
sessions under  a  royal  salute,  the  British  flag  being 
hoisted  on  the  Fort  of  Sarai  for  the  first  time. 

Writing  to  Sir  Cohn  Campbell  on  March  9th, 
1858,  Sir  Hugh  Rose  said:  'The  great  thing  with 
these  Indians  is  not  to  stay  at  long  distances  firing ; 
but  after  they  have  been  cannonaded,  to  close  with 
them.  They  cannot  stand.  By  forcing  the  Pass  of 
Mundinpur  I  have  taken  the  whole  line  of  the  enemy's 
defences  in  rear,  and  an  extraordinary  panic  has 
seized  them.  I  hope  I  am  not  over-sanguine,  but  I 
think  that  matters  as  far  as  we  have  gone  look  well. 
All  in  our  rear  is  really  police  work  ;  and  all  I  want 
is  a  reserve  to  occupy  the  country  I  take,  and  prevent 
my  flanks  and  rear  being  turned  as  I  advance.  A 
military  police,  organised  on  the  Irish  Constabulary 
system,  is  what  is  needed  here,  and  in  India  generally.' 


THE  SOUTHERN  OPERATIONS  109 

Sir  Hugh  Rose  now  continued  his  march  to  Jhansi, 
which  lay  125  miles  north  of  Sagar.  Great  import- 
ance was  attached  by  the  British  authorities  to  the 
fall  of  this  fortress  and  city.  It  was  looked  on  as  the 
stronghold  of  the  mutineers  in  Central  India.  The 
rebel  garrison  included  10,000  Valaitis  (Afghan  mer- 
cenaries), and  Bundelas  (as  the  people  of  Bundel- 
khand  are  called);  besides  1500  mutinous  Sepoys, 
of  whom  400  were  cavalry.  The  number  of  guns  in 
the  city  and  fort  was  estimated  at  from  thirty  to 
forty  pieces. 

Nowhere  in  India  had  the  people  displayed  a  more 
intense  hostility  to  the  English.  In  June,  1857,  after 
the  overthrow  of  British  authority  at  Delhi,  67 
Englishmen  and  women  were  murdered  at  Jhansi  in 
the  most  deliberate  way.  The  principal  inhabitants 
and  leading  tradesmen,  headed  by  ulemias  and  fanatics, 
marched  with  theii*  victims  in  solemn  procession  to 
the  place  of  execution,  singing  verses  of  the  Kuran, 
and  in  particular  the  ruthless  text,  '  No  mercy  to 
Giaours.'  The  English  prisoners,  amongst  them  the 
Resident,  Captain  Skene,  and  other  functionaries,  with 
their  wives  and  children,  were  marshalled  in  regular 
order;  and  on  reaching  the  ruins  of  an  old  mosque 
were  halted,  carefully  separated,  the  men  from  the 
women  and  children,  and  hacked  to  pieces  by  the 
butchers  of  the  city. 

But  anxious  as  were  Lord  Canning  and  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief that  Jhansi  should  speedily  fall,  they 
were  so   impressed  with    its  strength,  and  with  the 


no  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

inadequacy  of  the  force  for  its  attack,  that  Sir  Hugh 
Rose  was  given  the  option  of  masking  it  and  continu- 
ing his  march  to  Kalpi.  But  rather  than  leave  such 
an  important  stronghold  in  his  rear,  he  determined  to 
take  it  at  all  risks.  This  decision  is  a  matter  of 
some  historical  interest.  Much  as  Sir  Colin  Campbell 
might  desire  to  be  relieved  of  '  the  stiff  neck '  caused 
by  having  so  constantly  to  look  over  his  shoulder  at 
Jhansi,  he  began  to  doubt  Sir  Hugh  Rose's  ability  to 
take  the  place  with  a  comparatively  small  force ; 
while  he  foresaw  that  a  check  before  so  strong  a 
fortress  would  be  little  short  of  disastrous.  The  Com- 
mander-in-Chief had  accordingly  authorised  Sir  Hugh 
Rose^  to  pass  by  Jhansi  if,  after  weighing  all  the 
circumstances  of  the  case,  he  considered  that  the  siege 
could  not  prudently  be  undertaken ;  and  to  march 
instead,  in  two  divisions,  one  on  Kalpi  through 
Charkhari,  and  the  other  on  Banda.  Lord  Canning 
wrote  on  the  same  day  to  Sir  Robert  Hamilton,  ex- 
pressing a  wish  that,  as  Sir  Hugh  Rose  was  too  weak 
in  European  infantiy  to  run  any  risks,  he  '  should 
not  consider  himself  under  any  obligation  to  attempt 
the  reduction  of  Jhansi  against  the  possibility  of 
success.' 

But  the  General  in  command  had  no  doubt  on  the 
subject,  and  resolved  to  carry  out  his  original  instruc- 
tions at  all  risks,  seeing  how  fatal  it  would  be  to  leave 
a  garrison  of  some  i  i,ooo  desperate  men,  under  one  of 
the  most  capable  leaders  of  the  Mutiny,  to  harass  his 
1  Feb.  nth,  1858. 


THE  SOUTHERX  OPERATIONS  in 

march  onwards,  and  thus  effectually  prevent  the  paci- 
fication of  Bundelkhand.  A  month  later,  being  alarmed 
at  the  perilous  position  of  the  lo^^al  Chiefs  of  Panna 
and  Charkhari,  the  Government  of  India  sent  orders 
to  General  Whitlock  to  march  to  their  relief,  and 
directed  Sir  Hugh  Rose  (March  7th  and  T3th,  1858) 
to  co-operate  in  this  duty.  '  It  is  the  Governor- 
Generals  wish,'  wrote  the  Government  Secretary 
to  Sii*  Robert  Hamilton,  '  that  this  object  should 
for  the  present  be  considered  paramount  to  the 
operations  befoi-e  Jhansi,  and  that  Sir  Hugh  Rose 
should  take  such  steps  as  may  most  effectually  con- 
tribute to  its  accomplishment.'  On  receiving  these 
instructions.  Sir  Hugh  Rose  and  Sir  Robert  Hamilton 
both  informed  the  Government  of  India  that  the 
military  commander  desired  to  conform  with  them, 
but  after  and  not  before  the  siege  of  Jhansi. 

'To  relieve  Charkhari,'  said  Sir  Robert  Hamilton 
(March  13th,  1858),  'by  this  force  would  involve 
refusing  Jhansi,  and  the  suspension  of  the  plans  of 
operations  towards  Kalpi ;  both  of  which  operations 
form  the  ground-work  of  Sir  Hugh  Rose's  instruc- 
tions. However  anxious,  therefore,  the  desire  to  aid 
the  Raja  of  Charkhari,  Sii*  Hugh  Rose  is  compelled 
to  consider  the  movement  of  his  force,  or  of  any  part 
of  it,  in  the  direction  of  Charkhari  at  present  im- 
possible. The  advance  of  this  force  on  Jhansi,  in  the 
opinion  of  Sir  Hugh  Rose,  is  calculated  to  draw  the 
rebels  to  assist  in  its  defence  ;  whilst  the  fall  of  this 
fortress  and  its  possession  by  us  will  break  up  the 


112  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

confederacy,  take  away  its  rallying  point,  and  destroy 
the  power  and  influence  of  the  Rani,  whose  name 
is  prominently  used  to  incite  rebellion.' 

Following  up  this  letter.  Sir  Hugh  Rose  wrote  him- 
self to  the  Government  of  India  on  March  19th,  1858, 
expressing  his  wish  to  obey  their  instructions  at  a 
fitting  time,  as  they  completed  a  plan  of  operations 
which  he  and  Sn  Robert  Hamilton  had  on  the  previous 
day  agreed  it  would  be  advantageous  to  carry  out 
'  after  the  reduction  of  Jhansi.'  He  also  wrote  on  the 
same  day  to  General  Whitlock  informing  him  of  his 
intention  to  attack  Jhansi  at  once  and  to  co-operate 
with  him  afterwards.  On  the  following  day,  March 
20th,  1858, — Sir  Hugh  Rose  himself  being  engaged 
from  sunrise  to  sunset  at  the  outposts  in  reconnoitring 
duty  and  in  placing  in  position  the  siege  batteries, — Sir 
Robert  Hamilton  again  addressed  the  Government  of 
India,  recapitulating  the  reasons  why  the  General 
considered  it  important  to  attack  Jhansi  ^     Sir  Hugh 

^  It  is  expedient  to  give  these  facts  at  some  length  since  Sir 
Kobert  Hamilton,  in  a  memorandum  written  four  years  afterwards 
(March  20th,  1862)  averred  that  Sir  Hugh  Rose  hesitated  to  disobey 
the  orders  received,  and  that  he  (Sir  E.  Hamilton")  took  on  himself 
the  responsibility  of  ^proceeding  with  the  operations  against  Jhansi.' 
As  this  assertion  has  obtained  for  him  the  credit  of  having  saved 
the  campaign,  it  is  right  to  state  that  it  has  no  foundation,  and 
was  evidently  made  from  memory.  It  is  hardly  likely,  to  say  the 
least  of  it,  that  the  military  commander  would  have  allowed  the 
political  officer  to  supersede  his  authority  in  so  momentous  a 
military  decision  ;  although  it  must  be  acknowledged  that  Sir 
Robert  Hamilton  did  good  service  in  agreeing  with  that  decision, 
inasmuch  as  an  opposite  course  would  manifestly  have  increased 
the  difficulties  of  the  moment.     Sir  Hugh  Rose  never  thought  it 


THE  SOUTHERN  OPERATIONS  113 

Rose's  decision  was  generously  and  frankly  approved 
(March  30th,  ICS58)  by  Lord  Canning. 

Not  haviug  been  able  to  obtain  any  plan  of  the  city 
and  fortress,  and  being  provided  only  with  an  old 
and  erroneous  map  of  the  country  round,  Sir  Hugh 
Rose  had  to  reconnoitre  all  the  positions  and  defences 
about  Jhansi,  to  a  considerable  distance.  '  We  arrived 
before  the  city  at  7  a.m.  on  the  morning  of  March 
20th,'  says  a  writer  already  quoted.  '  The  General 
and  his  staff  rode  off  to  reconnoitre.  We  were  short 
of  water,  firewood,  and  grass ;  there  was  not  a  tree  to 
give  shade  to  the  troops,  and  we  remained  out  in 
the  open  till  the  return  of  the  General  at  6  p.m.' 

The  fortress  of  Jhansi  stood  on  a  high  rock,  over- 
looking a  wdde  plain,  and  with  its  numerous  outworks 
of  masonry  presented  a  very  imposing  appearance. 
The  walls  of  granite,  from  16  to  20  feet  thick,  were 
protected  by  extensive  and  elaborate  works  of  the 
same  solid  construction,  all  within  the  walls,  with 
front  and  flanking  embrasures  for  artillery  fire,  and 
loopholes,  some  of  five  tiers,  for  musketry.  Guns 
placed  on  the  high  towers  of  the  fort  commanded 
the    country    all    around.      One    tower,    called    the 

worth  while  to  challenge  a  statement  contradicted  by  the  corre- 
spondence which  passed.  He  merely  wrote  on  the  following  year 
(June  26th,  1863)  in  a  public  despatch:  'I  had  always  foreseen 
the  difficulties  of  besieging  Jhansi  with  my  inadequate  force,  which 
led  the  Viceroy  and  Lord  Clyde  to  give  me  the  option  of  not  attack- 
ing it,  but  it  was  impossible  to  obey  my  orders  to  march  to  Kalpi, 
by  Charkhari,  and  leave  such  a  stronghold  as  Jhansi  untaken  in 
my  rear.*    And  there  he  left  the  matter. 

H 


114  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

'White  Turret,'  had  been  raised  in  height  by  the 
rebels,  and  was  armed  with  heavy  ordnance  for  the 
defence. 

The  fort  was  suiToimded  by  the  city  on  all  sides, 
except  on  the  west  and  part  of  the  south  faces.  The 
precipitous  steepness  of  the  rock  protected  the  west 
side  of  the  fort ;  while  to  the  south,  the  city  wall, 
with  bastions  springing  from  the  centre,  ended  in  a 
high  mound  or  mam  el  on,  which  protected  by  a  flank- 
inof  fire  the  south  face  of  the  fort.  This  mamelon  was 
fortified  by  a  strong  circular  bastion  for  five  guns, 
round  part  of  which  was  a  ditch,  12  feet  deep 
and  15  feet  broad,  of  solid  masonry.  Swarms  of  men 
were  always  at  work  on  the  mamelon.  The  city 
itself,  4^  miles  in  circumference,  was  surrounded  by  a 
fortified  and  massive  wall,  from  6  to  1 2  feet  thick,  and 
from  1 8  to  30  feet  in  height^  with  numerous  flanking 
bastions,  armed  as  batteries,  and  with  loopholes  in 
the  banquette  for  infantry.  Outside  the  wall  to  the 
east  was  a  picturesque  lake  and  the  palace  of  the 
former  rajas.  On  the  south  side  of  the  wall,  and 
outside  it,  were  the  ruined  cantonments  and  residences 
of  the  English  ofiicials  and  troops,  burnt  by  the  rebels 
in  June,  1857.  There  were  also,  on  this  side,  temples 
and  gardens. 

The  First  Brigade  under  Brigadier  Stuart  having 
now  joined  Sir  Hugh  Eose,  the  force  was  much 
strengthened  in  all  arms,  although  still  only  an 
incomplete  division  seemingly  inadequate  for  the  task 
before   it.     Here   again,  as   on   other   occasions,   Sir 


THE  SOUTHERN  OPERATIONS  115 

Hugh  Kose  showed  his  capacity  as  a  commander  by- 
disregarding  fixed  rules  of  war,  when  to  observe  them 
would  be  mere  pedantry.  Had  his  example  been 
followed  more  generally  in  other  parts  of  India  much 
time  and  many  lives  might  have  been  saved.  He  had 
recourse  to  a  mode  of  attack  which  under  ordinary 
circumstances  would  not  have  been  justifiable.  In 
order  to  enfilade  the  city  wall,  he  disconnected  and 
separated  his  two  attacks ;  while  to  make  up  for 
deficiencies  in  siege  artillery,  he  brought  up  nine 
and  six-pounder  guns  to  fire  on  the  enemy's  defences. 
At  the  same  time,  wishing  to  invest  the  place  as  com- 
pletely as  possible  with  his  small  force,  he  established 
seven  flying  camps  of  cavalry  and  horse  artillery, 
posting  native  artillery  and  infantry  at  the  principal 
camps.  These  flying  camps  sent  out  patrols  to  a 
considerable  distance  in  every  direction,  in  order  to 
prevent  the  rebels  either  leaving  or  entering  the 
beleaguered  city.  Abattis  and  deep  trenches  were 
dug  across  the  roads  and  tracks.  Each  camp,  on  any 
attempt  being  made  to  force  its  line,  had  orders  to  call 
to  its  aid  the  neighbouring  camps.  An  observatory  ^ 
and  telegraph-post,  in  charge  of  an  ofiicer  and  two 
non-commissioned  ofiicers,  was  established ;  and  from 
here,  with  the  aid  of  a  telescope — the  best  that  could 
be  got — the  besiegers  could  see  right  into  the  interior 
of  the  city. 

1  It  was  fortunate  this  precaution  was  taken.  On  the  evening  of 
March  31st,  flags  were  flying  from  it,  indicating  that  Tantia  Topi  was 
coming  in  great  force  from  the  north  to  relieve  the  city. 

H  2, 


Il6  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

Day  and  night  a  heavy  fire  was  kept  up  on  the 
fort  and  mamelon.  Day  and  night  the  rebels  served 
their  guns,  and  repaired  their  defences.  Some 
batteries  returned  shot  for  shot.  The  native  women 
were  seen  working  on  the  walls,  and  carrying  ammu- 
nition; and  often  the  Rani  of  Jhansi  and  her  ladies, 
in  rich  attire,  visited  the  '  Black  Tower '  in  the  cool  of 
the  evening  to  see  how  the  fight  went.  A  bombardier 
in  charge  of  one  of  the  breaching  guns  reported  to  Sir 
Hugh  Eose,  on  one  occasion,  that  'he  had  covered 
the  Queen  and  her  ladies  with  his  gun,'  and  asked 
permission  to  fire  on  them  ;  but  he  was  told  that  that 
kind  of  warfare  was  not  approved. 

So  well  were  the  besieging  batteries  served,  that  by 
March  30th — the  eighth  day  of  the  investment — Sir 
Hugh  Rose's  gunners  had  dismantled  the  defences  of 
the  fort  and  city,  or  disabled  the  enemy's  guns ;  and 
the  General,  to  save  further  expense  of  ammunition,  of 
which  he  was  running  short,  made  arrangement  for 
the  storming  of  Jhansi  on  the  next  day.  The  advance, 
however,  of  the  so-called  army  of  the  Peshwa — which 
to  the  number  of  20,000  men  crossed  the  Betwa  under 
Tantia  Topi  with  reinforcements  of  heavy  guns, 
engineering  obstacles,  and  all  the  material  of  war — 
caused  the  assault  to  be  deferred.  At  sunset  on 
March  31st  the  enemy  lit  an  immense  bonfire  on  a 
rising  ground  on  the  Jhansi  side  of  the  river  Betwa, 
as  a  signal  to  the  town  of  their  arrival.  It  was 
answered  by  salvos  from  all  the  batteries  of  the  fort 
and  city,  and  by  shouts  of  joy  from  the  defenders 


THE  SOUTHERN  OPERATIONS  117 

There  was  now  no  doubt  that  Tantia  Topi  sought 
battle  with  the  besieging  force.  The  reason  of  his 
self-confidence  presently  appeared  from  statements 
made  by  prisoners.  Tantia  Topi,  they  said,  had  been 
informed  by  his  spies  that  nearly  all  the  English 
force  was  scattered  in  the  siege  and  investment,  and 
that  he  could  easily  destroy  the  few  who  guarded  the 
camp. 

A  more  anxious  moment  than  this  seldom  came  to 
an  officer  in  command.  Sir  Hugh  Rose  grasped  the 
situation  as  coolly  as  if  he  had  to  deal  with  a  parcel 
of  school-boys  out  for  a  holiday.  His  military 
capacity  was  indeed  to  be  tested  by  no  mean  ordeal ; 
but  he  was  equal  to  the  occasion.  Relying  on  him- 
self and  on  the  spirit  of  the  troops  he  understood  so 
well,  he  resolved  to  fight  a  general  action  with  the 
new  enemy,  while  not  relaxing  either  the  siege  or 
the  investment. 

During  the  course  of  the  evening,  he  moved  all  the 
available  men  who  could  be  spared,  and  drew  them 
up  in  two  lines.  Friend  and  foe  bivouacked  under 
arms  opposite  to  each  other.  At  midnight  a  report 
was  brought  in  that  several  thousand  of  the  enemy 
were  crossing  the  Betwa  by  a  ford  some  little  way  off, 
with  the  evident  intention  of  turning  the  left  of  the 
little  British  force  and  of  relieving  Jhansi  from  the 
north.  The  General  was  at  once  compelled  to  send 
his  second  line  to  oppose  this  flank  movement,  so  that 
he  himself  was  left  with  a  force  which,  all  arms 
included,  did  not  amount  to  more  than  900  men.     He 


Il8  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

intended  to  open  battle  at  daybreak  ;  notwithstand- 
ing this  disparity  of  numbers,  to  pour  into  the  rebels 
the  fire  of  all  his  guns  ;  and  then  to  turn  and  double 
up  their  left  flank.  But  before  this  plan  could  be 
carried  out,  Tantia  Topi  vigorously  attacked  him 
with  all  the  elan  of  a  foe  certain  of  victory. 

A  decisive  movement  was  therefore  necessary,  and 
this  was  boldly  and  successfully  carried  out  by  the 
infantry  advancing  against  the  enemy's  centre,  while 
his  flanks  were  attacked  with  horse  artillery  and 
cavalry.  To  use  Sir  Hugh  Rose's  own  words,  '  the 
enemy  poured  a  heavy  fusillade  into  the  cavalry  ;  the 
Valaitis  jumped  up  in  hundreds  on  high  rocks  and 
boulders  to  load  and  fire,  but  before  they  could  reload 
their  matchlocks.  Captain  Need,  leading  his  troop  in 
advance,  penetrated  into  the  midst  of  them,  and  for  a 
time  was  so  hotly  engaged  that  his  uniform  was  cut 
to  pieces,  although,  singular  to  say,  he  only  received  a 
slight  wound  himself.  The  attack  on  the  enemy's 
right  by  the  fire  of  Captain  Lightfoot's  battery  and 
the  charge  of  the  14th  Light  Dragoons  were  equally 
successful ;  and  the  enemy  broke  and  retired  in 
confusion.' 

A  general  advance,  straight  against  the  enemy's 
centre,  turned  the  retreat  of  the  rebels  into  a  complete 
rout.  The  whole  of  the  artillery  and  cavalry  were 
now  sent  forward  in  pursuit.  The  fugitives — singly 
or  standing  back  to  back — availed  themselves  of  any 
shelter  they  could  find.  Maddened  with  hhang,  they 
fought  desperately  ;  springing  on  the  pursuers,  match- 


THE  SOUTHERN  OPERATIONS  119 

lock  and  tuhvar  in  hand,  or  lying  down  and  cutting 
at  them.  The  jungle,  too,  was  set  on  fire  by  the 
fugitives ;  but  nothing  could  check  the  ardour  of  the 
pursuit,  for  the  British  saw  within  their  reach  Tantia 
Topi's  heavy  artillery. 

The  four  guns  of  the  Eagle  Troop  and  the  Field 
Battery  under  Captain  Lightfoot  galloped  with  Sir 
Hugh  Rose  through  the  blazing  jungle  until  they 
reached  the  banks  of  the  Betwa,  after  capturing  a 
horse  battery.  The  gunners  then  opened  fire  on  the 
enemy,  who  were  recrossing  the  Betwa  in  wild  con- 
fusion ;  supported  by  their  second  line,  which  had 
not  yet  come  into  action,  and  which  now  opposed 
the  pursuing  troops  with  artillery  and  musketry 
fire.  But  resistance  was  useless,  and  the  pursuit 
was  continued  till  dark  for  some  16  miles.  Tantia 
Topi's  loss  in  this  extraordinary  action  was  1500 
men,  besides  stores,  siege  guns,  camp  equipage,  and 
materials  of  war;  welcome  booty  to  the  victors. 
Tantia  Topi  himself  fled  to  Kalpi,  and  the  whole  of 
the  Peshwa's  army — which  by  threatening  Bundel- 
khand  and  taking  Charkhari  had  so  alarmed  the 
Governor-General  and  his  advisers  as- to  induce  them 
to  think  that  its  defeat  should  be  paramount  to  the 
siege  of  Jhansi — was  dispersed  and  broken.  Whit- 
lock  was  able  to  march  on  Banda.  Charkhari  was 
already  an  aflfair  of  the  past.  And  all  this  was 
effected  by  a  handful  of  disciplined  men  led  by  a 
determined  and  skilful  General. 

Nor  while  thus  subduing  a  district  with  one  hand, 


/0\ 


UBRA/c?v 


120  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

would  Sir  Hugh  Eose  allow  the  siege  operations  to  be 
for  an  instant  relaxed  with  the  other.  Anxious  to 
profit  by  the  discouragement  caused  among  the  be- 
sieged and  the  fresh  energy  infused  into  the  besiegers, 
the  General  resolved  to  strike  at  once.  He  gave  his 
men  no  rest  and  they  themselves  did  not  expect  it. 
Breach  or  no  breach  he  determined  that  Jhansi  should 
be  taken  on  the  3rd  of  April.  And  it  was  taken.  For 
the  men  under  his  command,  although  well-nigh  tu^ed 
out,  were  no  less  confident  and  resolute. 

The  front  and  enfilading  fire  on  the  breach  was  so 
heavy  that  except  from  the  fort  the  enemy  made  but 
little  resistance  at  this  point ;  but  at  the  rocket  battery 
on  the  left^  which  was  taken  by  escalade,  and  also  along 
the  defence  works  on  the  left,  likewise  taken  by 
escalade,  they  made  a  desperate  resistance  ;  fii'st  with 
artillery  fire,  rockets,  stink-pots,  &c.,  and  then  in  a 
hand-to-hand  fight  with  spears  and  swords. 

Though  the  3rd  Europeans  under  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Liddell  did  their  duty  bravely,  the  attack  by 
escalade  on  the  right  failed  ^,  on  account  of  the  short- 

^  Here  there  were  several  casualties.  Amongst  the  killed  were 
two  gallant  young  officers,  Lieutenants  Meicklejohn  and  Dick,  both 
of  the  Bombay  Engineers.  Lieutenant  Meicklejohn,  leading  the 
storming  party  up  the  ladders,  had  reached  the  topmost  rung, 
when  he  was  wounded,  dragged  from  the  ladder  by  the  Valaitis, 
and  hacked  to  pieces  on  the  wall,  where  his  body  was  found  by 
Colonel  Louth's  column.  He  had  spent  the  previous  night  in 
making  his  will  and  writing  to  his  mother,  wife  of  the  Presbji;erian 
clergyman  at  Hopetoun.  In  his  letter  he  said  that  he  felt  certain 
he  would  be  killed  in  the  next  day's  storm,  and  that  Sir  Hugh 
Rose  would  do  his  best  to  obtain  his  vacancy  for  a  younger  brother. 


THE  SOUTHERN  OPERATIONS  121 

ness  of  one  of  the  ladders,  the  breaking  down  of  others, 
and  the  fierceness  of  the  defence.  But  the  attack  on 
the  breach  and  the  escalade  on  the  left  proved  suc- 
cessful. To  quote  from  Sir  Hugh  Rose's  own  notes : 
*The  left  attack,  ably  and  gallantly  conducted  by 
Brigadier  Stuart,  succeeded  perfectly ;  its  right  column 
passing  without  loss  or  difficulty  through  the  breach. 
The  escalade  on  the  left  of  the  breach  was,  at  the  same 
time,  gallantly  led  by  Lieutenant  (now  Major-General) 
Webber,  E-.E.,  a  first-rate  officer,  and  the  capture  of  the 
Rocket  Bastion  was  effected  after  an  obstinate  re- 
sistance. It  was  only  finally  taken  after  a  severe 
struggle  inside  the  bastion.  Colonel  Louth,  com- 
manding Her   Majesty's  86th  Regiment,  acted  with 

On  the  General's  application,  the  vacancy  was  filled  according  to 
the  dead  man's  wish.  Lieutenant  Dick,  some  days  before  the 
assault,  had  committed  an  error  of  judgment  in  screening,  with 
the  best  intentions,  a  sergeant  of  Sappers,  who  had  been  looting 
in  spite  of  the  General's  most  positive  orders.  Such  an  example 
was  so  fatal  to  discipline  that  Lieutenant  Dick  rendered  himself 
liable  to  a  Court  Martial.  Sir  Hugh  Kose  sent  for  the  young  officer 
and  told  him  of  the  penalty  he  had  incurred,  adding :  '  But  I  have 
heard  of  your  high  promise  and  good  qualities,  and  I  cannot 
subject  you  to  a  punishment  which  would  be  ruinous  to  your 
career,  and  deprive  you  of  the  honour  of  the  assault.  I  therefore 
pardon  you  and  I  know  you  will  do  your  duty  to-morrow.'  On 
putting  his  foot  on  the  step  of  the  scaling-ladder  Lieutenant  Dick 
said  to  a  brother-officer,  '■  I  never  can  be  sufficiently  obliged  to  Sir 
Hugh  Rose  :  tell  him  how  I  have  done  my  duty.'  He  ran  up 
the  ladder,  received  several  shots,  and  fell  mortally  wounded  to 
the  ground.  Sir  Hugh  Rose  had  also  to  deplore  the  death  of 
Colonel  Turnbull,  commanding  the  Artillery,  who  had  given  re- 
markable proof  of  ability  and  intrepidity  throughout  the  campaign, 
and  who  now  fell  mortally  wounded  by  a  shot  from  one  of  the 
rebel  lascars. 


122  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

the  same  cool  judgment  which  he  had  shown  at 
Chandari.  The  regiment  carried  the  breach  with 
little  loss,  and  bringing  their  shoulders  forward, 
swept  round  in  rear  of  the  wall,  which  in  most 
instances  caused  the  precipitate  retreat  of  its  de- 
fenders.' 

The  General  himself^  entering  the  breach  with  the 
troops,  moved  on  with  some  companies  of  the  86th 
Regiment  to  take  the  palace.  Hurrying  across  a 
large  open  space  under  fire  from  the  fort — a  fire 
which  it  was  impossible  to  return — they  fought  their 
way  through  the  streets  to  the  palace  gates.  An 
entrance  was  soon  forced,  and  then  the  conflict  waxed 
fiercer  than  ever.  Driven  from  room  to  room,  the 
enemy  defended  themselves  with  the  fury  of  despair, 
setting  light  to  trains  of  powder  on  the  floor,  and 
even  to  the  ammunition  in  their  pouches. 

The  right  and  left  attacking  parties  were  now  con- 
centrated in  the  palace.  The  next  thing  to  be  done 
was  to  clear  the  city  of  the  numerous  armed  rebels, 
who  remained  in  the  houses  and  were  firing  on  the 
troops.  Part  of  this  task  was  accomplished  that  same 
day,  April  3rd,  not  without  many  desperate  hand-to- 
hand  combats.  In  particular  there  was  a  terrible 
fight  in  the  palace  stables^,  between  some  men  of 
Her  Majesty's  86th  Regiment;  and  thirty  or  forty 
Valaiti  troopers  of  the  Rani's  bodyguard.  The  86th 
Regiment  here  captured  over  thirty  standards  and 
an  English  Union  Jack,  which  had  been  given  by 
Lord  William  Bentinck  to  a  former  ruler  of  Jhansi, 


THE  SOUTHERN  OPERATIONS  123 

with  permission  to  have  it  carried  before  him  as  a 
reward  for  his  fidelity. 

Toward  sunset,  the  signalling  party  telegraphed 
from  the  observatory  that  the  enemy  were  again 
approaching  from  the  east ;  and  the  troops,  well-nigh 
spent,  one  would  have  thought,  after  their  thirteen 
hours'  fiofhtins:  under  a  fierce  sun,  were  nevertheless 
ready  to  begin  again  with  as  much  spirit  as  if  they 
were  fresh  from  the  parade  ground.  The  alarm 
happily  proved,  however,  to  be  a  false  one  ;  troops 
arriving  from  Tehri  having  been  mistaken  for  the 
enemy. 

The  next  day,  April  4th,  the  remainder  of  the  city 
was  captured  and  occupied.  In  the  evening,  the 
Rani,  accompanied  by  300  Valaitis  and  25  troopers, 
left  the  fort  and  fled  towards  Kalpi.  It  was  afterwards 
discovered  that  her  horse  had  been  brought  into  the 
fort  ditch,  with  the  connivance  of  a  native  contingent 
serving  with  Sir  Hugh  Rose,  and  that  after  being  let 
down  from  a  window  in  the  turret  she  was  placed  in 
the  saddle,  with  her  stepson  in  her  lap,  and  thus 
escaped.  Next  morning,  April  5th,  Sir  Hugh  Rose 
occupied  the  fortress  without  meeting  further  resist- 
ance. 

Thus  ended  the  siege  of  Jhansi.  The  Central  India 
Field  Force  had  been  contending  against  an  enemy 
more  than  double  their  number,  and  posted  behind 
formidable  fortifications ;  an  enemy  who  at  the  assault 
and  afterwards  defended  themselves  most  stubbornly. 
For  seventeen  days  and  nights  the  men  had  never 


124  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

taken  off  their  clothes,  nor  unsaddled  the  horses  of 
the  cavalry  and  artillery  pickets.  To  this  constant 
strain  was  added  exposure  under  a  burning  sun,  and 
there  were  several  fatal  cases  of  sunstroke.  But  the 
discipline  and  spirit  of  the  troops  enabled  them  to 
overcome  difficulties  and  opposition  of  every  kind, 
and  finally  to  take  by  storm  the  strongest  fortress  in 
Central  India,  with  a  loss  to  the  rebels  of  some  5000 
killed  alone.  The  casualties  in  the  Central  India 
Field  Force  in  the  operations  before  Jhansi  and  the 
fight  at  the  Betwa  were  '>fi  officers  and  307  men  killed 
and  wounded,  besides  those  who  died  of  sunstroke 
and  fatigue.  The  victors  treated  the  enemy's  women 
and  children  with  humanity.  '  Neither  the  desperate 
resistance  of  the  rebels  nor  the  recollection  of  the 
revolting  and  wholesale  murders  perpetrated  the 
preceding  year  at  that  place,'  said  Sir  Hugh  Rose, 
*  could  make  them  foro-et  that,  in  an  Enoiish  soldier's 
eyes,  the  women  and  children  are  always  spared.  So 
far  from  hurting,  the  troops  were  seen  sharing  their 
rations  with  them.' 

The  satisfaction  of  the  authorities  at  the  fall  of  this 
city  fortress  was  of  course  great.  The  Duke  of  Cam- 
bridge wrote  to  Sir  Hugh  Rose:  'This  operation  is 
highly  satisfactory,  and  it  only  proves  how  much  can 
be  done  with  a  small  force,  such  as  the  one  under 
your  command,  if  it  is  but  ably  handled.  I  had 
always  the  greatest  confidence  in  your  talent  and 
judgment.' 

Sir  Colin  Campbell  also  congratulated  the  General 


THE  SOUTHERN  OPERATIONS  125 

very  heartily  on  all  he  had  accomplished.  '  Your 
operations,'  he  said,  '  have  been  conducted  with  much 
skill,  and  I  have  reason  to  thank  you  for  the  manner 
in  which  you  have  executed  the  difficult  tasks 
assigned  to  you  by  the  Government  of  India.' 

Sir  George  Whitlock  also  sent  a  message  from 
Banda :  '  Really  your  motto  seems  to  be  Fern,  Yidi^ 
Vici,  whilst  my  Second  Brigade,  with  their  snail's 
pace,  has  prevented  me  leaving  this  place.' 


CHAPTER  VII 

The  Southern  Operations  {continued) 
TO  THE  Recapture  of  Gwalior 

Leaving  a  small  portion  of  his  Second  Brigade  to 
garrison  Jhansi,  Sir  Hugh  Rose  marched  on  April  25th, 
1858,  with  his  First  Brigade  for  Kalpi,  102  miles  to 
the  north-east.  He  had  hardly  started  when  infor- 
mation came  that  the  Sepoy  garrison  of  Kalpi, 
reinforced  by  Valaitis  under  the  Rani  of  Jhansi, 
and  by  Tantia  Topi  with  the  Gwalior  Contingent, 
and  other  rebels,  had  occupied  Kunch  (42  miles  from 
Kalpi  and  between  it  and  Jhansi).  Kunch  was  a 
difficult  place  to  attack  owing  to  the  woods,  gardens, 
and  temple  enclosures  lying  round  it ;  and  the  enemy 
had  strongly  fortified  the  western  quarter  and  the 
Jhansi  gate. 

Acting  on  his  usual  principle,  that  nothing  was  so 
likely  to  disconcert  the  rebels  as  turning  their  flank 
and  threatening  their  rear,  Sir  Hugh  Rose  resolved 
to  mask  the  fortified  front  on  the  Jhansi  road  and 
to  attack  Kunch  in  flank.  In  accordance  with  these 
tactics,  as  well  as  to  avoid  a  protracted  engage- 
ment in  the  fierce  heat  of  the  sun,  he  made  a 
long    night   march   to    the    left   flank,   and   shortly 


THE  SOUTHERN  OPERATIONS  T27 

after  daybreak  arrived  opposite  the  west  side  of 
Kunch,  in  rear  of  the  fort  and  town ;  thus  turning 
the  strong  defences  of  the  Jhansi  gate.  After  the 
troops  had  rested,  the  artillery  opened  fire,  and  the 
infantry  prepared  to  storm  the  fort.  A  wing  of 
the  86th  Regiment  and  the  25th  Bombay  Native 
Infantry  were  thrown  into  skirmishing  order,  sup- 
ported on  the  flank  by  detachments  of  artillery  and 
cavalry  ;  the  remainder  of  the  attacking  force  being 
formed  into  a  second  line.  The  skirmishers  of  the 
Native  Infantry,  under  cover  of  the  guns,  cleared 
the  woods,  temples,  and  walled  gardens  ;  whilst  the 
British  regiment,  led  by  Major  Stuart,  made  a  circuit 
to  the  left,  taking  all  the  obstacles  in  their  front,  and 
cutting  the  enemy's  line  in  two ;  thereby.  Sir  Hugh 
Rose  wrote  in  his  despatch,  adding  '  another  claim  to 
the  obligations  I  owe  this  regiment  for  their  very 
distinsjuished  conduct  at  all  times  in  the  field.' 

The  enemy,  seeing  their  defence  thus  broken  down, 
and  their  right  completely  turned,  retii'ed  in  masses 
from  Kunch  to  the  extensive  plains  stretching  to- 
wards Kalpi,  forming  a  long,  irregular  line,  covered 
by  skirmishers  at  close  intervals.  So  keen,  however, 
was  the  pursuit,  that  they  soon  became  a  helpless 
mob  of  runaways,  losing  in  the  retreat  some  600  men 
besides  15  guns. 

During  the  operations  before  Kiinch  the  men  of 
the  71st  Highlanders  (who  had  recently  joined  the 
force  by  bullock-train  from  Bombay)  and  of  the 
3rd   Europeans   dropped   down   in  numbers    on  the 


128  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

field  from  sunstroke.  In  fact,  the  sun  was  a  far 
more  deadly  enemy  than  the  rebels,  for  there  was 
no  cover.  Dooli  after  dooli  was  brought  into  tlie 
field  hospital,  with  officers  and  men  suffering  from 
sunstroke,  some  dead,  some  prostrate,  others  laughing 
or  sobbing  in  delirium.  The  General  himself  had 
fallen  three  times  from  sunstroke,  but  each  time 
forced  himself  to  rally  until  the  victory  was  won. 
When  the  men  moved  off  towards  the  encamping 
ground  on  the  Kalpi  side  of  Kunch,  they  were  com- 
pletely worn  out ;  the  action  having  lasted  from 
daybreak  till  9  o'clock  at  night,  in  a  heat  which 
was  110°   in  the  shade. 

Before  marching  on  to  Kalpi,  Sir  Hugh  Rose 
detached  Major  Gall  with  a  small  force  to  attack 
and  take  the  strong  fort  of  Lohari,  held  by  Valaitis, 
six  or  seven  miles  on  his  left  flank.  This  was  done 
with  great  gallantry.  The  fort  was  too  strong  to 
batter  with  field  artillery,  and  the  only  entrance  was 
a  difficult  one,  built  on  the  old  Maratha  plan  of  a 
double  gate  with  a  small  postern  in  an  angle.  Here 
the  3rd  Europeans  particularly  distinguished  them- 
selves. A  desperate  struggle  took  place  when  they 
got  into  the  first  gate.  Two  officers  were  severely 
wounded,  and  several  men  killed.  A  soldier  named 
Whirlpool^   received  no  less  than  nineteen  wounds. 

*  He  had  been  mentioned  in  despatches  for  saving  the  lives  of 
two  comrades  who  had  fallen  wounded  from  the  broken  ladders  at 
the  siege  of  Jhansi.  He  himself  lived  to  receive  the  Victoria  Cross 
and  sixpence  a  day  beyond  his  usual  pension.  Sir  Hugh  Rose 
always  thought  that  the  name  of  Whirlpool  was  assumed,   and 


THE  SOUTHERN  OPERATIONS  129 

^Take  care,  lads,'  he  said,  as  they  put  him  into  the 
dooli,  'and  don't  shake  my  head,  or  else  it  will 
come  off.' 

Writing  of  the  action  of  Kunch,  three  days  after- 
wards, Sir  HughKose  said  :  'We  should  have  destroyed 
the  enemy,  had  not  the  dreadful  heat  paralysed 
the  men.  Eleven  poor  fellows  were  killed  outright 
by  the  sun,  and  many  more  were  struck  down.  I 
was  obliged  four  times  to  get  off  my  horse  by 
excessive  debility.  The  doctor  poured  cold  water 
over  me,  and  gave  restoratives,  which  enabled  me  to 
go  on  again.  I  do  not  think  I  shall  stay  in  India  to 
pass  such  another  torment  as  110°  in  the  shade.  I  have 
succeeded  militarily  better  than  I  could  have  expected, 
and  that  is  all  I  wanted.'  He  also  wrote  to  a 
relative :  '  I  took  Kiinch  from  the  rebels  in  a  heat 
which  cannot  be  told — 110°  in  the  shade.  Owing  to 
God's  great  mercy  to  me,  I  have  had  thirteen  fights, 
and  always  won  the  day — never  one  check.  Your 
old  regiment,  the  71st  Highlanders,  had  twelve  men 
struck  down  in  the  ranks.  Afterwards,  near  Kalpi, 
it  was  II 9°  in  the  shade,  and  200  men  out  of  less  than 
400  of  the  25th  Native  Infantry  fell  out  of  the  ranks, 
stricken  by  the  sun.  I  delight  in  the  71st,'  he  added, 
'and  I  have  such  a  splendid  regiment  in  the  86th. 
They  go  at  anything.' 

afterwards  learnt  that  the  man  was  a  son  of  Mr.  Conker,  the 
postmaster  of  Dundalk.  When  the  General  was  in  command  in 
Ireland  the  parents  came  to  thank  him  for  his  kindness  to  their 
son,  who  was  then  in  New  South  Wales. 


130  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

An  urgent  message  now  arrived  from  the  Civil 
Officer  at  Kunch,  saying  that  unless  Sir  Hugh  Rose 
marched  at  once  to  the  right  bank  of  the  Jumna, 
Tantia  Topi  and  the  Rani  at  Kalpi,  with  the  Nawab  of 
Banda  at  Nowgong,  twenty  miles  to  the  south-west 
of  Kalpi,  would  cut  him  off,  and  so  prevent  him 
'  giving  a  hand,'  as  desired  by  the  Government  of 
India,  to  Sir  Colin  Campbell.  He  accordingly  made 
forced  marches  towards  Kalpi,  leaving  a  small  detach- 
ment ^  to  strike  the  tents  at  Kunch,  and  to  join  him  as 
quickly  as  they  could  at  Gulauli  on  the  Jumna,  seven 
miles  from  Kalpi. 

The  troops  had  now  to  contend,  not  only  against 
the  rebel  army,  fighting  with  all  the  advantages  of 
superior  numbers  and  knowledge  of  the  ground,  but 
with  an  Indian  sun  at  its  maximum  of  summer  heat. 
The  number  of  officers  and  men  on  the  sick  list 
increased  daily,  and  added  to  the  difficulties  of  trans- 
port. There  was  a  scarcity  both  of  water  and  forage. 
But  obstacles  were  things  that  had  to  be  overcome. 
A  check,  or  worse  still,  a  defeat  before  Kalpi,  in  the 
advanced  state  of  the  hot  season  and  with  the  rains 
close  at  hand,  while  resuscitating  rebellion  throughout 

^  At  one  of  the  halting-places,  the  General  found  a  party  of  sick 
and  wounded  lying  on  the  ground  in  their  great  coats,  with  their 
knapsacks  under  their  heads  for  a  pillow.  He  asked  if  they  had 
any  complaints,  *  Complaints,  sir,'  said  the  siirgeon  in  charge, 
'  they  haven't  a  single  thing  which  they  would  have  in  an  English 
hospital  in  camp,  at  home,  or  in  the  field  ;  but,'  he  added,  '  they 
have  no  complaints  except  one,  and  that  is,  they  cannot  march 
with  you  to-morrow  against  the  enemy.'  The  men,  raising  their 
heads  from  their  knapsacks,  smiled  in  assent. 


THE  SOUTHERN  OPERATIONS  13 1 

India,  would  have  compromised  the  safety  of  Cawn- 
pur,  and  have  exposed  the  extensive  line  of  operations 
conducted  by  the  Commander-in-Chief  to  an  attack 
in  flank. 

For  the  protection  of  Kalpi  the  rebels  had  con- 
structed elaborate  defence  works  on  the  main  road 
from  Kunch.  Finding  it  impossible  to  bring  an 
adequate  force  against  these  defences,  Sir  Hugh  Rose 
determined  to  break  off  to  the  right  and  to  join 
hands  with  Brigadier  (now  Sir  George)  Maxwell's 
small  force^  which  had  been  sent  by  the  Commander- 
in-Chief  to  the  left  bank  of  the  river  to  co-operate 
with  him.  To  mislead  the  enemy,  and  mask  this 
movement,  he  directed  his  Second  Brigade  to  follow 
up  the  high  road  to  Kalpi,  although  its  movements 
were  unfortunately  paralysed  by  sickness.  Notwith- 
standing these  difficulties,  two  pontoon  rafts,  brought 
with  great  trouble  from  Poona_,  were  thrown  over  the 
Jumna,  and  the  actual  junction  with  Sir  Colin 
Campbell's  army  was  effected  on  May  15,  1858. 
The  next  few  days  were  spent  in  skirmishes  with  the 
enemy  and  in  preparing  for  the  attack  on  Kalpi. 

By  this  time  sickness  had  made  fearful  inroads  on 
the  strength  of  Sir  Hugh  Rose's  column.  The  super- 
intending surgeon,  Dr.  Arnott,  reported  in  an  official 
letter  that  the  greater  part  of  the  force,  officers  as  well 
as  men,  from  the  General  and  his  staff  downwards, 
were  ill  from  sunstroke  ;  and  he  declared  that  if 
the  operations  were  to  be  protracted  for  more  than  a 
few  days,   the   entire   column   would    be    absolutely 

I  a 


1^2  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

prostrated  ^.  Lord  Canning  was  so  alarmed  at  these 
dismal  forebodings  that  he  wished  to  send  his  Body- 
guard to  the  assistance  of  the  Central  India  Force ; 
but  before  this  and  other  contemplated  reinforcements 
could  be  despatched,  and  before  the  expiry  of  the 
term  specified  by  Dr.  Arnott,  Kalpi  was  taken. 

So  admirable  was  the  conduct  of  the  men  under 
these  trials  that  their  Commander  wrote  of  them  in 
his  official  despatch:  'These  noble  soldiers,  whose 
successes  were  never  chequered  by  a  reverse,  with  a 
discipline  which  was  as  enduring  as  their  courage, 
never  proffered  one  complaint.  They  fell  in  their 
ranks,  struck  down  by  the  sun^  and  exhausted  by 

^  Writing  on  May  19th,  1858,  Dr.  Arnott  said  : — 'In  the  action 
before  Kunch  of  the  7th  instant,  one  regiment,  about  420  strong, 
lost  seven  men  by  sunstroke,  and  on  the  march  to  Banda  lost  five 
men  and  admitted  35  into  hospital ;  and  whenever  it  has  been 
exposed  it  has  suffered  very  severely.  Though  the  rest  of  the 
troops  have  borne  exposure  better,  their  losses  have  been  heavy 
and  their  admissions  into  the  hospital  very  numerous,  from  the 
overwhelming  effects  of  a  temperature  ranging  from  109°  to  117° 
in  tents,  and  seldom  falling  under  100°  at  night.  But  to  illustrate 
better  the  state  of  health  of  all  ranks,  I  may  mention  that  we  have 
now  310  Europeans  in  hosj)ital,  having  lost  in  the  week  21  by  sun- 
stroke ;  and  there  is  scarcely  an  officer  of  the  Staff  fit  for  duty. 
The  Quartermaster-General,  Clergyman,  the  Adjutant-General, 
the  Commissariat  Officer,  the  Baggage  Master,  the  Brigade  Major 
and  Quartermaster-General  and  Brigadier  of  the  2nd  Brigade, 
are  all  sick.  Several  of  these  and  many  other  officers  will  have  to 
go  to  Europe,  and  others  will  have  to  go  elsewhere  for  change  of 
climate.  Thus  paralysed  as  the  force  already  is,  and  with  the  rest 
enfeebled  and  worn  out  by  this  long  and  arduous  campaign,  I 
cannot  refrain  from  mentioning  my  apprehensions  that  should 
the  operations  before  Kalpi  be  protracted  and  the  exposure  great, 
the  force  will  be  completely  prostrated.' 


THE  SOUTHERN  OPERATIONS  133 

fatigue  ;  but  they  would  not  increase  the  anxieties  of 
their  General  or  belie  their  devotion  by  complaint. 
No  matter  how  great  their  exhaustion  or  how  deep 
their  short  sleep^  they  always  sprung  to  my  call  to 
arms  with  the  heartiest  good-will.  To  think  of 
yielding  or  retreating  would  have  been  ignominy. 
All  felt  that  physical  strength  might  fail,  but  that  the 
spirit  and  discipline  never  could.  They  were  often 
too  ill  to  march,  but  their  devotion  made  them  fight. 
It  is  almost  superfluous  to  add  that  troops  animated 
by  so  high  a  sense  of  duty  were  sober,  orderly,  and 
very  respectful  to  their  ofiicers.  There  was  less  crime 
in  my  camp  than  in  garrison.' 

Kalpi  is  situated  on  a  high  rock  rising  from  the 
Jumna,  and  is  surrounded  by  miles  of  deep  ravines. 
Sallying  out  from  their  almost  impregnable  ambuscade, 
the  rebels  unceasingly  hampered  the  troops  on  the 
left  of  Sir  Hugh  E-ose's  position ;  while  opposite  his 
right  was  the  army  of  the  Nawab  of  Banda,  who, 
after  his  defeat  by  Whitlock  (19th  April,  1858),  joined 
the  rebels  at  Kalpi,  with  a  serviceable  body  of  cavahy. 

Acting  upon  information  that  the  enemy  intended 
to  make  a  determined  attack  upon  his  right,  on  the 
morning  of  May  22nd,  Sir  Hugh  Rose  at  once 
strengthened  his  position  there  ;  and  at  the  same  time 
asked  Brigadier  Maxwell  to  send  him  the  Camel  Corps, 
two  companies  of  the  88th  Regiment,  and  some  Sikh 
infantry.  Placing  himself  in  the  centre  of  his  line, 
with  the  Camel  Corps  under  Major  (now  Lieutenant- 
General  Sir  John)  Ross,  he  was  ready,  on  the  eventful 


134  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

day,  to  meet  any  emergency  ;  that  is  to  say,  to  rein- 
force the  right  or  left  as  required.  Shortly  afterwards, 
an  orderly  came  from  Brigadier  Stuart,  who  was 
commanding  on  the  right,  begging  him  to  come  up 
immediately  with  reinforcements,  as  the  rebels  were 
debouching  from  the  ravines  and  were  advancing  in 
strength.  The  General  at  once  started  himself  with 
the  Camel  Corps  ;  sending  orders  to  the  25th  Native 
Infantry  to  join  him  immediately.  Dismounting  the 
Camel  Sowars,  and  forming  them  into  line,  he  took 
them  at  the  double  up  the  rising  ground,  from  the 
top  of  which  they  saw  Brigadier  Stuart,  sword  in 
hand,  protecting  his  battery  of  mortars,  with  the  help 
of  his  infantry  escort.  Their  strength  had  been  so  re- 
duced and  weakened  by  casualties,  that  there  were 
only  seven  or  eight  artillerymen  to  both  mortars  ^ 

A  charge  of  the  Camel  Corps  soon  relieved  the 
position  from  immediate  danger.  But  the  enemy 
still  swarmed  out  from  the  ravines,  and  became 
closely  engaged  with  the  86th  Regiment.     The  Gwa- 

^  In  his  graphic  account  of  these  operations  Colonel  Malleson 
quotes  a  letter  addressed  to  him  by  an  eye-witness,  who  wrote : 
'Well  do  I  remember  that  day.  Nearly  400  of  my  regiment— the 
86th — were  lnors  de  combat.  The  native  regiment — the  25th  Bengal 
Native  Infantry — were  not  much  better,  and  thousands  of  yelling 
savages  were  pressing  on  while  we  had  a  river  in  our  rear.  We  were 
well  nigh  beaten  when  the  Camel  Corps  came  up  ;  and  about  150 
fresh  troops  soon  turned  the  tide,  and  sent  the  bhang-fortified  enemy 
to  the  rightabout  again.  It  was  the  Camel  Corps  that  virtually  saved 
Sir  Hugh  Eose's  division.  The  enemy  were  within  twenty  yards 
of  our  battery  and  outpost  tents,  the  latter  full  of  men  down  with 
sunstroke.  Another  quarter  of  an  hour  and  there  would  have 
been  a  massacre.* 


THE  SOUTHERN  OPERATIONS  135 

lior  ScpojT^s — fine  stalwart  men  in  red  jackets  and 
white  turbans,  with  white  trousers  di'awn  up  to  the 
thigh — looked  like  demons  as  they  advanced,  uttering 
imprecations  against  the  English. 

The  European  troops  were  hampered  by  defective 
ammunition ;  while  their  great  exertions,  and  the 
gi'eat  heat  of  the  sun,  caused  numerous  sunstrokes. 
Sir  Hugh  Rose  here  received  his  fifth.  Before  this 
happened,  however,  he  had  seen  at  a  glance  that  their 
defective  ammunition  rendered  the  men  useless  as 
skirmishers,  and  that  it  was  no  longer  profitable  to 
employ  them  as  such.  Closing  his  men,  therefore, 
in  double  time  on  their  centre,  he  ordered  them  to 
charge  the  enemy,  who,  unable  to  withstand  the 
shock,  fell  back  in  confusion  to  their  ravines,  sufiering 
heavy  losses  as  they  fled. 

In  the  meantime  Sir  Hugh  Rose  heard  that  his  left 
had  completely  succeeded  in  driving  back  into  Kalpi 
the  force  under  the  Rani  of  Jhansi  and  Rao  Sahib. 
The  battle  was  won,  and  he  might  attack  Kalpi  itself 
the  next  morning  before  daybreak. 

But  the  enemy,  whose  Tiiorale  was  shattered  by 
their  defeat,  had  already  begun  to  evacuate  the  place. 
In  fact  Kalpi  had  been  won  ^  by  the  general  action  on 
the  banks  of  the  Jumna,  and  was  next  day  occupied 
without  further  fighting.  Vast  quantities  of  stores, 
ammunition,  guns,  &c.,  were  found  in  the  fort,  which 

*  In  justice  to  a  gallant  officer  it  must  here  be  said  that  to  the 
efficient  co-operation  of  Brigadier  Maxwell,  Sir  Hugh  Rose  owed 
much  of  his  success  in  the  difficult  operations  before  Kalpi. 


136  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

was  a  central  depot  for  the  rebel  troops  stationed 
south  of  the  Jumna,  and  between  that  river  and  the 
Ganges. 

When  explaining  to  the  Commander-in-Chief  his 
reasons  for  calling  on  Brigadier  Maxwell  to  assist 
him,  for  which  he  had  been  censured,  Sir  Hugh  Rose 
stated  (May  26,  1858)  that  he  was  influenced  by  the 
wish  to  effect  the  rapid  capture  of  Kalpi.  He  had  no 
plan  of  the  fort  and  only  a  faulty  Ordnance  map  to 
consult.  '  When  I  came  near  Kalpi,'  he  wrote, '  I  found 
that  it  was  surrounded  by  a  belt  of  ravines  about  two 
miles  in  breadth,  as  difficult  ground  as  could  be  seen, 
and  that  to  attack  the  fort  I  must  force  the  ravines, 
of  which  the  enemy  had  entrenched  the  entrance, 
and  afterwards  the  town  which  surrounds  the  fort. 
I  always  thought  and  hoped  that  I  should  have  one 
good  fight  with  the  rebels  for  Kalpi ;  and  that  if  they 
lost  it,  they  would  evacuate  the  town  and  fort.  After 
being  beaten  at  Kunch,  they  would  have  evacuated 
Kalpi  had  not  the  Nawab  of  Banda  reinforced  them 
with  a  large  body  of  troops  and  induced  them  to  stay. 
But  whether  the  attack  of  Kalpi  was  to  be  deter- 
mined by  one  or  by  many  days  operations^  I  felt  the 
conviction  that  I  required  reinforcements  on  account 
of  the  sickly  state  of  my  force^  and  the  great  strength 
of  the  ground  defended  by  entrenchments.  All  the 
old  Indian  officers  of  my  force  say  that  they  never 
felt,  not  even  in  Sind,  so  bad  a  heat  as  that  of  the 
Jumna.  The  men  affected  by  it  had  apoplexy, 
violent  crying  fits,  and  lost  their  heads  and  sight. 


THE  SOUTHERN  OPERATIONS  137 

Brigadier  Stuart  and  all  his  staff  were  on  the  sick 
list.  Out  of  '^6  men  of  the  14th  Light  Dragoons  who 
went  from  Gulauli  to  reinforce  a  party  escorting 
supplies  and  threatened  by  the  enemy,  17,  after  being 
out  only  three  hours,  came  home  in  doolis.  Out  of 
less  than  400  men  of  the  25th  Bombay  Native 
Infantry  whom  I  took  to  reinforce  the  Second  Bri- 
gade, 200  fell  out  of  the  number  after  two  hours/ 

Sir  Hugh  Rose  added  :  '  The  Sepoys  having  sworn 
by  the  Jumna,  and  full  of  opium,  made  a  fierce  attack 
on  my  camp.  The  first  on  May  20th  was  only  on 
our  right.  It  was  of  course  beaten  back ;  but  I  did 
not  advance  because  I  knew  the  enemy's  tactics  were 
to  expose  us  as  much  as  possible  to  the  sun,  and  I 
had  made  arrangements  with  Maxwell  to  attack  Kalpi 
on  the  22nd  after  he  had  shelled  the  enemy^s  defences 
in  and  in  advance  of  the  town.  The  second  attack 
was  on  May  22nd.  It  was  a  general  one  and  by  their 
whole  force.  They  made  a  real  and  violent  attack  on 
our  right,  and  a  strong  feint  against  our  centre  and 
left.  Hearing  a  heavy  fire  on  our  right,  I  sent  to  ask 
Brigadier  Stuart  if  I  should  send  him  any  of  the 
Camel  Corps.  He  asked  for  1 00.  I  went  myself  with 
200  to  his  support.  I  found  him  with  very  few  men, 
half  of  whose  rifles  would  not  go  off  on  account  of 
bad  ammunition  ^  ;  and  40  men  were  lying  close  to 

^  It  was  a  proof  of  the  inadequacy  of  musketry  instruction  at 
that  time  that  the  troops,  having  been  trained  to  fire  at  so  short 
a  distance,  fired  generally  with  a  bad  aim  and  too  high.  The 
enemy's  casualties  were  consequently  few,  and  those  chiefly  from 
the  bayonet.     The  men  had  not,  moreover,  been  trained  either 


138  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

him  struck  down  by  the  sun.  The  enemy  were  close 
up  to  his  two  nine-pounder  guns  ;  and  Brigadier  Stuart 
was  so  hard  pressed  that  he  was  on  the  point  of 
ordering  the  Artillerymen  to  draw  their  swords  and 
defend  their  guns.  I  ordered  the  Rifles  and  8cth  to 
charge  with  their  bayonets,  which  young  Ross  did 
most  gallantly  and  effectually,  driving  the  enemy 
back  for  half  a  mile.  The  w^hole  line  then  advanced  ; 
and  they  ran  in  every  direction,  pursued  and  cut  up 
by  the  infantry,  cavalry,  and  artillery.  .  .  .  The  rebels 
are  completely  down  and  discouraged.  In  the  pursuit 
they  threw  away  their  arms  and  made  no  resistance. 
Among  other  guns  we  took  ten  horse-artillery  guns 
of  which  they  are  so  proud.  We  found  a  subterranean 
magazine  of  ammunition  in  the  fort,  two  or  three 
excellent  foundries  and  gun  manufactories.  The 
quantity  of  powder  and  ordnance  stores  in  the  maga- 
zine is  extraordinary.' 

In  a  general  order  to  the  force,  thanking  them  for 
their  devotion  and  discipline.  Sir  Hugh  Rose  said 
amongst  other  things :  '  When  you  first  marched  I 
told  you,  as  British  soldiers,  you  had  more  than 
enough  of  the  courage  for  the  work  which  was  before 

to  fire  at  an  enemy  on  a  high  elevation,  nor  at  an  enemy  on  a 
bank  across  broad  ravines.  A  defect  in  the  ammunition  supplied 
to  the  force  also  made  itself  felt.  From  the  mistake  of  not  con- 
centrating the  whole  strength  of  the  powder  in  the  charge  by  a 
round  ring  at  the  bottom,  which  gave  expansion  to  the  leaden 
bullet,  the  cone  was  only  blown  off  by  the  explosion  ;  and  the 
shell  of  the  bullet  stuck  in  the  rifle.  This  happened  to  all  the 
skirmishers,  to  the  distraction  and  danger  of  the  men. 


THE  SOUTHERN  OPERATIONS  139 

you,  but  that  courage  without  discipline  was  of  no 
avail ;  and  I  exhorted  you  to  let  discipline  be  your 
watchword.  You  have  attended  to  my  orders.  In 
hardships,  in  temptations,  and  in  dangers,  you  have 
obeyed  your  General  and  have  never  left  your  ranks. 
You  have  fought  against  the  strong,  and  you  have 
protected  the  rights  of  the  weak  and  defenceless,  of 
foes  as  well  as  of  friends.  I  have  seen  you  in  the 
heat  of  the  combat  preserve  and  place  children  out 
of  harm's  way.  This  is  the  discipline  of  Christian 
soldiers,  and  this  it  is  which  has  brought  you 
triumphant  from  the  shores  of  Western  India  to  the 
waters  of  the  Jumna.' 

Sir  Hugh  Rose  himself  was  prostrated  with  sickness. 
He  had  had  three  attacks  of  the  sun  at  Kunch,  a 
fourth  in  an  intermediate  reconnaissance,  and  a  fifth 
in  the  general  action  before  Kalpi.  As  the  remedies 
administered  to  enable  him  to  rise  again,  ride,  and 
retain  command  in  the  field  were  necessarily  strong, 
whilst  his  duties  became  more  onerous  from  all  his 
stafif  being  sick  or  ailing,  he  became  quite  overborne 
with  fatigue  and  anxiety.  The  condition  of  the  force 
was  described  by  an  eye-witness  (Dr.  Lowe),  who 
wrote  :  '  The  General  was  very  ill ;  his  chief  of  the  stafiT, 
General  Wetherall,  was  in  a  raging  fever  ;  his  Quarter- 
master-General, Captain  Macdonald,  worn  out ;  the 
Chaplain  of  the  Force  had  lost  his  reason,  and  was 
apparently  sinking  fast.'' 

The  capture  of  Kalpi  completed  the  plan  of  the 
campaign,  which  the  Government  of  India  had  drawn 


I40  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

Tip  for  the  Central  Indian  Force.  Marching  from 
Mhow  in  January,  1858,  that  force  in  five  months 
had  traversed  Central  India,  had  beaten  the  enemy  in 
thirteen  general  actions  and  sieges,  and  had  captured 
some  of  the  strono^est  forts  in  India.  Lord  Canning 
telegraphed  to  Sir  Hugh  Rose  on  May  24th,  1858  : 
'  Your  capture  of  Kalpi  has  crowned  a  series  of 
brilliant  and  uninterrupted  successes.  I  thank  you 
and  your  brave  soldiers  v^ith  all  my  heart.' 

Sir  Colin  Campbell  had  decided  that  after  the  fall 
of  Kalpi  the  Central  India  Field  Force  was  to  be 
broken  up,  and  to  be  distributed  at  Gwalior  and 
Jhansi.  The  necessary  arrangements  were  taken  in 
hand  ;  and  Sir  Hugh  Rose,  worn  out  with  fatigue  and 
sunstroke,  was  advised  by  his  medical  officer  to 
return  at  once  to  Bombay.  But  before  he  could 
start,  intelligence  came  which  upset  all  his  plans  and 
created  a  sensation  throughout  India  hardly  inferior 
to  that  caused  by  the  first  mutinies.  The  rebel  army 
under  Tantia  Topi  and  the  Rani  of  Jhansi,  the  report 
said,  whilst  retreating  across  the  Chambal  river,  had 
changed  their  route,  and  had  attacked  the  Maharaja 
Sindhia  at  Bahadurpur,  nine  miles  from  Gwalior; 
whereupon  his  Highness'  troops  of  all  arms,  with 
the  exception  of  a  few  of  his  bodyguard,  had  treach- 
erously gone  over  en  r)iasse  to  the  enemy. 

The  Maharaja,  it  seems,  had  called  out  his  troops 
to  co-operate  with  Lord  Clyde's  army  against  the 
rebels  who  were  retreating  into  Rohilkhand ;  but 
when   he  paraded  them  in   order    to    march,   they 


THE  SOUTHERN  OPERATIONS  141 

mutinied  to  a  man.  After  a  brave  endeavour  to 
assert  his  authority,  he  was  forced  by  the  fire  of  his 
own  artillery  and  the  combined  attacks  of  his  troops 
and  of  the  rebel  army  to  fly  to  Agra,  which  place  he 
reached  with  difficulty,  accompanied  by  only  one  or 
two  attendants.  The  rebels  had  meanwhile  entered 
Gwalior  and  looted  the  treasury  and  jewels ;  amongst 
these  latter  being  a  famous  pearl  necklace  taken 
from  the  Portuguese  regalia.  The  garrison  of  the 
fort  at  the  same  time  opened  its  gate  to  the  rebels  ; 
and  from  50  to  60  fine  guns  (comprising  horse,  field, 
and  siege  artillery),  as  well  as  an  arsenal  with  abund- 
ance of  warlike  stores,  fell  into  the  enemy's  hands. 
Thus  the  rebels  who  had  fled  a  disorderly  and  help- 
less mob  from  Kalpi,  now  found  themselves  provided 
with  abundance  of  money,  with  a  serviceable  park  of 
artillery,  with  iniaUriel  of  war,  and  with  Sindhia's 
army  as  their  allies.  To  render  the  situation  still 
more  embarrassing,  Gwalior  fell  into  rebel  hands  at 
the  most  unfavourable  time  of  the  year  for  military 
operations ;  on  the  eve,  that  is,  of  the  great  rains,  and 
when  the  heat  of  summer  was  at  its  maximum. 

This  serious  news  reached  Sir  Hugh  Hose  just 
after  his  leave  had  been  granted.  A  few  days'  rest 
had  revived  him  and  he  at  once  telegraphed  to  the 
Governor- General  to  say  that  he  would  be  glad  to 
take  command  of  the  force  ordered  to  recapture  the 
city  and  fortress.  Lord  Canning  thanked  him  warmly 
for  this  generous  devotion  to  the  public  service,  and  ac- 
cepted the  offer.     At  the  same  time,  Brigadier-General 


142  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

(the  late  Field-Marshal  Lord)  Napier,  who  had  been 
appointed  to  succeed  Sir  Hugh  Eose  on  his  departure 
to  Bombay,  now  with  the  generosity  which  always 
characterised  him,  told  Lord  Canning  that  he  would 
be  delighted  to  serve  as  second  in  command ;  and  Sir 
Hugh  Eose  was  glad  to  have  so  able  an  officer  to 
assist  him  in  the  operations. 

Starting  on  June  5th,  Sir  Hugh  reached  Bahadur- 
pur,  the  scene  of  Sindhia's  defeat,  on  June  i6th.  The 
march  was  attended  with  considerable  difficulties  on 
account  of  the  absence  of  roads,  the  want  of  maps, 
rivers  difficult  to  be  crossed,  and  heat  so  intense  that 
the  thermometer  on  one  occasion  stood  at  130°  when 
it  broke.  Sir  Hugh  Eose's  plan  of  operations  was  to 
invest  Gwalior  as  closely  as  its  great  extent  would 
allow,  and  then  to  attack  on  the  weakest  side ;  the 
investing  troops  cutting  off  the  escape  of  the  rebels. 
He  hoped  that  the  defeat  of  the  enemy,  outside  and 
inside  the  city,  would  be  followed,  as  at  Kalpi,  by 
the  easy  capture  of  the  fortress.  A  scientific  siege  of 
the  fortress  would  have  prolonged  the  operations  far 
into  the  rainy  season.  With  great  trouble  he  had 
ascertained  that  the  weakest  side  of  Gwalior,  and  con- 
sequently the  best  suited  for  an  attack,  was  the  east, 
where  the  city  was  commanded  by  high  hills.  Here, 
too,  Gwalior  might  be  captured  almost  out  of  range 
of  the  guns  in  the  fort. 

Placing  the  Haidarabad  Contingent  in  a  position  to 
cut  off  the  retreat  of  the  rebels  to  the  South,  and 
directing  Brigadier  Smith  with  the  Eajputana  Field 


THE  SOUTHERN  OPERATIONS  143 

Force  to  move  from  Sipri  to  Kotah-ki-Sarai,  about 
seven  miles  to  the  east  of  Gwalior,  Sir  Hugh  Rose,  on 
June  1 6th,  marched  with  Brigadier  Stuart's  column 
and  the  small  force  he  had  brought  from  Kalpi 
against  the  Morar  cantonments.  These  cantonments, 
which  lay  about  five  miles  from  Gwalior,  were  re- 
ported to  be  in  the  enemy's  possession. 

A  close  reconnaissance  showed  that  the  side  of  the 
cantonments  fronting  his  force  was  occupied  by  strong 
bodies  of  cavalry,  and  that  with  them  were  guns  and 
a  considerable  number  of  infantry.  Feeling  certain 
that  his  men  would  be  reinvigorated  rather  than 
fatigued  by  an  immediate  action,  and  that  the  morale 
of  the  enemy  would  be  damped  by  his  attacking  them 
unexpectedly  after  a  long  night's  march, — for  he  had 
only  reached  Bahadurpur  at  6  a.m.  on  June  16th  and 
marched  against  Morar  the  same  day, — he  resolved  to 
strike  at  once,  and  placed  the  troops  in  order  of 
battle. 

The  advance,  covered  by  the  Haidarabad  cavalry, 
was  made  in  two  lines  in  echelon  from  the  right. 
The  first  line,  under  the  General  himself,  consisted  of 
a  field  battery  and  siege  guns  in  the  centre,  the  86th 
Regiment  on  the  right,  the  25th  Bombay  Native  In- 
fantry on  the  left,  and  the  14th  Light  Dragoons  on 
each  flank.  The  second  line,  under  Brigadier-General 
Napier,  was  placed  in  echelon  on  his  left;  the  left  was 
'  refused,'  as  the  ravines  in  this  direction  were  full  of 
ambuscaded  troops  and  such  a  formation  would  enable 
the  whole  force  to  wheel  rapidly  to  the  left  if  necessary. 


144  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

Patrols  of  cavalry  were  at  the  same  time  sent  to  searcli 
the  hills  on  the  left  and  rear. 

As  the  troops  advanced,  the  enemy  in  the  ravines 
were  forced  to  show  themselves  by  Brigadier- General 
Napier,  and  a  sharp  action  took  place  between  them 
and  the  71st  Highlanders,  who  behaved  admirably, 
routing  the  enemy  with  great  slaughter.  In  Sir 
Hugh  Rose's  own  words,  '  the  commander  of  the 
second  line  merited  my  warmest  thanks  for  his  skilful 
management  of  it.'  On  this  occasion,  Lieutenant 
Neave,  of  the  71st  Highlanders,  who  led  a  charge 
against  the  enemy  and  fell  mortally  wounded,  par- 
ticularly distinguished  himself;  and  a  sergeant  and 
private  of  the  regiment  obtained  the  Victoria  Cross 
for  personal  bravery.  The  success  was  completed  by 
an  admirable  pursuit  of  the  rebels  by  a  wing  of  the 
14th  Light  Dragoons. 

The  capture  of  the  Morar  cantonments  had  good 
results.  It  was  the  first  defeat  which  the  combined 
forces  of  the  Kalpi  and  Gwalior  rebels  had  sustained ; 
and  it  enabled  Sir  Hugh  Rose  to  at  once  open  up 
communications  with  Brigadier  Smith  at  Kotah-ki- 
Sarai,  seven  miles  to  the  east,  and  to  reconnoitre 
Gwalior  from  that  side. 

In  the  meantime,  Er'gadier  Smith  had  a  sharp  en- 
counter with  the  enemy  and  was  able  partially  to 
occupy  the  heights  to  the  east  of  Gwalior,  in  spite  of 
determined  opposition.  In  resisting  a  gallant  charge 
of  a  squadron  of  the  8th  Hussars  under  Captain 
Heneage, — when  the   Hussars  passed  right  through 


THE  SOUTHERN  OPERATIONS  145 

the  enemy's  camp,  carrying  everything  before  them — 
the  Rani  of  Jhansi  received  her  death  wound;  and 
the  spot  ^Yas  afterwards  shown  where  her  body  was 
burnt  with  great  ceremony  ^.  Thus  fell  '  the  bravest 
and  best  military  leader  of  the  rebels '  at  the  early 
age  of  twenty  years. 

Sir  Hugh  Rose's  reconnaissance  of  Gwalior  satisfied 
him  that  the  information  on  which  he  had  decided  to 
attack  was  trustworthy.  He  could  not  leave  Morar, 
however,  without  adequate  protection.  Brigadier- 
General  Napier  was  accordingly  posted  at  the  canton- 
ments to  guard  the  position,  with  instructions  to 
pursue  the  enemy  when  they  retreated;  while  Sir 
Hugh  himself,  in  order  to  complete  his  communi- 
cations with  Brigadier  Smith  and  to  attack  Gwalior 
from  the  east,  marched  on  the  afternoon  of  June 
1 8th  towards  Kotah-ki-Sarai.  The  march  was  very 
harassing,  100  men  of  the  86th  Regiment  alone  being 
compelled  by  the  sun  to  fall  out  and  go  into  doolis. 
There  was  clearly  no  time  to  lose,  and  the  enemy  had 
to  be  attacked  at  once.  A  deep  ditch  surrounded  the 
high  hills  which  overlooked  Gwalior ;  but  notwith- 
standing this  obstacle,  the  troops  quickly  gained 
possession  of  the  heights  to  the  east  of  the  town,  and 
came  in  full  view  of  it.     A  large  party  of  the  rebels, 

*  This  Indian  Joan  of  Arc  was  dressed  in  a  red  jacket  and 
trousers  and  white  turban.  She  wore  Sindhia's  celebrated  pearl 
necklace  which  she  had  taken  from  his  treasury.  As  she  lay 
mortally  wounded  in  her  tent,  she  ordered  these  ornaments  to 
be  distributed  among  her  troops.  The  whole  rebel  army  mourned 
her  loss. 

E 


146  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

some  10,000  men,  were  seen  drawn  up  on  the  parade 
square,  with  numerous  cavalry  and  two  i8-pounders, 
besides  other  guns. 

Brigadier  Smith  having  come  up  in  the  mean- 
time and  turned  the  enemy's  left,  Sir  Hugh  Rose 
sent  Cornet  (now  Major-General)  Goldsworthy,  8th 
Hussars,  a  'gallant  and  intelligent  officer,'  for  the 
Field  Battery  and  Horse  Artillery.  The  gunners 
soon  opened  a  successful  fire,  which  killed  and  disabled 
a  large  number  of  the  enemy  and  put  the  rest  to 
flight. 

The  troops  now  entered  the  town  without  difficulty ; 
and,  marching  up  the  main  street,  took  possession 
of  Sindhia's  palace  ^,  with  the  intention  of  capturing 
the  fort  in  the  morning.  Brigadier  Smith  co-operated 
with  good  efiect  on  the  left  near  the  palace  of  Phiil 
Bagh,  which  he  took,  killing  numbers  of  the  enemy 
and  capturing  several  guns. 

^  This  was  effected  without  bloodshed  through  the  useful  inter- 
position of  Captain  (now  Sir  Kichard)  Meade.  He  happened  to 
be  well  known  to  the  Gwalior  men,  and  gallantly  volunteered  to 
go  forward  alone  to  the  palace  court-yard,  which  was  full  of  armed 
and  excited  soldiery,  to  persuade  them  to  submit  peaceably,  and 
to  give  up  the  palace.  They  fortunately  recognised  him,  and  after 
some  delay,  acted  on  his  advice.  Captain  Meade  came  back  unhurt 
to  the  General  and  reported  that  the  force  could  move  forward. 
The  next  day  Sindhia  returned,  overjoyed  and  overcome,  to  his 
capital,  and  insisted  upon  giving  Sir  Hugh  Rose  a  dinner  in  his 
palace,  attended  by  his  old  servants,  who  seemed  overwhelmed 
with  pleasure.  He  was  afterwards  anxious  to  present  a  medal 
with  his  device,  a  serpent,  to  all  the  officers  and  men  of  the 
Central  India  Field  Foi'ce,  together  with  six  months'  batta.  Lord 
Canning  approved  the  presentation  of  the  medal,  but  permission 
was  refused  by  the  Home  Government. 


THE  SOUTHERN  OPERATIONS  1 47 

In  the  early  morning  (June  19th)  Sir  Hugh  Rose 
moved  with  General  Stuart's  Brigade  to  the  left  of 
the  Gwalior  Rock,  where  it  was  not  precipitate; 
covering  the  movement  by  sending  the  25th  Native 
Infantry,  well  supported,  round  the  same  sort  of 
ground  on  the  right,  whence  they  could  scramble  up 
the  rock  above  the  gateway  of  the  fort.  Here  Lieu- 
tenant Rose,  son  of  Rose  of  Kilravock,  commanding 
the  advanced  skirmishers,  caught  sight  of  a  depression 
of  the  ground  where  the  second  gate  into  the  fort  was 
situated.  Collecting  his  skirmishers  into  line,  he 
stormed  it,  effecting  a  capture  as  successful  as  it  was 
bold ;  but  paying  for  his  gallantry  with  his  life. 

Sir  Hugh  Rose  now  sent  an  order  to  Brigadier- 
General  Napier  to  pursue  the  enemy  as  far  and  as 
closely  as  he  could.     This  Napier  did  most  effectually^. 

^  Brigadier  Napier  wrote  to  Sir  Hugh  Eose  as  follows  : — '  Camp 
Jaora-Alipur.  I  trust  you  have  received  my  letters  dated  21st, 
informing  you  of  our  having  attacked  and  dispelled  the  enemy 
and  captured  25  guns.  An  elephant  and  some  carts  and  tents 
were  also  taken,  and  a  Government  postbag  full  of  letters  for 
your  force,  I  moved  yesterday  by  Sirauda,  intending  to  have 
followed  the  enemy's  traces  to  Sabulgarh  ;  but  I  found  that, 
from  all  accounts  I  could  gather,  their  dispersion  was  more 
complete  even  than  I  had  believed,  whilst  the  leading  fugitives 
had  already  passed  Sabulgarh.  I  found  the  greatest  diffi- 
culty in  getting  supplies,  the  natives  of  the  force  having  been 
without  ^ta  for  several  days ;  the  banyas  had  deserted  their 
villages,  and  very  small  quantities  were  procurable  from  the  best 
disposed  villages  :  I  have  no  doubt  I  could  have  found  more,  but  of 
course  tried  to  avoid  embroiling  Sindhia  with  his  subjects  by  any 
coercive  measures.  Under  these  difficulties,  and  with  the  troops 
knocking  up  much  from  the  intense  heat,  I  have  thought  it  useless 
to  advance  further  and  have  brought  back  my  column  to  Jaora- 

K  2 


148  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

Twenty-five  pieces  of  artillery  were  the  fruits  of  his 
pursuit,  as  well  as  the  total  dispersion  of  the  enemy. 

Thus  ended  on  June  20th,  1858,  the  taking  of 
Gwalior.  The  operations  were  briefly  summed  up  by 
Sir  Hugh  Rose  in  a  despatch  to  the  Government  of 
India,  dated  October  13th,  1858,  in  which  the  General 
wrote : — '  As  the  commander  of  the  troops  engaged, 
it  is  my  duty  to  say  that  although  a  most  arduous 
campaign  had  impaired  the  health  and  strength  of 
my  force,  their  discipline,  devotion,  and  courage  re- 
mained unvarying  and  unshaken ;  enabling  them  to 
make  a  very  rapid  march  in  summer-heat  to  Gwalior; 
fight  and  gain  two  actions  on  the  road,  one  at  Morar 
Cantonments,  the  other  at  Kotah-ki-Sarai  ;  arrive, 
from  great  distances  and  by  bad  roads,  at  their  posts 
before  Gwalior  on  the  day  appointed,  the  19th  of 
June ;  and  on  that  same  day  carry  by  assault  all  the 
enemy's  positions  on  strong  heights  and  in  most 
difiicult  ground  ;  taking  one  battery  after  another, 
27  pieces  of  artillery  in  the  action,  %^  in  the  pursuit, 
besides  the  guns  in  the  fort,  the  old  city,  the  new  city, 
and  finally  the  rock  of  Gwalior,  held  to  be  one  of  the 
most  important  and  strongest  fortresses  in  India.     I 

Alipur.  Captain  Eoss's  detachment  is  here  in  charge  of  the  guns 
captured.  I  send  in  an  express  for  your  further  orders.  I  believe 
about  300  of  the  enemy  have  been  killed  ;  the  country  people  say 
about  500 ;  but  the  rebels  dispersed  over  the  whole  face  of  the 
country,  throwing  away  their  arms  and  accoutrements.  I  had  20 
cases  of  sunstroke  more  or  less  severe,  yesterday,  in  the  Horse 
Artillery.  I  never  felt  anything  like  the  heat.  Sindhia's  faithful 
Sowars  have  just  made  their  appearance,  and  I  employ  them  to 
have  a  relay  between  this  and  Gwalior  for  your  answer.' 


THE  SOUTHERN  OPERATIONS  149 

marched  on  June  9th  from  Kalpi,  and  on  the  19th  of 
the  same  month  the  Gwalior  State  was  restored  to 
their  prince.' 

The  Government  of  India  was  more  than  satisfied 
at  the  result;  and  immediate  steps  were  taken  to 
make  known  its  approval.  A  telegram  from  the 
President  in  Council  was  sent  to  all  stations,  at 
Lord  Canning's  desire,  requesting  that  *  the  news 
may  be  spread  through  every  part  of  the  Deccan, 
and  all  Southern  and  Eastern  India,  and  that  the 
restoration  of  our  brave  and  faithful  ally  Sindhia 
through  British  arms  may  be  loudly  proclaimed.' 
At  the  same  time,  a  public  notification  was  issued 
at  Calcutta,  ordering  a  '  royal  salute  '  to  be  fired  at 
every  large  town  in  India  to  celebrate  the  event. 

The  feeling  amongst  Anglo-Indians  generally  was 
fairly  reflected  in  a  letter  written  by  a  correspondent 
at  Gwalior  to  the  public  press  in  June,  1858.  After 
mentioning  that  Sir  Hugh  Rose  was  about  to  leave 
for  Bombay,  to  take  command  of  the  Poona  Division, 
the  writer  said :  '  His  career  has  been  a  glorious  one, 
and  is  worthily  crowned  by  the  capture  of  Gwalior 
and  the  utter  defeat  of  the  rebels  here.  His  position 
is  the  proudest  that  any  General  has  occupied  in  this 
country  for  many  a  long  day.' 

Nor  were  his  services  forgotten  at  home.  He  was 
created  a  G.C.B.  and  appointed  to  the  Colonelcy  of  the 
45th  Regiment.  His  name  was  also  mentioned  in  the 
vote  of  thanks,  passed  in  both  Houses  of  Parliament,  to 
the  troops  engaged  in  the  Mutiny  Campaign ;  on  which 


150  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

occasion  high  praise  was  bestowed  on  his  skill  and 
gallantry  by  the  Earl  of  Derby,  the  Duke  of  Cambridge, 
Lord  Palmerston,  and  other  distinguished  statesmen. 

It  is  impossible,  however,  to  overlook  the  keen 
disappointment  that  was  felt  in  the  Service  when  the 
troops  of  the  Central  India  Field  Force  were  not 
only  forbidden  to  accept  the  silver  star  which  the 
Maharaja  Sindhia  desired  to  give  them,  but  received 
no  hatta^  and  no  decoration,  for  a  series  of  brilliant 
successes  untarnished  by  a  defeat  or  retreat^,  except  the 
general  clasp  that  was  given  promiscuously  to  all  the 
troops  in  Central  India,  some  of  whom  had  done 
little  or  nothing.  To  crown  all,  the  Central  India 
Field  Force  was  debarred,  by  a  special  pleading, 
founded  on  some  Admiralty  ruling  respecting  the 
blockade  of  ports  by  ships  of  war,  from  participating 
in  the  prize-money  found  at  Banda  and  Kirwi ;  al- 
though the  right  of  the  Force  to  receive  a  share 
had  been  frankly  acknowledged  by  the  Government 
of  India,  by  the  Commander-in-Chief  in  India,  and 
by  the  military  authorities  and  head  of  the  Govern- 
ment at  home.  Sir  Hugh  Rose  himself  never  asked 
for  and  never  received  any  pension ;  and,  his  means 
at  that  time  being  small,  the  loss  of  some  £30,000  as 
his  own  personal  share  in  the  coveted  prize-money  was 
a  serious  one. 

In  bringing  to  a  close  the  story  of  the  Southern 
operations,  it  may  not  be  improper  to  quote  the  remarks 
of  an  impartial  critic  ^,  who  writes :  '  It  seldom  happens 
^  Prichard's  'India.* 


THE  SOUTHERN  OPERATIONS  151 

that  a  great  war  or  a  serious  political  crisis  fails  in 
bringing  forward  the  man  of  the  time,  whose  genius 
lacked  only  the  opportunity  of  development.  The 
campaign  in  India  of  1857-58  was  no  exception  to 
the  rule.  Far  in  advance  of  any  of  the  other  com- 
manders in  genius,  tact,  judgment,  energy,  and  that 
unflinching  determination  which  has  won  for  England 
so  many  victories  by  sea  and  land,  the  character  of 
Sir  Hugh  Rose,  to  any  one  who  studies  the  military 
history  of  those  times,  stands  out  prominently.  If 
his  services  have  been  barely  rewarded,  they  have 
never  been  appreciated,  because  not  thoroughly  under- 
stood in  England.  In  India  it  is  generally  believed 
some  official  jealousy  threw  into  the  shade  what  was 
undoubtedly  one  of  the  most  brilliant  achievements 
that  the  military  history  of  any  country  in  ancient  or 
modern  times  has  recorded.  Important  as  were  the 
operations  under  Lord  Clyde  in  Oudh  and  Rohilkhand, 
they  would  have  been  profitless,  so  far  as  putting  an 
end  to  the  war  is  concerned,  had  it  not  been  for  the 
vigour,  determination,  and  skill  of  his  lieutenant ;  and 
fortunate  it  was  for  us  that  the  tremendous  task  of 
recovering  Central  India,  from  the  borders  of  the 
Western  Presidency  up  to  the  Ganges,  had  been  en- 
trusted to  a  commander  of  Sir  Hugh  Rose's  stamp. 
Had  it  been  made  over  to  a  less  able  man,  the  result 
would  have  been  the  transference  of  the  seat  of  war 
from  Oudh  and  Rohilkhand  to  Central  India ;  where 
in  a  most  difficult  country,  surrounded  by  independent 
States  only  half  inclined  to  side  with  us,  the  campaign, 


152  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

iDstead  of  being  closed  in  1859,  would  have  probably 
gone  on  two  years  longer.  Had  all  Sir  Hugh  Rose's 
previous  service  been  passed  in  India,  had  he  made 
the  country  and  the  character  of  its  inhabitants  his 
study  for  years,  he  could  not  have  shown  greater 
knowledge  of  the  most  effective  method  of  dealing 
with  the  rebellion.  With  a  small  but  well-appointed 
force,  a  tithe  of  that  with  which  Lord  Clyde  confronted 
an  enemy  scarcely  less  formidable,  he  marched  in  one 
career  of  conquest  from  the  Western  Presidency  right 
up  to  Kalpi  on  the  Jumna,  captured  fortresses  and 
walled  towns,  driving  the  enemy  before  him,  fighting 
battles  against  enormous  odds  with  one  hand,  while, 
with  the  other,  he  kept  open  his  communications,  or, 
as  at  Jhansi,  maintained  a  siege.  He  understood  the 
immense  importance  in  Asiatic  warfare  of  keeping 
the  ball  rolling.  He  allowed  the  enemy  no  breathing 
time.  The  consequence  was  that^  formidable  as  they 
were  in  numbers,  in  character,  in  desperation,  in  re- 
sources, in  position,  and  in  the  sympathy  of  the 
population,  they  disappeared  before  the  British  troops 
as  a  row  of  houses  built  up  with  a  pack  of  cards  falls 
at  the  touch  of  the  hand.  Such  an  unchecked  career 
of  conquest  resembles  that  of  the  Israelitish  invaders 
of  Palestine.  It  was  an  achievement  scarcely  less 
glorious  than  the  Retreat  of  the  Ten  Thousand.' 

Having  made  over  the  command  of  the  Central 
India  Field  Force  to  Brigadier-General  Napier,  Sir 
Hugh  Rose  bade  farewell  to  his  troops  and  set  out  on 
June  29,  1858,  to  rejoin  his  command  at  Poona,  where 


THE  SOUTHERN  OPERATIONS  153 

he  rapidly  regained  his  health.  On  all  sides  he  re- 
ceived kindnesses  and  congratulations.  '  People  of  all 
classes,'  he  wrote  August  18,  1858,  'continue  to  give 
me  all  sorts  of  ovations,  but  public  favour  is  a  very 
fitful  thing  and  may  change  in  a  contrary  direction 
at  any  moment.  I  am  all  ready  however,  thank  God, 
for  another  campaign,  although  from  all  accounts  I 
think  there  will  not  be  one.' 

Only  two  anxieties,  at  this  period,  weighed  on  his 
mind.  One  was  owing  to  the  delay  in  the  submission 
of  his  reports  and  despatches ;  which  delay  not  only 
elicited  a  reproof  from  Government,  but  also  helped 
to  postpone  a  proper  appreciation  of  the  value  of  his 
campaign.  The  other  anxiety  was  the  escape  to 
Southern  India  and  the  vain  and  continued  pursuit 
of  the  ubiquitous  Tantia  Topi.  The  delay  of  the 
despatches  was  much  to  be  regretted,  and  was  almost 
unaccountable.  Judging  from  the  correspondence 
which  passed  at  the  time,  it  arose  partly  from  the 
labour  which  it  cost  to  place  on  record  an  accurate 
account  of  the  rapid  events  that  had  taken  place ; 
and  partly  from  the  fact  that  during  the  campaign  he 
had  no  plans  of  forts  or  positions,  and  was  therefore 
unable  to  undertake  any  operation  without  reconnoit- 
ring localities  himself,  being  often — one  might  almost 
say  daily — fourteen  and  fifteen  hours  in  the  saddle  on 
that  kind  of  duty.  As  regards  Tantia  Topi,  it  was  not 
until  the  spring  of  1 859  that  his  hiding-place  was  be- 
trayed by  an  associate,  and  he  was  captured  by  Meade 
and  hanged  at  Sipri  on  April  1 8th  of  that  year. 


154  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

On  March  29th,  1859,  Sir  Hugh  Rose  was  ap- 
pointed to  the  Command-in- Chief  of  the  Bombay 
Army.  At  the  end  of  a  few  months  he  was  trans- 
ferred (June  4th,  i860),  on  the  departure  of  Lord 
Clyde  for  England,  to  the  Commander-in-Chiefship 
of  India.  This  appointment  greatly  pleased  him, 
and  he  wrote  (Sept.  19th,  i860):  'As  a  proof  of  con- 
fidence and  approval,  my  being  made  Commander-in 
Chief  is  more  gratifying  than  a  peerage,  especially 
when  the  Indian  Army  has  to  be  reorganised.  I  will 
endeavour  to  bear  v/ith  humility  my  elevation,  which 
I  am  convinced  I  owe  more  to  the  signal  mercy  of 
God  than  to  my  own  merits.  I  feel  that  with  His 
blessing  I  can  do  an  immense  amount  of  good  ;  but  I 
shall  fail  in  doing  what  I  ought  to  do,  if  I  give  way 
to  anything  like  feelings  of  pride.' 

After  holding  this  command  for  five  years  Sir 
Hugh  Eose  returned  to  England,  was  raised  to  the 
peerage  with  the  title  of  Baron  Strathnairn  of  Strath- 
nairn  and  Jliansi,  and  was  subsequently  promoted 
to  the  rank  of  Field-Marshal.  He  died  suddenly  at 
Paris  on  the  16th  of  October,  1885,  at  the  age  of 
eighty-four,  and  now  lies  in  the  family  graveyard  of 
the  Priory  Church  of  Christchurch,  Hants. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

Reconstruction 

As  may  readily  be  imagined,  even  by  readers  who 
are  unfamiliar  with  the  details  of  military  administra- 
tion in  India,  it  was  impossible  that  the  defeat  of  the 
rebels  in  the  field  should  be  followed  by  a  tranquil 
restoration  of  the  status  quo  ante.  Bloodshed  and 
disorder  had  given  way  to  peace  and  to  measures 
of  reorganisation,  but  it  required  all  the  wisdom  of 
the  conquerors  to  reconstruct  institutions  which  had 
been  shaken  and  discredited ;  besides  dealing  with  a 
local  European  army  which,  after  splendid  service  in 
the  field,  tarnished  the  glory  of  its  success  by  a 
so-called  'white'  mutiny,  and  with  a  disbanded 
Sepoy  force  which  was  alike  despised  and  detested. 
Everything  was  more  or  less  in  a  state  of  transition. 
Men  of  Indian  experience  vied  with  each  other  in 
efforts  to  change  everything,  to  replace  everything ; 
nor  is  it  extraordinary  that  the  improved  systems 
and  new  organisations,  eventually  adopted,  were  often 
found  to  be  of  doubtful  utility. 

The  reformers  of  one  great  school  contended  that  to 
be  ready  for  offence  was  the  only  way  to  avoid  being 


IS6  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

attacked;  and  that  if  the  peace  of  India  was  to  be 
safeguarded  from  internal  commotion  and  foreign 
aggression,  the  army  must  be  made  strong  enough  to 
overawe  enemies  either  within  or  without  its  boun- 
daries. They  accordingly  advocated  large  increases  in 
the  permanent  British  Ai'my  stationed  in  the  country  ; 
the  formation  of  a  powerful  Navy ;  a  wholesale 
reduction  of  the  Native  Army,  which  was  best  fitted, 
they  argued,  for  police  duties  ;  an  entire  rearmament 
of  batteries,  forts,  and  fortified  positions ;  and  a 
complete  remodelling  of  all  civil  and  military  institu- 
tions. 

Another  school  of  experts  would  have  none  of  these 
things.  We  should  hold  India,  they  contended,  not 
by  the  sword,  but  by  winning  the  love  and  affection 
of  conquered  races,  and  by  inviting  all  classes  to  take 
a  larger  share  in  the  civil  and  military  government  of 
the  country.  There  was  much  to  be  said  ih  favour  of 
both  schools.  The  arguments  of  each  were  submitted 
to  the  verdict  of  public  opinion  with  considerable 
abiKty  and  earnestness ;  and  were  in  due  course 
recorded  in  those  ponderous  Blue  Books  and  volumi- 
nous reports  which  are  the  delight  of  Governments 
and  Royal  Commissions  of  the  present  century. 

To  make  a  proper  use  of  the  opportunity  was  more 
difficult  than  to  win  the  battle.  For  there  was  an 
East  India  Company  to  dispose  of ;  a  Company  which 
boldly  asserted  that,  as  a  governing  body,  it  was  '  not 
onty  one  of  the  purest  in  intention,  but  one  of  the 
most  beneficent  in  act  ever  known  among  mankind.' 


RECONSTRUCTION  157 

There  were,  moreover,  the  officers  of  a  disbanded 
army  whose  interests  had  to  be  studied,  albeit  their 
ignorance  of  the  men  they  commanded,  and  their  un- 
fitness for  ordinary  military  command,  in  too  many 
cases,  had  precipitated  the  disaster  which  had  left  them 
without  regiments.  And  not  to  speak  of  the  varied 
questions  of  moment  that  arose  in  connection  with 
the  European  portion  of  the  Company's  forces,  there 
was  above  all  the  necessity  of  forming  a  new  Native 
Army  on  the  ruins  of  an  old  one  whose  traditions, 
after  all,  had  been  honourable,  whose  service  up  to 
the  date  of  the  Mutiny  had  been  invaluable,  and  whose 
place  it  was  not  easy  to  fill. 

On  Lord  Canning  principally  devolved  the  irksome 
duty  of  reconciling  incompatible  opinion,  and  of 
reorganising:  the  defences  of  India.  The  Governor- 
General  had  borne  with  calmness  the  brunt  of  the 
Mutiny.  He  was  fearless  of  responsibility,  he  had  a 
considerable  insight  into  character,  and  he  had 
attained,  during  the  time  of  trial,  an  unusual  degree 
of  military  prescience  and  instinct,  which  made  itself 
felt  on  occasions  when  he  had  to  control  with  his 
intelligence  and  judgment  the  barrack-yard  know- 
ledge of  some  of  the  barrack-yard  soldiers  who  carried 
out  his  orders. 

India  was  still  feeling  the  shock  from  which  it  had 
barely  recovered;  and  Lord  Canning,  therefore,  felt 
that  while  he  could  aftbrd  to  be  pacific,  he  could  not 
afford  to  be  weak.  We  had  originally  fought  our  way 
to  power  in  the  East ;  and  it  was  now  for  us  to  show 


158  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

ourselves  capable  of  retaining  the  great  position  that 
had  been  recommitted,  as  it  were,  into  our  hands  by 
Providence.  The  time  was  coming  when  it  would 
be  our  duty  to  think  less  of  ruling  by  the  sword,  and 
more  of  securing  the  goodwill  and  affection  of  the 
people.  But  that  time  had  not  yet  arrived,  and  the 
Indian  Government  had  therefore  to  pay  almost 
exclusive  attention,  for  several  years  after  the  Mutiny, 
to  military  measures  and  military  precautions. 

The  general  population  and  educated  classes  in 
the  British  provinces  had  stood  aloof  from  the  revolt, 
and  the  closer  incorporation  of  their  interests  with 
the  Buling  Power  formed  part  of  the  scheme.  But 
territories  that  for  a  thousand  years  had  been  held 
by  the  sword,  and  the  great  kingdoms  of  Oudh  and 
Haidarabad,  the  Maratha  States,  and  the  Punjab, 
which  had  been  established  since  the  rise  of  British 
power,  must  still,  it  was  rightly  considered,  be  held 
by  a  sword  firmly  grasped.  These  were  the  senti- 
ments that  actuated  the  minds  of  Indian  adminis- 
trators during  the  eventful  years  of  change  and  recon- 
struction which  followed  the  suppression  of  the  Mutiny.. 

They  were  years  of  destruction  as  well  as  of 
construction.  The  first  institution  to  be  abolished 
was  the  East  India  Company  itself.  However  useful 
in  earlier  generations,  a  dual  government  had  resulted 
disastrously  in  divided  responsibilities  ;  and  there  was 
no  other  alternative  open  but  to  replace  the  Company's 
depreciated  authority  by  the  sceptre  of  the  Queen. 
Accordingly,  after  an  existence  of  some  two  and  a 


RECONSTRUCTION  159 

half  centuries,  the  East  India  Company  was  buried 
decently  and  in  order  in  the  autumn  of  1858;  and 
the  Queen's  Government  assumed  control  of  the 
administration.  The  change  was  formally  accom- 
plished by  the  Act  for  the  better  government  of  India, 
passed  on  August  2,  1858  ;  and  on  November  i,  it 
was  announced  in  a  noble  and  heart- stirring  procla- 
mation addressed  by  the  Sovereign  to  her  Indian 
subjects. 

After  calling  upon  all  subjects  to  bear  true  allegiance 
to  the  Crown,  and  nominating  Lord  Canning  to  be 
first  Viceroy  and  Governor-General,  the  Royal  Pro- 
clamation said :  '  We  hereby  announce  to  the  Native 
Princes  of  India  that  all  treaties  and  engagements 
made  with  them  by  or  under  the  authority  of  the 
Honorable  East  India  Company  are  by  Us  accepted 
and  will  be  scrupulously  maintained,  and  We  look  for 
a  like  observance  on  their  part.  We  desire  no  exten- 
sions of  Our  present  territorial  possessions ;  and, 
while  We  will  permit  no  aggression  upon  Our 
dominions  or  Our  rights  to  be  attempted  with 
impunity,  We  shall  sanction  no  encroachment  on 
those  of  others.  We  shall  respect  the  rights,  dignity, 
and  honour  of  Native  Princes  as  Our  own  ;  and  we 
desii^e  that  they,  as  well  as  Our  own  subjects,  should 
enjoy  prosperity,  and  that  social  advancement  which 
can  only  be  secured  by  internal  peace  and  good 
government.  We  hold  ourselves  bound  to  the 
natives  of  Our  Indian  territories  by  the  same  ob- 
ligations  of  duty  which   bind   us  to  all   Our   other 


l6o  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

subjects ;  and  those  obligations,  by  the  blessing  of 
God,  we  shall  faithfully  and  conscientiously  fulfil. 
Firmly  relying  Ourselves  on  the  truth  of  Christianity 
and  acknowledging  with  gratitude  the  solace  of 
religion,  We  disclaim  alike  the  right  and  the  desire 
to  impose  Our  convictions  on  any  of  Our  subjects. 
We  declare  it  to  be  Our  Royal  will  and  pleasure  that 
none  be  in  any  wise  favoured,  none  molested  or 
disquieted,  by  reason  of  their  religious  faith  or 
observances  ;  but  that  all  shall  alike  enjoy  the  equal 
and  impartial  protection  of  law ;  and  We  do  strictly 
charge  and  enjoin  all  those  who  may  be  in  authority 
under  Us  that  they  abstain  from  all  interference  with 
the  religious  belief  or  worship  of  any  of  Our  subjects 
on  pain  of  Our  highest  displeasure.  And  it  is  Our 
further  will  that,  so  far  as  may  be.  Our  subjects  of 
whatever  race  or  creed  be  freely  or  impartially  ad- 
mitted to  offices  in  Our  service,  the  duties  of  which 
they  may  be  qualified  by  their  education,  ability,  and 
integrity  duly  to  discharge.  We  know  and  respect 
the  feelings  of  attachment  with  which  the  natives  of 
India  regard  the  lands  inherited  by  them  from  their 
ancestors,  and  We  desire  to  protect  them  in  all  rights 
connected  therewith,  subject  to  the  equitable  demands 
of  the  State ;  and  We  will  that,  generally,  in  framing 
and  administering  the  law,  due  regard  be  paid  to  the 
ancient  rights,  ways,  and  customs  of  India.  We 
deeply  lament  the  evils  and  misery  which  have  been 
brought  upon  India  by  the  acts  of  ambitious  men  who 
have  deceived  their  countrymen  by  false  reports,  and 


RECONS  TR  UCTION  1 6 1 

led  them  into  open  rebellion.  Our  power  has  been 
shown  by  the  suppression  of  that  rebellion  in  the 
field ;  We  desire  to  show  our  mercy  by  pardoning 
the  ofiences  of  those  who  have  been  thus  misled,  but 
who  desire  to  return  to  the  path  of  duty.' 

We  now  come  to  the  measures  of  military  re- 
organisation undertaken  after  the  Mutiny.  Masses 
of  Reports  so  dear  to  Indian  administrators  were 
collected  in  India ;  while  a  Royal  Commission  was 
issued  in  England,  to  decide,  for  good  or  for  evil^ 
the  future  destiny  of  the  Indian  Army.  This  Com- 
mission recommended  the  abolition  of  the  local 
European  Army,  and  its  amalgamation  with  the  so- 
called  '  Queen's  Army.'  Their  proposals  were  accepted, 
and  the  European  troops  of  the  Company's  forces, 
numbering  about  14,000  officers  and  men,  ceased 
to  have  a  separate  existence.  The  Artillery  became 
Royal  Artillery,  the  Cavalry  became  the  19th,  20th, 
and  21  st  Hussars,  and  the  Infantry  were  formed 
into  regiments  of  the  Line  numbered  from  loi  to 
109. 

This  transference  of  the  Company's  Europeans  was 
not  unattended  with  disturbance.  Many  regretted^ 
and  still  regret,  the  change.  The  European  soldiers, 
led  astray  by  evil  advisers,  and  resenting  what 
they  regarded  as  a  breach  of  faith  on  the  part  of 
Government,  displayed  a  spirit  of  insubordination 
which,  weakly  dealt  with  in  its  birth-throes  by  the 
military  authorities,  grew  into  the  so-called  '  white 
mutiny.'      The  measures   taken  for    its   suppression 

L 


l62  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

were  effective ;  nor  could  the  movement  arrest  the 
progress  of  reform. 

Changes  rapidly  followed  one  upon  another.  The 
European  officers  of  the  old  Native  Army  and  those  of 
the  Company's  European  troops  who  did  not  accept 
service  in  the  new  Jloyal  Regiments,  formed  with 
freshly  recruited  Native  soldiers  the  new  Indian 
Army.  This  army  was  enlisted  for  general  service, 
and  reconstructed  on  what  is  known  as  the  irregular 
system  ;  a  system  somewhat  severely  applied  and  with 
doubtful  results  to  the  Native  cavalry  and  infantry 
of  all  the  three  Presidencies.  The  levies  which  had 
been  raised  during  the  Mutiny  were  formed  into  Line 
regiments  or  disbanded,  and,  as  we  shall  see  presently, 
the  Native  Army  was  largely  reduced. 

The  necessity  for  providing  for  the  large  number 
of  officers  whose  regiments  no  longer  existed  gave 
the  military  authorities  much  concern  during  this 
anxious  period.  The  interests  of  the  officers  conflicted 
in  some  measure  with  those  of  the  public  service  ; 
and  a  not  altogether  successful  compromise  was 
arrived  at  which  resulted,  in  1861,  in  the  formation 
of  the  Indian  Staff  Corps.  The  principle  on  which 
the  old  Company's  army  was  officered  had  no  doubt 
been  faulty,  inasmuch  as  it  led  to  the  practice  of 
detaching  from  regiments  the  best  officers  to  spend 
the  rest  of  their  service  in  civil  duties  unconnected 
with  a  military  career.  But  the  new  system  was 
equally  faulty,  inasmuch  as  it  enabled  young  officers 
to  abandon  a  military  career  almost  at  the   outset 


RECONSTRUCTION  163 

for  civil  emploj^ment,  and  yet  to  rise  under  the  Staff 
Corps  rules  at  fixed  periods  of  years  to  the  higher 
military  ranks,  without  the  slightest  pretence  of 
military  service,  and  to  retire  eventually  on  '  Colonel's 
allowances/  which  represented  a  pension  even  in  excess 
of  that  given  to  any  Civil  servant.  In  fact  the  whole 
system  of  the  Staff  Corps  was  unsound.  The  event 
proved  that  the  Eoyal  Commissioners  would  have 
acted  more  wisely  had  they  listened,  in  1859,  to  the 
advice  of  the  Duke  of  Cambridge,  who,  foreseeing  the 
evils  of  the  Staff  Corps  system,  strongly  urged  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  general  list  for  the  promotion  of  officers. 
Amid  all  these  varied  changes  and  complications 
the  veteran  Lord  Clyde  took  a  well-earned  rest ;  and 
bending  his  steps  homeward,,  handed  over  the  chief 
military  command  in  India,  on  June  4,  i860,  to 
Sir  Hugh  Kose.  There  could  not  have  been  a  better 
selection  on  the  part  of  the  Queen's  Government 
for  so  difficult  a  post ;  and  no  one  rejoiced  in  it  more 
sincerely  than  Lord  Clyde  himself,  although  it  did  not 
altogether  accord  at  the  moment  with  his  own  per- 
sonal views.  One  of  the  first  duties  which  Sir  Huofh 
Rose  set  before  himself,  after  taking  over  the  chief 
cpmmand,  was  to  improve  the  discipline  of  the 
English  Army  in  India,  which,  from  the  effects  of 
the  Mutiny  and  the  long  campaign  consequent  on  it, 
was  in  a  lax  condition.  This  evil  was  especially 
apparent  amongst  the  Company's  old  regiments 
known  as  '  European,'  in  contradistinction  to  the 
'  Royal '  army.     The  prevailing  discontent  at  length 

L  2 


1 64  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

culminated  in  open  mutinous  conduct  on  the  part 
of  a  European  regiment  at  Dinapur ;  and  Sir  Hugh 
Rose,  finding  it  impossible  to  allay  by  ordinary 
methods  this  spirit  of  insubordination,  was  forced 
to  warn  the  army  at  large  that  he  intended  to  take 
serious  notice  of  the  next  case  that  came  before  him. 

Such  a  case  occurred  in  the  5th  European  Regiment. 
Private  Johnson  disobeyed  a  superior  officer,  and 
for  this  was  found  guilty  and  sentenced  to  be  shot. 
The  Commander-in-Chief  resolved,  much  against  his 
own  personal  feeling  of  compassion,  to  enforce  the 
sentence.  In  doing  so  he  wrote  in  a  General  Order 
(November  8th,  i860):  'His  Excellency's  regret  that 
he  is  compelled  to  enforce  the  sentence  is  most  sincere. 
But  that  regret  is  diminished  when  he  reflects  that 
the  present  example  is  necessary  for  the  good  of 
the  State,  that  it  is  an  act  of  mercy  to  all  misguided 
soldiers  who  may  be  tempted  to  follow  the  fatal 
example  of  the  5th  Regiment,  which  has  caused  sorrow 
and  indignation  throughout  the  army.'  The  execution 
of  the  sentence  was  followed  by  the  disbandment 
cf  the  regiment. 

Another  matter  which  Sir  Hugh  Rose  saw  to  be  of 
vital  importance  to  the  European  soldier  in  India, 
was  the  provision  of  some  employment  for  him  in 
the  weary  hours  of  cantonment  life.  With  this  object, 
and  with  the  coi-dial  support  of  the  supreme  Govern- 
ment, he  made  arrangements  for  the  maintenance  of 
workshops,  regimental  institutions,  and  soldiers'  gar- 
dens, which,  after  fail-  trial,  proved  extremely  beneficial, 


RECONSTRUCTION  165 

and  were  soon  afterwards  adopted  at  all  places  gar- 
risoned by  the  British  Army  at  home  and  abroad. 

While  paying  attention  to  the  British  portion 
of  the  army  in  India,  Sir  Hugh  Rose  did  not  forget 
the  Native  regiments ;  some  of  which,  and  particularly 
the  Native  Irregular  Cavalry,  are  now  second  to  no 
troops  in  the  world  for  discipline,  eflSciency,  and  good 
conduct.  It  was  his  constant  endeavour  to  make  the 
army  of  India  not  only  effective  as  a  fighting  machine, 
but  perfect  in  interior  economy  and  discipline. 

In  April,  1865,  after  five  years'  tenure  of  the  post. 
Sir  Hugh  Rose  relinquished  the  chief  command, 
amidst  much  regret  and  many  valued  expressions  of 
goodwill  on  the  part  both  of  officers  and  men.  One 
of  the  most  gratifying  tokens  of  this  feeling  was  given 
at  a  farewell  entertainment  at  Simla,  on  September 
27th,  1864,  when  Sir  Robert  Napier  (the  late  Lord 
Napier  of  Magdala),  for  whom  Sir  Hugh  had  a  warm 
admiration  and  regard,  said :  '  Never  has  the  army  of 
India  had  a  chief  more  earnestly  solicitous  to  ensure 
its  efficiency  than  Sir  Hugh  Rose ;  never,  I  believe, 
has  the  army  of  India  been  in  a  more  efficient  condition 
than  it  is  at  the  present  moment ;  never  has  the  army 
of  India  had  a  chief  whom  it  would  have  followed  to 
the  field,  against  a  foe  worthy  of  it,  with  fuller  con- 
fidence of  success  than  this  army  would  feel  under  its 
present  Commander-in-Chief.' 

On  his  arrival  in  England,  Sir  Hugh  Rose  was  ap- 
pointed by  the  Duke  of  Cambridge  to  be  Commander  of 
the  forces  in  Ireland.     The  Times  of  the  day  (May  22, 


1 66  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

1 865),  welcomed  the  veteran  home, '  after  a  career  which 
would  have  entitled  a  Roman  general  to  a  triumph.' 

Having  given  this  somewhat  imperfect  sketch  of 
the  changes  in  the  Indian  Army  directly  brought 
about  by  the  events  of  the  Mutiny,  it  may  not  be  out 
of  place  to  carry  our  thoughts  backwards,  by  tracing 
briefly  the  rise  of  the  military  forces  of  the  three 
Presidencies,  in  order  that  the  difference  between  our 
military  position  under  the  Company  and  under  the 
Queen  may  be  clearly  appreciated.  It  must  be  re- 
membered that,  for  military  and  administrative  pur- 
poses, British  India  has  up  to  the  present  time  been 
divided  into  three  great  political  sections — Bengal, 
Madras,  and  Bombay ;  and  that  the  Native  Army  of 
India  has  always  consisted  of  three  portions  corres- 
ponding to  the  three  Presidencies.  This  separation 
into  three  distinct  armies  was  the  natural  consequence 
of  the  original  foundation  of  separate  settlements  and 
factories  in  India  ;  each  of  which  retains  to  the  present 
day  its  own  separate  history  and  traditions. 

Of  the  three  Presidencies,  Madras  is  the  oldest. 
The  fii'st  armed  force  in  this  Presidency  was  the  little 
garrison  of  Armagon  on  the  Coromandel  Coast,  con- 
sisting of  12  guns  and  28  soldiers.  In  1644  Fort  St. 
George  was  built  and  garrisoned  by  ico  soldiers,  and 
in  1653  Madras  became  a  Presidency.  In  1748  the 
various  independent  companies  of  factory  guards  at 
settlements  on  the  coast  were  consolidated  into  the 
Madras  European  Regiment.     In  the  following  year 


RECONSTRUCTION  167 

Clive,  with  only  200  soldiers  and  300  Sepoys,  seized 
and  held  Arcot,  the  capital  of  the  Karnatik,  and  on 
three  several  occasions  defeated  the  troops  of  the 
Nawab  and  their  French  auxiliaries. 

From  this  period  we  may  date  the  first  military 
power  of  Madras.  In  1754,  a  Royal  regiment,  the 
39th  Foot,  was  sent  out  to  Madras  for  the  first  time, 
to  be  followed,  four  years  afterwards,  by  three  other 
Royal  regiments.  In  1784  the  number  of  the  Native 
troops  in  Madras  had  risen  to  34,000. 

In  regard  to  Bengal,  it  appears  that  in  1650  the 
English  traders  in  that  part  of  India  were  restricted 
to  a  militar}^  establishment  of  an  ensign  and  90  men. 
Shortly  afterwards,  this  little  corps  was  reinforced 
from  Madi'as  by  '  a  corporal  of  approved  fidelity  and 
20  soldiers.'  At  the  battle  of  Plassey  a  century  later 
(June  23,  1757),  the  force  under  Clive  consisted  of  the 
39th  Foot  and  some  3000  Madras  Sepoys  ;  the  defeated 
army  numbering  about  70,000  men. 

The  island  of  Bombay,  as  is  well  known,  formed  part 
of  the  marriage  portion  received  by  Charles  II  with  the 
Infanta  of  Portugal,  and  in  1662  the  Bombay  regiment 
of  Europeans  was  raised  to  defend  the  place.  In  1668 
the  island  was  granted  to  the  East  India  Company ; 
and  in  1 708  Bombay  became  a  Presidency.  By  1 794,  in 
consequence  of  the  struggles  with  the  Maratha  power, 
the  native  troops  had  been  increased  to  24,000  men. 

In  1796  a  general  reorganisation  of  the  Indian 
armies  took  place.  The  officers  in  each  Presidency, 
hitherto   borne    on    general   lists    according    to    the 


l68  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

branches  of  the  service  to  which  they  belonged,  were 
formed  into  cadres  of  regiments,  and  at  the  same  time 
an  establishment  of  general  officers  was  created. 
This  was  followed  by  augmentations  in  numerical 
strength  till,  in  1808,  the  total  military  force  in  British 
India  amounted  to  24,000  Europeans  and  154,000 
Natives.  The  first  half  of  the  present  century 
witnessed  a  series  of  wars  and  annexations,  which 
necessitated  further  increases  in  the  military  force. 
Horse  artillery  was  formed ;  and  the  artillery  service 
generally  was  placed  on  a  strong  footing.  Regiments 
of  irregular  cavalry  were  added  to  the  establishment, 
while  local  corps  and  contingents  were  raised,  some 
of  which  (such  as  the  Punjab  Irregular  Force  and  the 
Haidarabad  Contingent)  soon  became  formidable. 

The  officering  and  recruiting  of  the  three  armies 
was  at  the  time  of  the  Mutiny  in  essentials  alike 
in  each  Presidency.  The  officers  were  mainly  supplied 
by  the  Company's  Military  College  at  Addiscombe 
(established  in  1809) ;  direct  appointments  being  made 
by  the  Court  of  Directors.  The  Bengal  Army  was 
recruited  from  Hindustan,  the  infantry  being  chiefly 
drawn  from  Oudh  and  Behar.  The  soldiers  were 
usually  high  caste  Hindus,  but  a  sixth  of  them  were 
Muhammadans  recruited  from  Rohilkhand  and  the 
Gangetic  Doab.  The  only  other  elements  in  the 
Bengal  Army  were  the  four  Gurkha  regiments  en- 
listed from  Nepal  and  the  local  Punjab  Irregular 
Force.  The  Madras  Army  was  chiefly  recruited  from 
that  Presidency  or  from  the  Native  States  adjoining  it, 


RECONSTRUCTION  169 

and  consisted  of  Muhammadans,  Brahmans,  Marathas, 
Telingas,  and  Tamils.  The  Bombay  Army  was  re- 
cruited mainly  from  its  own  Presidency,  but  contained 
some  Hindustanis.  Most  of  the  Bombay  Sepoys  were 
Marathas  and  Muhammadans  ;  but  the  Bombay  Light 
Cavalry  were  brought  for  the  most  part  from  Hin- 
dustan proper. 

In  the  year  preceding  the  Mutiny  the  Indian  Army 
had  reached  its  highest  strength ;  amounting  in 
numbers  to  no  fewer  than  39,000  Europeans  of  all  arms, 
with  276  field  guns  and  about  330,000  Native  troops 
(including  local  and  ii-regular  forces),  with  248  field 
guns  ;  truly  a  magnificent  establishment :  '  outwardly 
worthy  of  the  great  Empire  which  England  had 
created  for  herself  in  the  East,  but  inwardly  unsound 
and  on  the  very  eve  of  crumbling  to  pieces.' 

We  are  now  in  a  position  to  rightly  appreciate  the 
military  reforms  carried  out  subsequent  to  the  Mutiny. 
The  new  organisation  to  which  reference  has  already 
been  made  was  promulgated  in  1863.  It  ^entailed 
changes  both  in  the  recruitment  and  composition  of  the 
Indian  Army.  The  Bengal  Army  is  now  chiefly  com- 
posed of  Muhammadans,  Hindus,  Rajputs,  Punjabis, 
and  Pathans  ;  and  while  some  regiments  are  entirely  of 
one  race,  such  as  the  Gurkhas  and  a  few  Sikh  corps, 
in  others  different  races  are  mixed  by  companies  or 
otherwise.  There  are  no  official  restrictions  on  caste  or 
race,  but  care  is  taken  to  prevent  an  undue  prepon- 
derance of  any  one  class.  Enlistment  remains  purely 
voluntary.  In  the  Bengal,  as  in  the  Madras  and  Bombay 


3  70  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

armies,  the  native  officers  are  appointed  from  the  non- 
commissioned ranks,  with  the  exception  of  a  very  few 
natives  of  rank  and  position,  who  obtain  direct  com- 
missions. The  British  officers  in  all  three  Native 
armies  are  obtained  through  the  medium  of  the  Staff 
Corps  already  referred  to.  This  Staff  Corps  is  re- 
cruited by  commissioned  volunteers  from  the  British 
Army,  and  now  supplies  the  native  armies  of  India 
with  regimental  officers. 

The  Madras  Native  Army  is  composed  of  a  limited 
number  of  Christians  and  Muhammadans,  and  a  large 
proportion  of  Telingas,  or  Gentus  and  Tamils.  The 
cavalry  are  mostly  Arcot  Musalmans,  descendants  of 
the  soldiers  of  the  old  Nawabs  of  the  Karnatik.  The 
army  is  recruited  as  in  Bengal,  but  it  has  a  peculiar 
institution  of  its  own,  namely,  the  'recruit  and  pen- 
sion boys '  (sons  of  soldiers  and  pensioners)  attached  to 
each  regiment  and  transferred  to  the  ranks  when  they 
attain  a  proper  standard  of  age  and  efficiency ; — a  valu- 
able institution,  which  affords  a  powerful  hold  upon  the 
fidelity  of  the  men.  The  Bombay  Army  resembles  that  of 
Bengal  in  its  recruiting,  organisation,  and  equipments. 
It  is  composed  of  a  few  Christians,  some  Brahmans, 
Rajputs,  and  other  Hindu  castes ;  but  mainly  Marathas 
and  Purwaris,  with  a  few  Punjabis  and  Pathans. 

It  is  no  easy  task  to  draw  comparisons  between 
native  soldiers  recruited  from  so  many  different  parts 
of  the  Empire.  It  is  generally  acknowledged,  how- 
ever, that  the  most  warlike  are  the  inhabitants  of 
Sind,  the  Punjab,  and  Trans-Indus  territory.     Next 


RECONSTRUCTION  1 7 1 

to  these  come  the  men  of  Rohilkhand  and  Oudh,  and 
the  Marathas.  All  these  races  possess  a  keener 
aptitude  for  military  training  and  are  usually  of  a 
better  physique  than  the  general  population  of  the 
Peninsula.  Of  the  actual  value  of  Native  troops,  it  is 
still  more  difficult  to  form  a  correct  estimate ;  but  it 
has  been  truly  said  by  a  distinguished  military  writer 
that  the  natives  of  India,  both  as  friends  and  foes,  have 
proved  themselves  gallant  soldiers,  not  unworthy  of 
being  matched  with  Europeans.  The  ordinary  Sepoy 
under  the  guidance  of  British  officers  has  furnished 
many  instances  of  heroism  and  devotion.  A  Bengal 
regiment  successfully  stood  the  brunt  of  a  charge  by 
the  French  at  the  battle  of  Porto  Novo  in  ]78i.  The 
devoted  courage  of  Olive's  Sepoys  at  Arcot  and 
Plassey  has  passed  into  a  proverb.  At  the  siege  of 
Delhi,  in  1857,  Native  regiments  sustained  losses 
which  few  European  troops  could  have  borne ;  while 
many  of  the  men  then  in  hospital,  with  wounds  only 
partly  healed,  volunteered  to  join  in  the  final  assault. 
Our  present  military  position  in  India  affords  abun- 
dant evidence  of  the  strenuous  and  successful  efforts 
of  Anglo- Indian  administrators  and  commanders  to 
bring  the  army  and  its  establishments  to  the  highest 
degree  of  efficiency  attainable.  With  a  view  to 
protection  of  the  country,  both  against  commotions 
within  and  aggressive  attacks  from  without,  there 
have  been  in  recent  years  many  important  modifica- 
tions and  developments  of  the  reorganisation  rendered 
necessary  after  the  suppression  of  the  Mutiny. 


172  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

The  education  of  the  army  generally  is  now  much 
more  carefully  attended  to  than  in  the  old  days. 
Instruction  in  musketry,  g3^mnastics,  and  garrison 
duties  is  provided  ;  and  stricter  tests  are  imposed 
on  all  candidates  for  Staff  employ  or  for  promotion. 
Armed  camps  of  exercise  have  been  instituted,  where 
large  bodies  of  troops  are  assembled,  and  opportunities 
are  afforded  for  higher  tactical  training.  The  Com- 
missariat department  has  been  improved  and  enlarged  ; 
the  military  accounts  branch  has  been  remodelled; 
and  the  supply  and  manufacture  of  nfiateriel  of  war 
now  leaves  little  ground  for  criticism.  The  new  regu- 
lations for  the  relief  of  troops  have  greatly  shortened 
the  British  soldier's  term  of  Indian  service.  For  his 
benefit,  too,  large  barracks  have  been  built  on  approved 
principles  in  the  plains,  and  sanitaria  constructed 
to  hold  about  lo.coo  British  troops  in  the  hills 
during  the  hot  weather.  By  all  these  and  similar 
measures,  and  by  a  liberal  expenditure  of  money  on 
sanitary  requirements,  the  death-rate  of  the  British 
Army  in  India  has  been  reduced  to  one-half  what 
it  was  in  former  years. 

Other  great  questions  still  remain  to  be  dealt  with. 
The  conditions  which  led  to  the  formation  and  growth 
of  three  Presidency  armies  are  materially  altered  by 
the  development  of  intercommunication  between  the 
various  provinces  of  India ;  and  the  system  is  unlikely 
to  be  much  longer  retained.  The  expedient  of  a  Staff 
Corps  has  been  found  cumbrous,  and  its  abolition  is 
becoming  only  a  matter  of  time. 


RECONSTRUCTION  173 

It  should  be  added  that  the  military  position  of 
India  has  been  further  strengthened  by  the  enrolment 
of  about  20,000  European  volunteers,  that  a  reserve  of 
Native  soldiers  has  been  organised,  and  that  by  re- 
ductions on  the  one  hand  and  improved  organisation 
on  the  other,  carried  out  under  the  supervision  of  ex- 
perienced British  officers,  a  large  number  of  troops  in 
the  pay  of  our  Chiefs  and  Feudatories  have  been  made 
effective  for  service  in  a  second  line  of  defence. 
Contingents  furnished  by  Native  States  have  already 
proved  in  many  campaigns  that  they  are  valuable 
auxiliaries. 

The  contrast  between  the  state  of  things  now  and 
the  situation  in  1 857  is  indeed  a  striking  one.  At  the 
outbreak  of  the  Mutiny  the  army  in  India,  as  already 
said,  was  composed  of  about  39,000  British  and  225,000 
Native  troops,  including  men  in  contingents  paid  by 
and  serving  in  Native  States.  Natives  manned  more 
than  half  the  guns ;  and  to  a  great  extent  held 
our  arsenals,  magazines,  and  fortifications.  At  the 
present  time  the  Army  consists  of  72,000  British 
and  about  157,000  Native  soldiers,  including  all  the 
reojular  contingents  on  the  Indian  establishment  serving 
in  Native  States,  besides  some  170,000  regular  police. 
Out  of  103  batteries  of  artillery,  88  are  manned  by 
Europeans.  Guns  and  rifles  of  the  newest  pattern 
have  been  supplied  to  the  troops.  The  rapid  con- 
struction of  railways  (288  miles  of  railway  were 
open  in  1857-58,  there  are  now  16,000  miles,  an  exten- 
sion entailing  a  cost  of  two  hundred  millions  sterling) 


174  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

has  facilitated  a  centralisation  of  authority,  and  per- 
mits of  a  rapid  concentration  of  troops  at  any  point 
either  within  Indian  limits  or  on  the  frontier.  The 
improvement  of  roads  and  other  communications,  of 
frontier  defences,  barracks,  transport  services,  and  field 
establishments,  should  also  be  taken  into  account ;  and 
a  fair  survey  of  the  situation  must  compel  even  the 
pessimist  observer  to  admit  that,  at  vast  labour  and 
expense,  the  military  position  of  India  is,  on  the  whole, 
satisfactory,  and  is  being  still  strengthened,  day  by 
day,  under  the  eyes  of  an  ever  vigilant  Government, 
aided  by  experienced  military  commanders. 

Should  the  question  be  asked  as  to  the  resistance 
which  India  could  offer,  in  the  event  of  an  attack 
from  without;  it  ma}^  be  stated  with  some  confidence 
that  the  Government,  at  the  present  moment,  could 
put  into  the  field  with  comparative  ease  two  strong 
army  corps,  fully  equipped  ;  while  for  purposes  of  a 
reserve,  and  on  what  may  be  called  the  lines  of  in- 
terior defence,  it  would  not  be  difficult  to  employ,  in 
addition  to  the  number  of  regular  soldiers  left  behind,  a 
considerable  portion  of  the  33,000  Europeans  and  the 
800,000  native  Christians  resident  in  India :  not  to 
mention  the  assistance  which  could  be  obtained  from 
the  native  population  (including  about  50,000  Indian 
Portuguese  and  Parsis),  who  might  be  largely  em- 
ployed, for  temporarily  holding  strategic  centres 
during  operations  on  or  beyond  the  frontier. 

It  would  be  undesirable  here  to  enter  upon  a  dis- 
cussion of  various  minor  details  of  military  organisa- 


RECONSTRUCTION  175 

tion  whicli  occupy  the  attention  of  those  responsible 
for  the  safety  of  our  Indian  Empire.  There  are  one 
or  two  points,  however,  on  which  something  further 
may  be  said.  The  tendency  of  every  economical  or 
popularity-hunting  Government  is  to  cheapen  or  re- 
duce its  army.  Such  reductions  are  comparatively 
easy ;  for  they  are  certain  to  be  defended  and  approved 
by  people  who  have  had  no  military  training  and  no 
military  experience.  In  the  case  of  India,  there  has 
been  a  tendency  on  the  part  of  English  financiers 
to  view  with  favour  any  proposal  for  a  reduction  of 
European  troops  in  that  country,  and  even  to  speak 
of  a  withdrawal  of  a  portion  of  them  in  the  event  of 
European  complications. 

Very  difierent  was  the  view  taken  by  one  of  the 
most  far-seeing  statesmen  that  ever  ruled  in  India, 
the  late  Earl  of  Mayo.  He  thought  it  wrong,  indeed, 
to  compel  the  people  of  India  to  contribute  one  farth- 
ing more  to  military  expenditure  than  the  safety  and 
defence  of  the  country  absolutely  demanded.  He  de- 
clared that  a  large  reduction  of  the  Madras  Army 
was  necessary,  inasmuch  as  it  was  impossible  to  tax 
India  for  the  support  of  a  force  which  had  been  de- 
clared by  the  highest  authorities  in  the  Presidency  to 
be  far  beyond  local  requirements,  and  which  from  its 
composition  was  unreasonably  expensive.  At  the 
same  time  he  wrote  (September  9,  1869):  '  One  thing 
I  implore  may  not  be  done,  and  that  is  the  removal  of 
a  single  British  bayonet  or  sabre  from  India.  We  can, 
I  believe,  reduce  our  military  expenditure  by  a  million 


176  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

without  giving  up  one  of  the  little  white-faced  men 
in  red.  It  is  in  the  numher  of  officers  and  regiments, 
and  in  a  prudent  reduction  of  tlie  weakest  or  least 
efficient  portion  of  our  Native  Army,  that  a  safe  dimi- 
nution of  cost  can  be  obtained  ;  and  this  I  am  prepared 
to  recommend  regardless  of  frowns  or  forebodings.' 
And  again  he  wrote  (December  11,  1870) :  '  I  have  this 
year,  without  any  suggestion  from  any  quarter,  pressed 
upon  her  Majesty's  Government  the  necessity  that 
exists  for  immediately  arming  every  European  soldier 
and  volunteer  in  India  with  a  Snider  rifle.  I  have 
ever  since  the  beginning  of  1869  pointed  out  the  de- 
fective state  of  our  artillery  force,  and  recommended 
the  immediate  adoption  of  rifled  guns.  I  never,  there- 
fore, let  economic  considerations  interfere  in  cases  of 
necessity.  I  have  never  suggested  a  reduction  which 
is,  in  my  opinion,  calculated  to  diminish  our  military 
strength.  But  I  do  desire  to  reduce  military  ex- 
penditure by  a  very  large  amount.  I  fii'mly  believe 
that  there  are  forces  in  India  which  we  should  do 
better  without,  and  that  it  is  better  to  keep  only 
those  Native  regiments  in  arms  that  would  be  use- 
ful in  war.  I  think  it  is  not  desirable  to  keep  a  large 
number  of  batteries  of  artillery  in  an  undermanned 
state,  and  I  believe  that  if  we  have  a  really  sufficient 
number  of  guns,  fully  manned  and  equipped,  in  ample 
proportions  to  a  force  of  60,000  to  70,000  men  which 
can  be  put  into  the  field  at  a  moment's  notice,  we  have 
a  force  more  than  sufficient  to  overwhelm  anything 
that  can  be  brought  against  us  without  very  long 


RECONSTRUCTION  177 

notice.  In  view  of  possible  war,  I  should  be  more 
anxious  to  make  the  reductions  I  have  suggested  than 
I  am  now ;  because  if  any  augmentations  are  required, 
they  should  only  be  made  in  certain  directions,  and 
if  we  are  disembarrassed  of  comparatively  useless 
corps  we  can  add  to  the  strength  of  the  warlike 
poition  of  our  army  without  difficulty.' 

Lord  Mayo  was  equally  confident,  it  may  be  added, 
that  great  economy  would  be  effected  by  constructing 
all  kinds  of  military  stores  in  India.  'One  cap 
manufactory,'  he  said  (April  17,  1869),  'one  gun- 
carriage  manufactory,  one  gun  foundry,  &c.,  ought  to 
suffice  for  all  India.  We  ought  to  have  the  best  gun 
that  science  can  produce  without  a  moment's  delay. 
Above  all,  our  general  policy  should  be  to  manufacture 
everything  in  India,  so  as  to  be  as  independent  as 
possible  of  England  in  time  of  trouble.' 

What  Lord  Mayo  wrote,  on  the  necessity  of  main- 
taining the  strength  of  the  European  force  in  India 
unimpaired,  may  well  be  taken  to  heart.  Fewer  bat- 
teries, but  all  fully  manned ;  and  fewer  regiments,  but 
all  completed  to  not  less  than  1000  rank  and  file,  in 
lieu  of  half-manned  batteries  and  regiments  far  short 
of  their  complement,  would  not  only  admit  of  economy 
in  the  pay  of  officers  and  establishments,  but  would 
increase  the  efficiency  of  the  army.  And  if  to 
this  could  be  added  the  restoration,  in  part,  of  a 
European  force  specially  enlisted  for  India,  the  train- 
ing of  a  company  of  every  Infantry  Regiment  to  ride 
as  Mounted  Infantry  and  to  take  their  place,  if  need 

M 


178  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

be,  in  batteries  of  Artillery,  the  manufacture  of  guns 
and  ammunition  in  India  itself,  and  the  establishment 
of  an  Indian  Navy  on  a  proper  footing,  there  would 
be  but  few  defects  in  the  defence  of  India  for  criticism 
or  attack  by  friend  or  foe. 

But  there  is  another  point  which  needs  mention. 
While  viewing  with  satisfaction  all  the  improvements 
that  have  been  effected  in  the  Native  Army  of  India 
since  the  Mutiny,  and  without  overlooking  the  ad- 
vantages to  be  gained  by  abolishing  distinctions 
between  districts  or  Presidencies,  and  by  enlisting 
the  army  for  general  service,  we  must  also  bear  in 
mind  that  it  goes  a  long  way  towards  the  content- 
ment of  native  soldiers  to  confine  the  circle  of  their 
ordinary  service  to  the  limits  of  their  own  province, 
and  to  march  them  only  on  an  emergency  into  distant 
parts  of  the  Empire.  We  have  hitherto  tried  experi- 
ments in  increased  pay  and  haita  which  have  not 
been  willingly  accepted  in  lieu  of  exile.  It  is  there- 
fore worthy  of  consideration  whether  more  careful 
attention  may  not  be  paid  to  the  fact  that  nothing 
can  reconcile  natives  of  India  to  long  absence  from 
their  homes,  and  that  if  we  keep  regiments  ordinarily 
in  a  circle  near  their  homes,  the  service  will  be  ren- 
dered more  economical  and  more  popular. 


CHAPTER  IX 

Conclusion 

The  work  of  this  little  volume  is  now  brought  to 
a  close  with  a  consciousness  of  many  deficiencies  in 
language  and  description,  and  with  a  regret  that,  for 
reasons  already  given,  but  few  of  those  personal  acts 
of  heroism  which  formed  so  conspicuous  a  feature  of 
the  Indian  Mutiny,  and  which  are  so  valuable  in 
lighting  up  bare  records  of  military  operations,  have 
found  a  place  in  its  pages.  If,  however,  the  desire  to 
give  a  brief  and  simple  account  of  important  occur- 
rences has  been  in  any  measure  achieved,  the  object 
aimed  at  by  the  author  has  been  attained. 

A  remarkable  event  which  requires  exceptional 
treatment  seldom  calls  for  words  to  enforce  its  lessons. 
It  needs  no  efibrt,  therefore,  to  impress  on  the  reader 
the  many  lessons  of  the  Mutiny,  not  the  least  of  which 
were  the  unaccountable  blindness  with  which  Eng- 
land almost  courted  disaster  and  the  splendid  effort 
which  she  made  to  repair  her  error.  The  cause  of  the 
Mutiny  was  simple  ;  the  outbreak  was  inevitable ; 
the  situation  was  terrible  ;  the  struggle  was  prolonged 
and  fierce  ;  sons  and  daughters  of  our  race  fell  with- 
out demur  at  the  post  of  danger  ;  and  amid  this  scene 

M  2 


l8o  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN 

of  woe  and  desolation,  devoted  soldiers  and  sailors  of 
a  gracious  Sovereign,  even  those  of  different  nation- 
ality from  our  own,  united  in  giving  up  their  lives  in 
defence  of  her  rights.  If  the  marvellous  defence 
of  Lucknow,  the  fierce  struggle  before  Delhi,  the 
holding  of  isolated  positions  by  resolute  men  and 
women,  and  the  difficult  military  operations  which  at 
length  wrested  the  Empire  from  the  rebel  hand  can 
ever  be  forgotten  by  a  grateful  country,  then  history 
is  no  longer  history.  These  events  will  assuredly  not 
be  forgotten.  They  still  burn  brightly  in  the  hearts 
of  our  countrymen,  and  they  will  ever  find  a  place  in 
the  lesson-books  of  our  children  ;  nay,  more  than  this, 
they  will  at  all  times  teach  England  to  value  the  great 
possession  which  she  holds,  and  will  inspire  her  to 
allow  no  friend  or  foe  to  deprive  her  of  it.  But  what 
was  the  cost  %  Much  in  treasure  and  blood.  To  com- 
pare campaigns  carried  on  under  such  diverse  con- 
ditions as  those  ruling  in  the  Crimea  and  in  India  is 
an  almost  impossible  task.  Yet,  if  the  comparison  be 
allowed,  we  shall  perceive  that  while  our  casualties  in 
the  Crimean  Campaign  of  1855-56  amounted  to  390 
officers  and  18,058  rank  and  file,  those  in  the  Mutiny 
Campaign  of  1857-58  were  not  less,  so  far  as  can  be 
ascertained,  than  195  officers  and  10,826  of  our  gallant 
British  soldiers.  In  regard  to  the  extent  to  which  the 
troops  suffered  in  the  Mutiny  Campaign  from  casual- 
ties in  the  field  on  the  one  hand  and  from  delays  in 
the  operations  on  the  other,  it  may  be  of  interest  to 
note  that  while  86  British  officers  and  1948  rank  and 


CONCLUSION  l8l 

file  (besides  1240  natives)  were  killed  in  action  or 
died  of  wounds,  no  fewer  than  109  British  officers 
and  8878  rank  and  file  (exclusive  of  natives  of  whose 
casualties  under  this  head  the  author  has  been  unable 
to  obtain  an  accurate  return)  died  from  exposure  and 
sickness  ^.  These  figures  speak  for  themselves,  and 
fill  the  mind  with  mixed  feelings ;  for  deeply  as 
we  may  regret  that  the  apparent  advantages  of  the 
Crimean  Campaign  were  afterwards  wrested  from  us 
piecemeal,  we  must  rejoice  that  by  the  sacrifices  in 
the  Indian  operations  we  regained,  against  great  odds, 
one  of  the  most  valuable  possessions  of  the  British 
Crown. 

What  more  can  we  say  as  to  the  events  so  inade- 
quately recorded  in  this  volume  ?  Can  we  think  of 
them  for  a  moment  without  revering  the  lives  and 
memories  of  such  men  as  Henry  and  John  Lawrence, 
Robert  Montgomery,  Bartle  Frere  and  others  of  the 
Indian  Civil  Service ;  that  Service  which  by  its 
courage,  calmness  and  inestimable  qualities  of  de- 
cision proved  the  mainstay  of  the  Empire  in  the  crisis 
of  the  Mutiny  ?  Can  we  look  back  to  the  past  without 

^  The  records  of  the  Mutiny  period  were  of  necessity  some- 
what imperfectly  kept.  For  arriving  at  these  figures,  quantum 
valeant,  the  author  owes  much  to  the  kindness  of  the  Indian 
military  authorities,  and  to  Director-General  Sir  W.  A.  Mackinnon, 
K.C.B.  He  may  be  pardoned  for  adding  that  Lord  Clyde  was 
warmly  attached  to  his  friend  Mackinnon,  who  served  on  his 
personal  staff  during  the  campaign,  after  a  distinguished  training 
in  the  Crimea.  '  Mac '  was  well  known  in  the  Crimea,  India,  New 
Zealand,  and  Ashanti  for  his  '  combative  qualities/  and  for  his 
coolness  and  gallantry  in  the  field. 


1 82  CLYDE  AND  STRATBNAIRN 

a  feeling  of  sorrow  that  such  men  as  Colin  Campbell, 
Hugh  Rose,  Nicholson,  Outram,  Havelock,  Napier, 
Hope  Grant,  Neill  and  others — men  specially  raised 
up  in  the  Providence  of  God  to  quell  one  of  the  most 
formidable  risings  of  the  present  century — now  lie  in 
the  grave,  soldiers  of  the  past  ?  And  what  of  Canning, 
Elphinstone,  the  many  heads  of  administrations  and 
provinces,  and  the  trained  political  officers,  who  by 
their  courage  and  influence  preserved  to  English  rule 
wide  tracts  of  country  and  turbulent  populations  far 
exceeding  in  extent  and  number  many  Engiands  ? 
What  of  the  loyal  Indian  Chiefs  and  Princes  ?  What 
of  the  native  troops  who,  faithful  to  their  salt,  fought 
against  their  own  comrades  in  rebellion  ?  What,  again, 
of  the  British  Regimental  officers  and  men,  including 
the  devoted  medical  service,  who  without  reward,  and 
in  some  cases  without  thanks,  fought  and  worked 
nobly  for  their  Queen  and  Country  ? 

They  all,  indeed,  await  their  reward  in  the  Great 
Awakening ;  and  England  may  truly  be  grateful  when 
she  calls  to  mind  records  so  brilliant  and  deeds  so 
honourable,  and  remembers  the  glorious  part  borne  by 
her  children  in  handing  down  to  posterity,  notwith- 
standing shortcomings,  failures  and  errors,  one  of  the 
most  memorable  chapters  of  her  memorable  history. 
Still  England  is  aware  that  her  aim  is  peace,  and  that 
while  governing  the  vast  Eastern  populations  com- 
mitted to  her  care  with  firmness  and  discretion — 
ready  to  defend  them  against  a  common  foe  within  or 
without  her  borders — it  were  folly  to  suppose  that  the 


CONCLUSION  183 

authority  of  a  Sovereign  can  be  upheld  by  the  sword 
without  the  attachment  of  a  people,  or  that  the  attach- 
ment of  a  people  can  be  of  any  avail  without  the  power 
of  the  sword.  Laying  to  heart  the  lessons  of  the  past, 
we  are  content  to  believe  that  the  Rulers  of  India  in 
the  future  will  use  with  wisdom  the  means  which  God 
has  placed  in  their  hands  for  inspiring  the  people  of 
that  country  with  affectionate  obedience  to  the  British 
Crown,  and  for  uniting  them  against  either  rebel  or 
invader. 


INDEX 


Addtscombe,  i68. 
Afghanistan,  policy  of  the  Amir, 

39.  46. 

Afghans,  39,  46. 

Agra,  21,  24,  34,  141. 

Alambagh,  42  :  occupied  by  the 
British,  67,  77. 

Alexander,  98. 

Alison,  General  Sir  Archibald 
and  his  brother,  73. 

Allahabad,  26,  30,  31,  34,  41, 
49,  55  :  reinforcements,  57,  78. 

Alma,  96. 

Ambala,  21. 

American  War,  45. 

Anson,  General,  21-2  :  his  march 
to  Delhi,  39,  44. 

Argot,  167,  170-1. 

Armagon,  166. 

Army,  European,  10,  13,  22: 
arrival  of  a  moveable  column 
of,  at  Delhi,  24  :  small  number 
at  Cawnpur,  24:  massacre  of, 
by  N^nd,  Sahib,  26-7  :  at 
Lucknow,  27  :  victory  of,  at 
Fatehpur,  under  Havelock,  30: 
Arrah,  relief  of,  34-5  :  Madras 
regiments  in  Persia,  few  in 
India,  35-6 :  Bombay  army 
large  proportion  of,  in  Persia, 
37  :  great  force  in  the  Punjab, 
38-40 :  chronological  table  of 
operations,  40-3 :  led  by  Sir 
C.  Campbell,  56-7 :  reinforce- 
ments, 57  :  strength  before 
Delhi,    57-8 :    Hodson's    force 


surrounded,  but  rescued  by  the 
Jind  Contingent,  58 :  victory  at 
Najafgarh :  continual  reinforce- 
ments encamped  before  Delhi, 
59  :  siege  and  conquest  of  Delhi, 
59-65 :  enter  Lucknow  Resi- 
dency, 67-8 :  arrival  of  the 
Commander-in-Chief,  69-70 : 
strength  of  garrison  before  and 
after  siege,  69 :  Colonel  Greathed 
arrives  at  Cawnpur,  with  in- 
fantry, cavalry,  and  artillery, 
71:  Commander-in-Chief  follows 
shortly,  72-3  :  at  Lucknow, 
73-6  :  attack  and  final  capture 
of  Lucknow,  80-4:  actions  in 
Oudh  and  Rohilkhand,  84-8  : 
in  Central  India,  97-9 :  march 
to  S%ar,  loi :  take  E-athgarh, 
101-2 :  success  at  Barodia, 
102:  relief  of  Sagar,  103-4: 
capture  of  Garhakota,  104  :  and 
Chandari,  1 06 :  Mundinpur  Pass 
forced,  107:  take  Sar^i  and 
Marowra  Forts,  108  :  march  to 
Jh^nsf,  109-13  :  attack  J hansf, 
1 14-7:  attacked  by  Tantia  Topi, 
118:  his  complete  rout  by, 
II 8-9:  siege  of  Jliansl  con- 
tinued, 120:  breach  and  occu- 
pation of,  1 21-5  :  at  Kunch, 
126-33:  sickness  from  sun- 
stroke, 1 30-3  :  defective  ammu- 
nition, 135-7,  (footnote)  138  : 
Kalpi,  attacked  and  captured, 
133-40  :  rebels  occupy  Gwalior, 


i86 


INDEX 


141  :  Sir  Hugh  Rose  attacks 
and  regains,  143-9  :  Sindhia's 
offer,  146  :  Home  Government 
refuse  permission,  146  :  disap- 
pointment of,  150:  reconstruc- 
tion of,  155-78. 

Army,  French,  95,  167. 

Army,  Native,  10:  Bengal 
Regular,  13-4:  Bengal  Sepoy, 
19,  20 :  rebellion  of,  20-33 : 
loyal  Giirkhas,  22 :  four  dis- 
affected Sepoy  regiments  at 
Cawnpur,  24  :  revolt  of,  25  :  at 
Lucknow,  27  :  Madras,  loyalty 
of  the,  35-6  :  fidelity  of  the 
Bombay,  37  :  strength  of,  in  the 
Punjab,  37-8  :  risings  quelled 
there,  39 :  Sikh  troops  des- 
patched to  Delhi  and  contin- 
gents of  Native  Chiefs,  39-40  : 
table  of  European  operations, 
40-3 :  the  Bengal  Regular 
revolt,  54:  great  strength, 
54-5  :  at  Baseratganj,  56  :  from 
the  Punjab,  57  :  defeat  at  Najaf- 
garh,  58-9 :  siege  and  fall  of 
Delhi,  59-65 :  Lucknow,  73- 
84:  Oudh  and  Rohilkhand, 
84-8 :  defeated  at  Rathgarh, 
102  :  loss  at  Barodia,  102  : 
Sagar  relieved  from,  103  :  evacu- 
ate Garhakota,  104:  Mundinpur 
Pass  forced,  107-8  ;  yield  the 
forts  of  Sarai  and  Marowra,  loS : 
strength  at  Jhansl,  109:  Sir 
Hugh  Rose  arrives  at,  1 1 2-4  : 
besieges,  11 5-7  :  ro'it  of  rebels, 
1 18-9:  at  Jhansf,  125  : 
rebels  defeated  at  Kunch,  127  : 
Tautia  Topi  and  the  Rani  at 
Kalpi.  130-5  :  taken  by  the 
British,  136-40 :  rebels  hold 
Gwalior,  140-1  :  defeated  by 
Sir  Hngh  Rose,  142-9 :  death 
of  the  Rani,  145:  reconstruction 
of  armies,  155-78. 

Armies,  Company's,  European 
and  Native,  reconstruction  of, 
155-78:  propositions  to  reor- 
ganise, 155-7  ■•  6^fl  of  the  rule  of 
the  East  India  Company,  156-9 : 


India  under  the  Crown,  159-83 : 
Royal  Proclamation,  159-61  : 
amalgamation,  161-3:  origin 
of,  166-71  :  education,  172  : 
volunteers,  173:  Native  States, 
173:  united  strength,  174-5: 
Lord  Mayo,  quoted  on,  1 75-7  : 
their  equipment,  176:  gun 
manufactories,  177:  increase  of 
efficiency,  177:  Natives  serve 
best  in  their  own  provinces,  178. 

Arnott,    Dr.,    131,  quoted,    132 
(in  footnote). 

Arrah,  relieved  by  Sir  V.  Eyre, 
35,  41- 

ASCALON,  91. 
ASHANTI,  181. 

azamgarh,  86. 

Bahadurpur,  140,  142-3. 
Bahadur  Shah,   15  :    set  up  as 

Sovereign  Lord  of  Hindustan  at 

Delhi,  20  :  taken  prisoner  and 

transported  to  Rangoon,  64 
Bala  Rao,  87. 

Banda,  Nawab  of,  130,  133,  136. 
Banda,   occupation  of,   42,    no, 

119,  125,  130,  133,  150. 
Banpur,  Raja  of,  102,  106. 
Bareilly,  21,  42,  85. 
Barnard,  General,  22,  death  of, 

24,  25. 
Bartle  Frere,  181. 
Baseratganj,  56. 
Behar,  16,  34,  86,  168. 
Belgrade,  94. 
Bengal,    12,    21,    34-5,  40,   66, 

166-70. 
Bentinck,  Lord  William,  122. 
Berlin,  91. 

Betwa,  42,  116-7,  119,  124. 
Beyrout,  92. 
Bhopal,    Native   State   of,  joins 

the  rebels,  54. 
Bidasoa,  45. 
Bithur,  15,  25,  34. 
Bombay,  10  :  peace  preserved,  36 : 

assistance    given    by,    37,    54, 

56,  80,   140,  142,  149,   166-7, 

169-70. 
Boyle,  Mr.,  34. 


INDEX 


187 


Brahmans,  169-170. 
Brind's  Battery,  60. 

BUNDELAS,  107,  109. 

BuNDELKHAND,  British  occupy, 
42  :  rebels  hold,  54-5  :  lOo,  103, 
106,  II 1-9. 

Burgess,  Corporal,  F.,  62. 

Burma.  29. 

BuRNE,  Sir  Owen,  97  (footnote). 

Caesab,  98. 

Calcutta,  33  :  distress  in,  35,  41, 

44  :   Lord  Clyde's  arrival,  49 : 

50,  55-6,  65,  71-2,  89,  149. 
Cambridge,  Duke  of,  72  :  quoted, 

9S-9,  124,  150,  163,  165. 
Campbell,   Sir  Colin,    20.      See 

Lord  Clyde. 
Canning,   Earl   of,   quoted,  19 : 

29,  50,  7<5,  78.  84-5.  109- 
II,  113,  TI9,  132:  quoted, 
140,  1 41 -2,  146  (footnote), 
149,  157:  First  Viceroy,  159: 
Boyal  Proclamation,  159-61, 
182. 

Canrobert,  Marshal,  95. 

Carmichael,  Sergeant,  A.  B.,  62. 

Carthaginians,  98. 

Cawnpur,  15,  21  :  situation  of, 
24-5 :  treachery  of  N^n^ 
Sahib,  25  :  massacre  of  the 
British,  25-7,  34:  mutiny  in, 
41 ,  55  :  General  Outram  reaches, 
66  :  Colonel  Greathed's  oppor- 
tune arrival,  71  :  Commander- 
in-Chief  follows,  72-3  :  79,  80, 
88,  131. 

Ceylon,  49. 

Chambal,  21,  140. 

Chandari  Fort,  42  :  taken,  106, 
122. 

Charbagh,  bridge,  67. 

Charkhari,  iio-i,  113  (foot- 
note) :  119. 

Charles  II,  167. 

Chatham,  89. 

China  War,  45  :  expedition,  57. 

Chinhat,  27,  41. 

Christchurch,  154. 

Clarendon,  Lord,  quoted,  96. 

Clive,  21,  167,  171. 


Clyde,  Lord,  20 :  his  arrival  at 
Calcutta,  33  :  assumes  Chief 
Command  of  the  army,  41,  42- 
3  :  offer  and  acceptance  of  the 
Chief  Command  in  India,  44 : 
his  birth,  44 :  entrance  into  the 
army,  44 ;  served  in  Peninsular 
War  and  Walcheren  Expedition, 
44  :  official  notice  of  his  gal- 
lantry, 44-5  :  as  Captain,  44  : 
as  Lieutenant-Colonel,  45  ;  his 
services  in  the  American  War, 
West  Indies,  in  the  China  and 
Sikh  Wars,  45-6  :  promoted  to 
K.C.B.,  45-6 :  his  wish  to  re- 
tire, 46  :  in  the  Crimean  War, 
46-8  :  his  account  of  Alma,  47  : 
at  Balaclava,  48  :  his  opinion  of 
the  Highland  Brigade,  48-9 : 
created  G.C.B.  and  starts  for 
India,  49  :  his  stay  at  Calcutta, 
49-50  :  relations  with  the  Vice- 
roy, 50  :  with  his  men,  51  : 
description  of  the  enemy,  51-2  : 
character  of,  53-4  :  quoted,  56  ; 
led  the  army  towards  Oudh  and 
Rohilkhantl,  57  :  his  opinion  of 
the  Delhi  situation,  57-8  :  rein- 
forcements arrive  at,  59  :  siege 
of  Delhi,  59-65  :  congratulates 
General  Wilson,  6f^ :  quoted, 
66:  at  Calcutta,  71-2:  ariival 
at  Cawnpur,  73 :  advance  on 
Lucknow,  73  :  second  relief  of, 
74-6  :  drives  the  rebels  back, 
78  :  his  loyalty,  78  :  letter  to 
Sir  Hugh  Rose,  79-80  :  cap- 
tures Lucknow,  80-4 :  at  Ba- 
reilly,  85-6  :  in  Oudh  and 
Bohilkhand,  86-8  :  created 
Field  Marshal,  and  raised  to  the 
peerage,  89  :  death,  89  :  107-10 
113  (footnote)  :  quoted,  124-5 
130-1,  136,  140,  150-2,  154 
returns  to  England,  163  :  181, 
182. 

Constantinople,  90,  94. 

Coromandel  Coast,  166, 

Crimean  W^ar,  46-8,    95-6,  99, 
180-1. 

Cuddapah,  35. 


i88 


INDEX 


Dalhousie,  Marquess  of,  14 : 
quoted,  19. 

Deccan,  149. 

Delhi,  15,  20  :  description  of,  22- 
3  :  position  of  the  British,  23- 
4,  seized  by  rebels,  33-5 :  aid 
given  by  Siiih  Chiefs,  39,  40 : 
British  force  before,  41,  52,  55, 
57:  besieged,  65,  67,  109,  171, 
180. 

Derby,  Earl  of,  quoted,  90,  150. 

Dhamoni  Pass,  106. 

Dick,  Lieutenant,  120,  121  (foot- 
note). 

Dilkusha,  76,  77,  80. 

DiNAPUR,  34-5,  55»  164. 

DoAB,  Gangetic,  55,  168. 

Dost  Muhammad,  39-46. 

Druses    (Muhammadans),  92-3. 

DuNDAS,  Admiral,  94-5. 

Dtjndhu  Panth,  15.  See  N^nd) 
Sahib. 

DUNDONALD,  52. 

East  India  Co^rPANT,  42,  156-9, 
161-3,  166,  168. 

Elgin,  Lord,  57. 

Elphinstone,  Lord,  Bombay  re- 
mains peaceful  under,  36-7, 
105,  182. 

Eyre,  Sir  Vincent,  relief  of  Arrah 
by.  34-5.  41.  74- 

Fatehgarh,  78,  85-6. 
Fatrer,  Sir  Joseph,  28,  68. 
FiBOZPUR,  21 :   rising  suppressed 
at,  39 »  59- 

FiROZSHAH,  29. 

Forbes,  Archibald,  quoted,  29. 
Fort  St.  George,  166. 
Franks,  General,  79,  81-2. 
Frederick  the  Great,  98. 
Frederick  William  or  Prussia, 
92. 

Gall,  Major,  128. 

Ganga   Bai,    15.      See  K^nf  of 

Jhansl. 
Ganges,  The,  24,  31,  55,  67,  78, 

87»  99.  i37>  151. 


Garhakota,  fort,  42  :  captured, 
104. 

Gaul,  90,  98. 

Gibbon,  90. 

Glasgow,  44. 

GoGRA,  87. 

GoLDSWORTHY,  Major -General, 
146. 

Grant,  Sir  Hope,  46,  74,  87,  182. 

Grant,  Sir  Patrick,  49. 

Greathed,  Colonel,  71,  73. 

GuLAULi,  130,  137. 

GuMTi,  The  river,  27,  73,  80,  83. 

Gurkhas,  22,  61,  82,  168-9. 

GwALiOR,  16  :  seized  by  the  rebels, 
and  recaptured;  42  :  rebels,  54, 
66:  Contingent, 7 2  :  holds  Kalpi, 
99,  126,  140:  in  the  hands  of 
the  rebels,  141-5  :  regained  by 
British,  146-9. 


Haidarabad,  35 :  Contingent  at 
Mundinpur,  107-S  :   158. 

Hamilton,  Sir  Eobert,  108,  no, 
III,  III  (footnote). 

Hannibal,  98. 

Hants,  154. 

Havelock,  Sir  Henry,  defeats 
N^na  Sahib,  26  :  his  previous 
career,  29  :  arrives  at  Bombay 
and  Calcutta,  30  :  is  charged  to 
relieve  Cawnpur  and  Luc  know, 
30  :  victory  at  Fatehpur,  30  : 
reaches  Cawnpur,  30-1  :  suc- 
cessfully encounters  the  enemy 
at  Unao,  31  :  falls  back  on 
Cawnpur  and  rests  one  month, 
31,  34:  first  and  second  relief 
of  Lucknow,  41  :  death  of,  at 
Alanibagh,  42  :  56,  66 :  occupied 
Alambagh,  67  :  with  Outram 
relieves  the  Lucknow  Presi- 
dency, 66-8 :  rescued  by  the 
Commander-in-Chief,  74-5  :  his 
death,  77,  182. 

Havelock-Allan,  Sir  Henry 
(present  ,77, 

Hawthorn,  Bugler,  62. 

'  Highland  Brigade,'  at  Alma, 
47-9- 


INDEX 


189 


Hindus,  character  of,  lo-i :  168- 

70. 
Hindustan,  168. 
HoDSON,  Lieutenant,  58,  64,  81. 
HoLDiCH,  Sir  Edward,  43,  88. 
Holmes,  quoted,  53-4. 
Home,  Lieutenant,  62. 
Hope,  Adrian,  73-4,  85. 
HuGLi,  57. 
HumIyun,  64. 

India,  comparative  area  and  popu- 
lation, 9-10  :  state  of,  33-43  : 
Sir  Colin  Campbell's  arrival  at 
Calcutta,  33. 

Indoke,  Native  State,  rebels,  54, 
loi. 

Indus,  98. 

Inglis,  Brigadier,  28. 

Inkerman,  96. 

Inn,  98. 

Ireland,  165. 

Irun,  45. 

JalalIbad,  29. 

JAlandhar,  39. 

Jang  Bahadur,  79-80. 

JAora-Alipur,  147-8  (footnote). 

Jawala  Parshad,  88. 

Jehlam,  39. 

JhInsi,  42,  52,  84,  85,  103,  124, 

126,  152. 
Jhansi,  E^nl  of,  15,99,  112,  116, 

122-3,  126,  130,  135,  140,  145. 
JiND,  Raja  of,  39 :  his  contingent, 

40  :  rescues  Hodson,  58. 
Johnson,  Private,  164. 
Jones,  Brigadier,  85. 
JUGLULLUK,  29, 
Jumna,  river,    21-2,  55,  80,  99, 

i3o-i,_i33,  135-7.  I39»  152- 

Kaisar  Bagh,  75,  79,  81,  83. 
Kalpi,  capture  of,  42,  72,  78,  80, 

99,  iio-i,  119,  126-8,  130-42, 

144,  152. 
Kapurthala,  Chief  of,  39. 
KarnItik,  167,  170. 
Karnul,  35. 
Kashmieians,  59,  61. 
Kathiavvar,  fidelity  of,  36. 


Kavanagh,  Mr.,  72. 

Kebu,  Lord  Mark,  86. 

Khaibar  Pass,  46. 

Khalsa,  29. 

Khan  Bahadur  Khan,  85-6. 

Khurd  Kabul,  29. 

KiNGLAKE,  quoted,  95  (footnote). 

KiRUR,  150. 

KiSHENGANJ,  61. 

KoER  Singh,  12  :  ravages  by,  34 : 
death,  86. 

KoTAH,  taking  of,  42. 

Kotah-Ki-Sarai,  143,  145, 148. 

KuNCH,  42,  126-33,  ^1^1  139- 

Lawrence,  Lord,  quoted,  16-8, 
21  :  his  influence  felt  in  the 
Punjab,  37 :  firm  dealings  of, 
38-40,  181. 

Lawrence,  Sir  Henry,  death  of, 
28,  29,  30,  31,  41,  48,  181. 

LiDDELL,  Lieutenant-Colonel,  120. 

LiGHTFOOT,  Captain,  118-9. 

London,  44. 

Louth,  Colonel,  121. 

Lowe,  Dr.,  139. 

Lower  Bengal,  10,  54. 

LucKNOW,  24 :  state  of,  at  the  time 
of  the  Mutiny,  27  :  situation  of, 
27  :  siege  of,  28  :  Lord  Canning's 
opinion  of  its  defence,  29,  32  : 
General  Mutiny,  41  :  first  and 
second  relief  by  Havelock,  41  : 
occupation  of,  42,  52  :  strength 
of  enemy  at,  54,  56,  57,  65: 
relief  of  the  Residency  by 
Outram  and  Havelock,  68-71  : 
rescue  by  Sir  C.  Campbell,  73-6, 
78:  contemplated  siege,  79-80: 
captured,  S0-4,  86-7,  180. 

LuGARD,  Brigadier,  86. 

Lynedoch,  Lord,  quoted,  44-5. 

Macdonald,  Captain,  139. 
MACKINNON,  Director-General  Sir 

W.  A.,  181  (footnote). 
Macliver,  Colin,  44.     See  Lord 

Clyde. 
Madras,  10,  35-6 :  54,  56,  loi, 

166-9. 
Maharajpur,  29. 
Malabar,  35. 


190 


INDEX 


Malleson,  Colonel,  67  (footnote), 

91  :  134  (footnote), 
Malta,  91,  94. 
Mansfield,    Major-General,   49. 

See  Lord  Sandhurst. 
MakathA  States,  158. 
Marathas,  29,  169-71. 
Maronites  (Christian),  92-3. 
Marowra,  Fort  of,  taken,  108. 
Maxwell,  Sir  George,  131,  133, 

135  (footnote),  136-7. 
Mayo,  Earl  of,  quoted,  175-7. 
Meade,  Sir   Richard,   146   (foot- 
note), 153. 
Meean  Meer,  rising  suppressed 

at,  39. 
Meerut,  outbreak  of  Mutiny  at, 

20-2,  40, 
Mehemet  Alt,  91. 
Meicklejohn,  Lieutenant,  120-1 

(footnote). 
Menschikoff,  Prince,  93-5. 
Mhow,  42,  80,  140. 

MONSON,  21. 

Montgomery,  37,  181. 

moradabad,  21. 

Morar,  143-5,  148. 

MORIER,  Sir  Robert,  96. 

MuDKi,  29. 

Muhammad  Fazl  Khan,  102. 

MuHAMMADANS,  character  of, 
lo-i  :  excitement  of  the  South- 
ern, 35,  168-70. 

Multan,  102. 

MuNDiNPUR  Pass,  forced,  42, 
106-7. 

Mutiny,  The,  9  :  its  origin,  13-4: 
leaders  of,  15-6 :  Lord  Law- 
rence's speech  on,  16-8 :  the 
outbreak,  19-32 :  at  Meerut, 
20:  Delhi,  the  centre  of,  20-1  : 
Cawnpur,  24-7 :  treachery  of 
Nana  Sahib,  25  :  massacre  of 
the  British,  25-7 :  Lucknow, 
position,  27  :  strength  of  Euro- 
pean force,  27  :  besieged  by  the 
rebel  Sepoys,  28  :  death  of  Sir 
Henry  Lawrence,  28  :  situation 
of  India  at  the  time  of,  33-43  : 
rise  of  Sepoys  at  Arrah,  34 : 
their  rout  by  Sir  Vincent  Eyre, 


34-5  :  state  of  Bengal,  Madras, 
NjCgpur,  35 :  excitement  of 
Muhammadans  in  the  South, 
35  :  peace  preserved  in  Bombay 
by  Lord  Elphinstone,  36  :  Bom- 
bay, assistance  given  by,  37  : 
Punjab  fairly  quiet  under  Law- 
nence  and  Montgomery  37-40: 
suppression  of  risings  at  Firoz- 
pur,  Peshawar,  Jalandhar, 
Jehlam,  Sijilkot  and  Meean 
Meer,  &c.,  39  :  revolt  of  the 
Bengal  Regular  Native  Troops, 
54 :  and  of  Native  States, 
Gwalior,  Indore,  and  Bhopal, 
54 :  North- Western  Provinces 
and  Gudh,  54-5  :  difficult  situa- 
tion, 55-6 :  siege  and  fall  of 
Delhi,  57-65  :  Lucknow,  66-70  : 
second  relief  of  Lucknow,  72-6: 
Tantia  Topi  leads  rebels,  77-8  : 
advantage  taken  by,78-9 :  Luck- 
now captured,  80-4:  escape  of 
the  rebels,  83  :  return  to  Oudh, 
83-4  :  defeat  at  Bareilly,  85-6  : 
flight  of  the  Nana,  87;  execution 
of  JaAvalti  Parshad,  88  :  Sir 
Hugh  Rose's  principles,  97-8 
Southern  operations,  97-154 
rebels  evacuate  Ratbgarh,  102 
loss  at  Barodia,  102 
defeated  Sagar,  103 :  leave 
Garhakota,  104 :  driven  from 
the  Mundinpur  Pass,  107-8 : 
lose  the  forts  Sarai  and  Ma- 
rowra, 108 :  strength  of  rebels 
at  Jhansi,  109  :  Sir  Hugh  Rose 
arrives  and  inspects,  112-4: 
attacks,  11 5-8:  Tantia  Topi 
signals  his  arrival,  116-7  •  ^^- 
tacks  Sir  Hugh  Rose,  118:  is 
defeated  and  routed  by,  118-9: 
siege  of  Jhjinsi,  continued  by 
Sir  Hugh  Rose,  120:  breach 
effected,  121-3:  captured  and 
occupied,  123-5:  defeat  of  rel) els 
at  Kiinch,  127:  Tantia  Topi 
and  the  Rani  at  Kalpi,  130: 
defeat  before  Kalpi,  133-5  • 
rebels  evacuate,  135  :  British 
capture,    136-40 :    rebel    army 


INDEX 


191 


hold  Gw.alior,  140-1  :  defeated 
by  Sir  Hugh  Rose  who  attacked 
and  gained  possession,  14  2-9  : 
death  of  the  Kdnl,  145  r  Tjlntia 
Topi  captured  and  hanj:;ed,  153  : 
results  of  Mutiny,  155-78  :  cost 
and  lessons  of,  1 79-83. 

Nabha,  RajjC  of,  39,  contingent 
of,  40. 

Nagpur,  35. 

NanA  Sahib,  reason  for  his  re- 
bellion 15,  treachery  of,  25, 
orders  massacre  of  British,  26  : 
proclaims  himself  Peshwa,  26  : 
defeated  by  Havelock,  26  :  puts 
his  prisoners  to  death,  26-7 : 
massacre  by,  41  :  capture  of  his 
followers,  43  :  escapes  into  Ne- 
piil,  87-8. 

Napiee,  Sir  Charles,  quoted,  4  c;, 
46. 

Napiek,  Lord  of  Magdala,  56,  74, 
81,142-8:  quoted  147-S  (foot- 
note), 152  :  quoted,  165,  182. 

Nakbada,  rebellion  in  territories 

of,  55,  99- 

Narut  Pass,  106-7. 

Native  States,  10-3  :  Princes  of, 
18:  Bombay,  loyalty  of,  36: 
and  the  Punjab,  37-40:  Gwalior, 
Indore,  and  Bhopal  rebel,  54 : 
contingents  of,  173,  176,  178. 

Neave,  Lieutenant,  144. 

Need,  Captain,  118. 

Neill,  Brigadier,  31,  5 6,  67,  182. 

Nelson,  quoted,  52. 

Nepal,  43,  87,  168. 

Neville,  Captain,  102,  102-3 
(footnote). 

New  Zealand,  181. 

Nicholson,  Brigadier-General, 
24>  40j  57»  59,  60-1,  63,  98, 
182. 

NfMACH,  34. 

North- Western  Provinces,  10: 
disorder  in,  34,  54-5,  66.  See 
also  Northern  Operations. 

NowGONG,  130. 

Olphebts,  Sir  William,  67. 


Omab  Pasha's  Brigade,  91. 
Operations,  Northkrn,  44-89  : 
arrival  of  Sir  Colin  Campbell, 
49  :  his  stay  at  Calcutta,  49-50  : 
the    enemy,    51-2  :     revolt    of 
Bengal  Native  Regular  Troops 
and  Native  States  near,  54-5  : 
state  of   Lucknow,    56  :    Oudh 
and    Rohilkhand   attacked  by 
Sir  Colin  Campbell,  56-7  :    at 
Delhi,    57-8  :    victory  at   Na- 
jafgarh,  58-9  :  growing  strength 
of  European,   Kashmlrian  and 
Sikhs  before  Delhi,  59:  Delhi 
besieged,     60-5 :      Kishenganj 
and    Taharipur,    61  :     General 
Outram  reaches  Cawnpur,  66: 
relief  of    Lucknow    Residency 
by  Outram  and  Havelock,  66- 
70 :      occupy    Alamb%h,    67  : 
loss  sustained,  68  :    rescue  by 
the    Commander-in-Chief,   69  : 
Sir  James  Outram  describes  the 
operations,      69-70  :      Colonel 
Greathed  and  his  flying  column 
reached  Cawnpur,  71  :  arrival  of 
Commander-in-Chief,    72  :    ad- 
advance  on  and  second  relief  of 
Lucknow,  72-6  :  withdrawal  to 
Dilkdsha,      76-7 :       Lucknow 
captured,  80-4 :    in  Oudh  and 
Rohilkhand,  84-8. 
Operations,  Southern,  90-154: 
summarised    by    the    Earl    of 
Derby,   90  :    state  of  country, 
99-100  :  ra-pid  march  to  Sagar, 
1 01  :    the  taking  of  Rathgarh, 
101-2  :  relief  of  Scigar,  103-4  • 
capture  of  Garhakota,  104  :  and 
Chandari,  106  :  the  Mundinpur 
Pass    forced,  107  :     Sarai   and 
Marowra     forts     taken,     108 : 
march     to     Jhansi,      109-1 3 : 
Jhansi,  descriplion  of,  114:  Sir 
Hugh   Rose's   mode   of  action, 
115,   117:  TcCntia  Topi  arrives 
with    a    large    army,    116-7  : 
attacks  Sir  Hugh  Rose  and  is 
beaten,  11 8-9  :  siege  continued, 
120-3:    breach   effected,    122: 
siege  ended,  123-5  :    ^i^  Hugh 


igz 


INDEX 


Rose  marched  for  Kalpi,  the 
position  of  the  rebels,  126:  he 
attacks  Kiinch  and  puts  the 
rebels  to  flight,  127  :  attacks 
Loh^ri,  128  ;  men  paralysed  by 
sunstroke,  129  :  again  starts  for 
Kalpi,  1 30-1  :  joins  Sir  George 
Maxwell,  131  :  sickness  in  the 
force,  131-3:  taking  of  Kdlpi, 
133-8  '•  rebels  attack  Sindhia, 
140 :  hold  Gwalior,  141-3 : 
defeated  by  Sir  Hugh  Rose, 
144-5  :  enter  Gwalior,  146-9  : 
conclusion  of  operations,  150-4. 

OuDH,  10:  annexation  of,  16-7: 
rebellion  in,  27,  31,  33,  36-7, 
43,  54 :  military  resources  of, 
55,  56,  66  :  Sir  Colin  Campbell 
moves  into,  72,  78,  82-8,  151, 
158,  168,  171. 

OuTRAM,  General  Sir  James,  55- 
6  :  reaches  Cawnpur  :  part  of 
his  letter  quoted  to  Brigadier 
Havelock,  66 :  his  character, 
66  :  with  Havelock  relieves  the 
Residency,  66-70 :  quoted  in 
footnote,  6'j  :  quoted,  69-70  : 
rescued,  74-6 :  occupies  the 
Alambagh,  77 :  at  Lucknow, 
80-4,  98,  182. 

Pagan,  29. 

Palestine,  152. 

Palmekston,  Lord,  93,  150. 

Panmure,  Lord,  quoted,  44. 

Panna,  Chief  of,  iii. 

Paris,  154. 

Parsis,  174. 

Pathans,  1 01,  169-70. 

Patiala,  Maharaja  of,  39:  his 
contingent,  40. 

Peel,  Captain,  57,  74. 

Peninsular  War,  44-5,  50  (foot- 
note), 89. 

Penny,  Brigadier,  85. 

Persian  Expedition,  35,  37,  55. 

Peshawar,  rising  suppressed,  39. 

PESHAWAli,Valley  of,  63(footnote). 

Plassey,  12,  21,  33,  167,  171. 

PooNA,  131,  152. 

Population  of  India,  9. 


Porto  Novo,  171. 

Portugal,  Infanta  of,  167. 

Portuguese,  Indian,  174. 

Pritchard,  quoted,  150-2. 

Prussia,  98, 

Prussia,  J'rederick  William  of, 
92. 

Punjab,  10,  24 :  attitude  of,  37 : 
under  control  of  Lawrence  and 
Montgomery,  37-40  :  strength 
of  Europeans  in,  38  :  vigilance 
of  oflBcials,  38-9  :  aid  given  by 
the  Sikh  Chiefs,  39 :  prompt 
suppression  of  all  risings,  39-40, 
54  :  reinforcements  from.  57  :  at 
Lucknow,  73-4:  158,  170. 

Punjabis,  169-70. 

PuRWARis,  170. 

Queen,  The,  77,  89,  158-61,  166, 
180,  182-3. 

Radcliffe,  Sir  PoUexfen,  81. 

Raglan,  Lord,  47-8. 

Railways,  173-4. 

Rajputs,  169. 

Rangoon,  29,  64. 

Rao  Sahib,  135. 

Rapti,  River,  87. 

Rathgarh,  42  :  taken,  loi,  102-3. 

Rifles,  176-7. 

Roberts,  Sir  Frederick,  42. 

Rohilkhand,   55,   57,    78,   83-7, 

140,  151,  168,  171. 
Romans,  98. 
Rome,  98. 

Rose,  Lieutenant,  147. 
Rose,  of  Kilvarock,  147. 
Rose,  Sir  Hugh,  quoted,  15.     See 

Lord  Strathnairn. 
Ross,  Captain,  148  (footnote). 
Ross,  Sir  John,  133. 
Russell,  73. 
Russell,  Dr.,  quoted,  82. 
Russia,  93-6. 
Russians,  47. 
Ruyah,  85. 

Sabulgaeh,  147  (footnote). 
Sagae,  55  :  march  to,  10 1  :  relief 
of,  103-5. 


INDEX 


193 


Salkeld,  Lieutenant,  62. 

Sandhurst,  Lord,  49,  57  (foot- 
note). 

San  Sebastian,  44-5. 

Sarai,  Fort  of,  108. 

Seaton,  Colonel,  85. 

Sebastopol,  95,  102-3  (foot- 
note). 

Secundra  Bagh,  73,  81. 

Sepoy  Mutiny.   See  The  Mutiny. 

Shadwell,  quoted,  48,  57. 

Shahgarh,  R^ja  of,  107. 

Shah  Jahan,  22. 

Shahjahanpur,  21. 

Sialkot,  rising  suppressed  at,  39. 

Sikhs,  loyal  aid,  12,  34,  39-40: 
second  Sikh  War,  45  :  at  Delhi, 
59,  82,  169. 

Simla,  87,  165, 

SiND,  136,  170. 

SiNDHiA,  Maharaja,  42,  1 03  (foot- 
note) :  140-2,  145-7  (foot- 
notes) :  149,  150, 

SiPRi,  143,  153. 

SiRAUDA,  147  (footnote). 

Skene,  Captain,  109. 

Smith,  Brigadier,  142,  144-6. 

Smith,  Sergeant  John,  62. 

SoBRAON,  29. 

Steuart,  Brigadier,  100. 

St.  Petersburg,  96, 

Stratford  de  Redcliffe,  Lord, 
95  (footnote). 

Strathnairn,  Lord,  quoted,  15, 
20:  quoted,  32:  advance  from 
Mhow  and  capture  of  Eathgarh, 
42  :  letter  to,  79-80 :  stormed 
and  took  Jh^nsl,  84-5,  90  :  birth 
and  education,  91  :  responsible 
duties  in  Ireland,  Malta,  and 
Egypt,  91  :  made  a  C.B.,  and 
later  British  Consul  in  Syria, 
92  :  Secretary  of  Embassy  at 
Constantinople,  93 :  his  policy 
when  in  a  difficult  position, 
93-5 :  in  the  Crimea,  95-6  : 
at  Sebastopol,  95  :  Alma  and 
Inkerman,  96  :  promotion  and 
honours,  96  :  character  of,  96-7  : 
influence  over  officers  and  men, 
98  :  serves  in  India,  99  :  incom- 


plete state  of  the  force,  100 : 
marches  to  Sigar,  loi  :  takes 
Rathgarh,  10  i -2  :  relieves  S^- 
gar,  103-4:  captures  Garhd,kota, 
104  :  and  Chandari,  106  :  forces 
Mundinpur  Pass,  107  :  takes 
Sarili  and  Marowra,  marches  to 
Jh^nsl,  109-13  :  mode  of  action, 
1 1 5-7:  attacked  by  T^ntia 
Topi,  118-9:  continues  siege 
operations,  120:  quoted,  12 1-2: 
enters  Jhansf,  1 22-5:  quoted, 
124:  marches  for  Kalpi,  rebels 
hold  Kilnch,  126  :  attacks  and 
takes  Kiinch,  puts  them  to 
flight,  127-9:  falls  from  sun- 
stroke, 128-9:  hastens  towards 
K^lpi,  1 30-1  :  joins  Sir  George 
Maxwell,  131 :  sickness  of  his 
force,  1 31-3  :  victory  at  K^lpi, 
135  :  rebels  evacuate,  135  : 
letter  to  the  Commander-in- 
Chief,  136-8  :  order  to  the  force, 
138-9:  illness  of,  139:  leave 
granted,  141  :  offers  to  com- 
mand force  at  Gwalior,  141 : 
plan  of  attack,  142  :  regains 
Gwalior,  143- 9:  public  opinion 
of,  149:  created  a  G.C.B.,  &c., 
149-50  :  Pritchard's  opinion  of 
151-2 :  rejo'ns  his  force  at 
Poona,  152-3  :  appointed  Com- 
mander-in-Chief of  Bombay 
Army  and  of  India,  154  :  raised 
to  the  peerage,  154:  promoted 
to  the  rank  of  i^'ield  Marshal 
and  death,  154  :  improves  dis- 
cipline, 163-4  •  employment  for 
European  soldiers,  164-5  :  care 
of  the  Native  regiments,  165  : 
returns  home  and  is  appointed 
Commander  of  forces  in  Ireland, 
165-6,  182. 
Stuaet,  Brigadier,  100,  114,  121, 

134,  137-8,  143,  147- 
Sutlej,  The,  37. 
Syria,  91-3. 

Taharipur,  61. 
Tamils,  169-70. 
Tantia  Topi,  16,  26,  42,  43,  77, 


N 


194 


INDEX 


99,  115  (footnote),  116-9,  126, 

130,  140,  153. 
Tehri,  123. 
Telingas,  169,  170. 
Therapia,  95. 

'Times,'  The,  quoted,  165-6. 
TiMUR  Shah,  22. 
Trans- Indus  Territory,  170. 
TURENNE,  98. 

Turkey,  Grand  Vizier  of,  93-4. 
Turkey,  Sultan  of,  93-4. 
Tuenbull,  Colonel,!  21  (footnote). 

Unao,  31. 

Valaitis,  ioi,  109,  118,  122,  126 
Van  Courtland,  General,  40. 
Vienna,  94. 

Vincent,  Colonel  H.,  47. 
Vindhya,  Mountains,  100. 
Vourla,  95. 


Wake,  Mr,,  34. 

Walcheren  Expedition,  44. 

Walpole,  Brigadier,  85. 

Webber,  Major-General,  121. 

Wellington,  Duke  of,  50  (foot- 
note). 

Weser,  98. 

West  Indies,  45. 

Wetherall,  General,  139. 

Wheeler,  Sir  Hugh,  24-5,  49. 

Whirlpool,  128-9  (and  foot- 
note). 

Whitlock,  General  Sir  George, 
42,  ioi,  112,  119:  quoted,  125, 

133- 
Wilson,  Brigadier  Archdale,  22, 

24,  58,  64,  65. 
WoLSELEY,  General  Viscount,  74. 
Wyndham,  General,  72-3,  76,  77. 


THE   END. 


pEUPr 

,   t*  Of   THE  ' 


RULERS  OP  INDIA 

THE   CLAItENDON  PRESS   SERIES   OF  INDIAN 
HISTORICAL  RETROSPECTS 
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V.  MADHAVA  RAO  SINDHIA  :   and  the  Hindu  Reconquest  of 
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Moghul  Empire,  &c.     [Published.] 
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by  Colonel  Malleson,  CS.I. 
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under  Victoria,  d:c.     [Published.]     Third  thousand. 
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Foreign  Secretary  to  the  Government  of  India,  Author  of 
Selections  from  the  Calcutta  Gazettes,  3  vols,  (i 784-1 805). 
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the  Company  into  the  supreme  Power  in  India,  by  the  Rev. 
W.  H.  Hutton,  M.A.,  Fellow  of  St.  John's  College,  and  Senior 
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XL  THE  MARQUESS  OF  HASTINGS  :  and  the  final  overthrow 
of  the  Mardthd  Poiver,  by  Major  Ross  of  Bladensbueg, 
Grenadier  Guards ;  F.R.G.S. 
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South- Western  India,  by  J.  S.  Cotton,  Esq.,  M.A.,  formerly 
fellow  of  Queen's  College,  Oxford,  Author  of  The  Decennial 
Statemerd  of  the  Moral  and  Material  Progress  and  Condition 
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RuLEBS  OF  India  Series  ^continued). 

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History  of  China,  &c.  [Immediately.] 
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Author  of  The  Punjab  Chiefs,  &c.     [Shortly.] 

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Hunter,  K.C.S.I.,  M.A.     [Published.]     Fourth  thousand. 

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the  Great  Revolt,  by  Major-General  Sir  Owen  Tudor 
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[Published.] 

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India,  and  late  Lieutenant-Governor  of  the  Punjab. 

XXI.  THE  EARL    OF  MAYO:     and  the  Consolidation  of  the 

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©pinions  of  tfie  Pre00 


SIR  WILLIAM  HUNTER'S  ^DALHOUSIE.' 

'  An  interesting  and  exceedingly  readable  volume Sir  William 

Hunter  has  produced  a  valuable  work  about  an  important  epoch  in 
English  history  in  India,  and  he  has  given  us  a  pleasing  insight  into 
the  character  of  a  remarkable  Englishman.  The  "  Rulers  of  India" 
series,  which  he  has  initiated,  thus  makes  a  successful  beginning  in  his 
hands  with  one  who  ranks  among  the  greatest  of  the  great  names  which 
will  be  associated  with  the  subject.' — The  Times. 

'  To  no  one  is  the  credit  for  the  improved  condition  of  public  intelli- 
gence [regarding  India]  more  due  than  to  Sir  William  Hunter.  From 
the  beginning  of  his  career  as  an  Indian  Civilian  he  has  devoted  a  rare 
literary  faculty  to  the  task  of  enlightening  his  countrymen  on  the  subject 


OPINIONS  OF  TEE  PRESS  ON  'DALHOUSIE'  (continued). 

of  England's  greatest  dependency  ....  By  inspiring  a  small  army  of 
fellow-labourers  with  his  own  spirit,  by  inducing  them  to  conform  to  his 
own  method,  and  shaping  a  huge  agglomeration  of  facts  into  a  lucid  and 
intelligible  system,  !Sir  W.  Hunter  has  brought  India  and  its  innumer- 
able interests  within  the  pale  of  achievable  knowledge,  and  has  given 
definite  shape  to  the  truths  which  its  history  establishes  and  the 
problems  which  it  suggests. .  . .  Such  contributions  to  literature  are  apt  to 
be  taken  as  a  matter  of  course,  because  their  highest  merit  is  to  conceal 
the  labour,  and  skill,  and  knowledge  involved  in  their  production ;  but 
they  raise  the  whole  level  of  public  intelligence,  and  generate  an 
atmosphere  in  which  the  baleful  influences  of  fully,  ignorance,  prejudice, 
and  presumption  dwindle  and  disappear.  . . .  No  one  we  think,  who  fairly 
studies  Sir  W.  Hunter's  exact  and  lucid  narrative  of  these  transactions, 
can  question  the  result  which  he  seeks  to  establish — namely,  that  Lord 
Dalhousie  merely  carried  out  with  moderation  and  skill  a  policy 
deliberately  adopted  by  the  Government  before  his  arrival  in  the  country 
— a  policy  the  strict  legality  of  which  cannot  be  disputed,  and  which  was 
inspired  by  the  growing  sense  that  sovereigns  exist,  not  for  their  own 
enjoyment,  but  for  the  happiness  of  their  subjects.' — Saturday  Review. 

*  Admirably  calculated  to  impart  in  a  concise  and  agreeableform  a  clear 
general  outline  of  the  history  of  our  great  Indian  Empire.' — Economist. 

*  A  skilful  and  most  attractive  picture.  .  .  .  The  author  has  made  good 
use  of  public  and  private  documents,  and  has  enjoyed  the  privilege  of 
being  aided  by  the  deceased  statesman's  family.  His  little  work  is, 
consequently,  a  valuable  contribution  to  modern  history.' — Academy. 

'  The  book  should  command  a  wide  circle  of  readers,  not  only  for  its 
author's  sake  and  that  of  its  subject,  but  partly  at  least  on  account  of 
the  very  attractive  way  in  which  it  has  been  published  at  the  moderate 
price  of  half-a-crown.  But  it  is,  of  course,  by  its  intrinsic  merits  alone 
that  a  work  of  this  nature  should  be  judged.  And  those  merits  are 
everywhere  conspicuous.  ...  A  writer  whose  thorough  mastery  of  all 
Indian  subjects  has  been  acquired  by  years  of  practical  experience  and 
patient  research.' — The  Athenceum. 

'  Never  have  we  been  so  much  impressed  by  the  great  literary  abilities 
of  Sir  William  Hunter  as  we  have  been  by  the  perusal  of  ''The  Marquess 
of  Dalhousie."  .  .  .  The  knowledge  displayed  by  the  writer  of  the  motives 
of  Lord  Dalhousie's  action,  of  the  inner  working  of  his  mind,  is  so  com- 
plete, that  Lord  Dalhousie  himself,  were  he  living,  could  not  state  them 
more  clearly.  In  the  next  place  the  argument  throughout  the  book  is  so 
lucid,  based  so  entirely  upon  facts,  resting  upon  official  documents  and 
other  evidences  not  to  be  controverted,  that  the  opponents  of  Lord 
Dalhousie's  policy  will  be  sorely  put  to  it  to  make  a  case  against  him. 
.  .  .  Sir  William  Hunter's  style  is  so  clear,  his  language  so  vivid,  and 
yet  so  simple,  conveying  the  impressions  he  wishes  so  perspicuously  that 
they  cannot  but  be  understood,  that  the  work  must  have  a  place  in 
every  liljraiy,  in  every  home,  we  might  say  indeed  every  cottage.' — 
Evening  Neics. 

'  Sir  William  Hunter  has  written  an  admirable  little  volume  on 
"  The  Marquess  of  Dalhousie  "  for  his  series  of  the  "  Rulers  of  India." 
It  can  be  read  at  a  sitting,  yet  its  references — expressed  or  implied — 
suggest  the  study  and  observation  of  half  a  life-time.' — The  Daily  News. 


©pinions  of  tbe  Press 

ON 

SIR  WILLIAM  HUNTER'S  'LORD  MAYO.' 

'  Sir  William  W.  Hunter  has  contributed  a  brief  but  admirable 
biography  of  the  Earl  of  Mayo  to  the  series  entitled  "  Eulers  of  India," 
edited  by  himself  (Oxford,  at  the  Clarendon  Press).' — The  Times. 

'  In  telling  this  story  in  the  monograph  before  us.  Sir  William 
Hunter  h;is  combined  his  well-known  literary  skill  with  an  earnest 
sympathy  and  fullness  of  knowledge  which  are  worthy  of  all  Commenda- 
tion. .  .  .  The  world  is  indebted  to  the  author  for  a  fit  and  attractive 
record  of  what  was  eminently  a  noble  life.' — The  Acadeini/. 

'The  sketch  of  The  Man  is  full  of  interest,  drawn  as  it  is  with  com- 
plete sympathy,  understanding,  and  appreciation.  But  more  valuable 
is  the  account  of  his  administration.  No  one  can  show  so  well  and 
clearly  as  Sir  William  Hunter  does  what  the  policy  of  Lord  Mayo  con- 
tributed to  the  making  of  the  Indian  Empire  of  to-day.' — The  Scotsman. 

'  Sir  William  Hunter  has  given  us  a  monograph  in  which  there  is  a 
happy  combination  of  the  essay  and  the  biography.  We  are  presented 
with  the  main  features  of  Lord  Mayo's  administration  unencumbered 
with  tedious  details  which  would  interest  none  but  the  most  official  of 
Anglo-Indians ;  while  in  the  biography  the  man  is  brought  before  us, 
not  analytically,  but  in  a  life-like  portrait.' — Vanity  Fair. 

*  The  story  of  his  life  Sir  W.  W.  Hunter  tells  in  well-chosen  language 
— clear,  succinct,  and  manly.  Sir  W.  W.  Hunter  is  in  sympathy  with 
his  subject,  and  does  full  justice  to  Mayo's  strong,  genuine  nature. 
Without  exaggei-ation  and  in  a  direct,  unaffected  style,  as  befits  his 
theme,  he  brings  the  man  and  his  work  vividly  before  us.' — The 
Glasgoiv  Herald. 

'  All  the  knowledge  acquired  by  personal  association,  familiarity  with 
administrative  details  of  the  Indian  Government,  and  a  strong  grasp  of 
the  vast  problems  to  be  dealt  with,  is  utilised  in  this  presentation  of 
Lord  Mayo's  personality  and  career.  Sir  W.  Hunter,  however,  never 
overloads  his  pages,  and  the  outlines  of  the  sketch  are  clear  and  firm.' 
— The  Manchester  Express. 

'  This  is  another  of  the  "  Rulers  of  India  "  series,  and  it  will  be  hard 
to  beat.  .  .  .  Sir  William  Hunter's  perception  and  expression  are  here  at 
their  very  best.' — The  Pall  Mall  Gazette. 

'  The  latest  addition  to  the  "  Rulers  of  India  "  series  yields  to  none  of 
its  predecessors  in  attractiveness,  vigour,  and  artistic  portraiture.  .  .  . 
The  final  chapter  must  either  be  copied  verbally  and  literally — which 
the  space  at  our  disposal  will  not  permit — or  be  left  to  the  sorrowful 
perusal  of  the  reader.  The  man  is  not  to  be  envied  who  can  read  it  with 
dry  eyes.' — Allen's  Indian  Mail. 

'  The  little  volume  which  has  just  been  brought  out  is  a  study  of  Lord 
Mayo's  career  by  one  who  knew  all  about  it  and  was  in  full  sympathy 
with  it.  .  .  .  Some  of  these  chapters  are  full  of  spirit  and  fire.  The 
closing  passages,  the  picture  of  the  Viceroy's  assassination,  cannot  fail 
to  make  any  reader  hold  his  breatli.  We  know  what  is  going  to 
happen,  but  we  are  thrilled  as  if  we  did  not  know  it,  and  were  still 
held  in  suspense.  The  event  itself  was  so  terribly  tragic  that  any 
ordinary  description  might  seem  feeble  and  laggard.  But  in  this 
volume  we  are  made  to  feel  as  we  must  have  felt  if  we  had  been  on 
the  spot  and  seen  the  murderer  "  fastened  like  a  tiger  "  on  the  back  of 
the  Viceroy.' — Daily  News,  Leading  Article. 


©pinions  of  tfte  press 

ON 

MR.W.S.SETON-KARIl'S'CORNWALLIS.' 

'  This  new  volume  of  the  "  Rulers  of  India  "  series  keeps  up  to  the 
high  standard  set  by  the  author  of  "  The  Marquess  of  Dalhousie."  For 
dealing  with  the  salient  passages  in  Lord  Cornwallis's  Indian  career  no 
one  could  have  been  better  qualified  than  the  whilom  foreign  secretary 
to  Lord  Lawrence.' — The  AthencBum. 

'  Lord  Cornwallis  has  been  very  properly  included  in  the  list  of  those 
"Rulers  of  India"  whose  biographies  are  calculated  to  illustrate  the 
past  growth  and  present  development  of  the  English  administration  in 
that  country.  His  name  is  connected  with  several  great  measures, 
which  more,  perhaps,  than  any  others  have  given  a  special  colour  to  our 
rule,  have  influenced  the  course  of  subsequent  legislation,  and  have  made 
the  Civil  Service  what  it  at  present  is.  He  completed  the  administrative 
fabric  of  which  Warren  Hastings,  in  the  midst  of  unexampled  difficulties 
and  vicissitudes,  had  laid  the  foundation.' — The  Saturday  Review. 

'  We  hope  that  the  volumes  on  the  "  Rulers  of  India "  which  are 
being  published  by  the  Clarendon  Press  are  carefully  read  by  a  large 
section  of  the  public.  There  is  a  dense  wall  of  ignorance  still  standing 
between  the  average  Englishman  and  the  greatest  dependency  of  the 
Crown,  although  we  can  scarcely  hope  to  see  it  broken  down  altogether, 
some  of  these  admirable  biographies  cannot  fail  to  lower  it  a  little.  .  .  . 
Mr.  Seton-Karr  has  succeeded  in  the  task,  and  he  has  not  only  pre- 
sented a  large  mass  of  information,  but  he  has  brought  it  together  in  an 
attractive  form.  .  .  .  We  strongly  recommend  the  book  to  all  who  wish 
to  enlarge  the  area  of  their  knowledge  with  reference  to  India.' — New 
York  Herald. 

'  The  **  Rulers  of  India  "  series.  This  outcome  of  the  Clarendon 
Press  grows  in  value  as  it  proceeds.  The  account  of  Cornwallis  is  from 
the  pen  of  Mr.  W.  Seton-Karr,  who  was  formerly  Foreign  Secretary  to 
the  Government  of  India,  and  whose  acquaintance  with  Eastern  afi'airs 
has  been  of  obvious  service  to  him  in  the  compilation  of  this  useful 
manual.' — The  Globe. 

'  One  might  almost  say  that  the  history  of  our  great  Indian  Empire 
might  be  read  with  comparative  ease  in  the  excellent  "  Rulers  of  India 
Series,"  published  at  the  Clarendon  Press  at  Oxford.  ...  Of  Cornwallis 
it  might  be  said  he  transformed  the  East  India  Company's  servants 
from  merchants  to  administrators,  and  determined  to  place  them  above 
jobbery,  which  he  despised.' — The  Independent. 

'  We  have  already  expressed  our  sense  of  the  value  and  timeliness  of 
the  series  of  Indian  historical  retrospects  now  issuing,  under  the  editor- 
ship of  Sir  W.  W.  Hunter,  from  the  Clarendon  Press.  It  is  somewhat 
less  than  fair  to  say  of  Mr.  Seton-Karr's  monograph  upon  Cornwallis 
that  it  reaches  the  high  standard  of  literary  workmanship  which  that 
series  has  maintained. . .  .  His  accurate  and  lucid  summary  of  the  necessi- 
ties which  dictated  Cornwallis's  policy,  and  the  methods  by  which  he 
initiated  and,  to  a  great  extent,  effected,  the  transformation  of  our  rule 
in  India  from  the  lines  of  an  Oriental  despotism  to  those  with  which  we 
are  now  familiar,  is  as  attractive  as  it  is  instructive.' — The  Literary 
World. 


fiDpinions  of  tfte  Press 


COLONEL  MALLESON'S  *DUPLEIX.' 

*  In  the  character  of  Dupleix  there  was  the  element  of  greatness 
that  contact  with  India  seems  to  have  generated  in  so  many  European 
minds,  French  as  well  as  English,  and  a  broad  capacity  for  govern- 
ment, which,  if  suffered  to  have  full  play,  might  have  ended  in  giving 
the  whole  of  Southern  India  to  France.  Even  as  it  was,  Colonel 
Malleson  shows  how  narrowly  the  prize  slipped  from  French  grasp. 
In  1783  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  arrived  just  in  time  to  save  the 
British  power  from  extinction.' — Times. 

'  Colonel  Malleson's  Life  of  Dupleix,  which  has  just  been  published, 
though  his  estimate  of  his  hero  differs  in  some  respects  from  Lord 
Stanhope's  and  Lord  Macaulay's,  may  be  accepted  as,  on  the  whole,  a 
fairly  faithful  portraiture  of  the  prophetic  genius  to  whom  the  possi- 
bility of  a  great  Indo-European  Empire  first  revealed  itself.  Had  the 
French  profited  by  all  the  advantages  they  possessed  when  Clive 
exchanged  the  counting-house  for  the  army,  the  history  of  India,  and 
perhaps  of  Europe  also,  might  have  been  different.' — Standard 
(leading  article). 

*  The  "  Rulers  of  India  "  series,  edited  by  Sir  W.  W.  Hunter,  and 
published  at  the  Clarendon  Press,  Oxford,  is  one  of  the  very  best  of 
the  serial  collections  which  are  now  so  popular.  All  the  writers  of 
these  little  volumes  are  well-known  and  acknowledged  authorities  on 
the  subjects  with  which  they  deal.  Not  the  least  interesting  volume 
in  this  particular  series  is  Colonel  Malleson's  biography  of  Dupleix  .  .  . 
It  was  to  Dupleix,  and  not  to  Clive,  that  the  idea  first  occurred  of 
founding  a  European  Empire  in  India  ...  It  is  a  stirring  story,  and 
full  of  moral  for  the  administrators  of  India  at  this  hour.' — Echo. 

'  One  of  the  best  of  Sir  W.  Hunter's  interesting  and  valuable  series. 
Colonel  Malleson  writes  out  of  the  fulness  of  familiarity,  moving  with 
ease  over  a  field  which  he  had  long  ago  surveyed  in  every  nook  and 
corner.  To  do  a  small  book  as  well  as  this  on  Dupleix  has  been  done, 
will  be  recognised  by  competent  judges  as  no  small  achievement. 
When  one  considers  the  bulk  of  the  material  out  of  which  the  little 
volume  has  been  distilled,  one  can  still  better  appreciate  the  labour 
and  dexterity  involved  in  the  performance.' — Academy. 

*  Colonel  Malleson  has  here  written  a  most  compact  and  effective 
history  of  the  French  in  India  in  a  little  handbook  of  180  pages.  He 
gives  a  brief  summary  of  French  enterprise  in  India  from  the  first, 
and  clearly  outlines  the  grand  designs  that  rose  in  the  fertile  brain  of 
Dupleix.  Colonel  Malleson's  chapter  on  the  "  Downfall  of  Dupleix  " 
is  as  touching  as  anything  we  remember  to  have  recently  read,  and  his 
chapter  on  Clive  and  his  work  may  be  read  with  interest  and  pleasure, 
even  after  the  glowing  and  brilliant  account  of  Macaulay.' — NoncoU' 

J'ormist. 

*  Well  arranged,  lucid  and  eminently  readable,  an  excellent  addition 
to  a  most  useful  series.' — Record. 


©pinions  of  ti)z  press 

ON 

COLONEL  MALLESON'S  *AKBAR.' 

'  Colonel  Malleson's  interesting  monograph  on  Akbar  in  the  "Rulers 
of  India "  (Clarendon  Press)  should  more  than  satisfy  the  general 
reader.  Colonel  Malleson  traces  the  origin  and  foundation  of  the 
Mughal  Empire  ;  and,  as  an  introduction  to  the  history  of  Muhamma- 
dan  India,  the  book  leaves  nothing  to  be  desired.' — St.  James's  Gazette. 

'  Akbar  was  certainly  a  great  man.  Colonel  Malleson  has  done  well 
to  tell  his  story  thus  succinctly  and  sympathetically :  hitherto  it  has  been 
mostly  buried  from  the  mass  of  readers.  The  book  is  in  our  idea  a 
piece  of  thoroughly  well-executed  work,  which  cannot  fail  to  recommend 
still  further  a  series  which  has  begun  right  well.' — Nonconformist. 

*  The  chief  interest  of  the  book  lies  in  the  later  chapters,  in  which 
Colonel  Malleson  presents  an  interesting  and  singularly  pleasing 
picture  of  the  great  Emperor  himself  and  the  principles  which  governed 
his  enlightened  and  humane  administration.' — Literary  World. 

*  It  is  almost  superfluous  to  say  that  the  book  is  characterised  by 
the  narrative  vigour  and  the  extensive  familiarity  with  Indian  history 
to  which  the  readers  of  Colonel  Malleson's  other  works  are  accus- 
tomed.'—  Glasgoio  Herald. 

*  This  volume  will,  no  doubt,  be  welcomed,  even  by  experts  in 
Indian  history,  in  the  light  of  a  new,  clear,  and  terse  rendering  of  an 
old,  but  not  worn-out  theme.  It  is  a  worthy  and  valuable  addition 
to  Sir  W.  Hunter's  promising  series.' — Athenceum. 

*  Colonel  Malleson  has  broken  ground  new  to  the  general  reader. 
The  story  of  Akbar  is  briefly  but  clearly  told,  with  an  account  of  what 
he  was  and  what  he  did,  and  how  he  found  and  how  he  left  India.  .  .  . 
The  native  chronicles  of  the  reign  are  many,  and  from  them  it  is  still 
possible,  as  Colonel  Malleson  has  shown,  to  construct  a  living  portrait 
of  this  great  and  mighty  potentate.' — Scots  Observer. 

'  Akbar  is,  after  Mohammed  himself,  the  most  striking  and  interest- 
ing figure  in  Mussulman  history.  Few  men  of  any  age  or  country 
have  united  in  equally  successful  measure  the  gifts  of  the  conqueror, 
the  organiser,  and  the  philosophic  statesman  .  .  .  His  personal  charac- 
ter is  even  more  exceptional  among  Oriental  rulers  than  his  intel- 
lectual brilliance  .  .  .  He  is  the  only  great  Mussulman  ruler  who 
showed  himself  capable  of  rising  out  of  the  narrow  bigotry  of  Islam  to 
a  lofty  and  comprehensive  view  of  religious  truth.  The  life  and  rule 
of  such  a  man  is  a  noble  theme  for  a  great  historian.' — Speaker. 

'  The  brilliant  historian  of  the  Indian  Mutiny  has  been  assigned  in 
this  volume  of  the  series  an  important  epoch  and  a  strong  personality 
for  critical  study,  and  he  has  admirably  fulfilled  his  task.  A  himinous 
exposition  of  the  invasions  of  India  by  Babar,  Akbar's  grandfather, 
makes  a  good  introduction  to  Asiatic  history  of  the  sixteenth  century. 
Akbar's  own  career  is  full  of  interest,  and  to  the  principles  of  his  in- 
ternal administration  Colonel  Malleson  devotes  in  the  final  chapter  more 
than  a  quarter  of  the  pages  of  his  book.  Alike  in  dress  and  style,  this 
volume  is  a  fit  companion  for  its  predecessor.' — Manchester  Guardian. 


Dpinions  of  tfje  Press 


CAPTAIN  TROTTER'S  < WARREN  HASTINGS.' 

'  The  publication,  recently  noticed  in  this  place,  of  the  "  Letters, 
Despatches,  and  other  State  Papers  preserved  in  the  Foreign  Depart- 
ment of  the  Government  of  India,  1772-17S5,"  has  thrown  entirely  new 
light  from  the  most  authentic  sources  on  the  whole  history  of  Warren 
Hastings  and  his  government  of  India.  Captain  L.  J.  Trotter's 
Warren  Hastings,  a  volume  of  the  "  Rulers  of  India  "  series,  edited 
by  Sir  W.  Hunter  (Oxford,  at  the  Clarendon  Press),  is  accordingly 
neither  inopportune  nor  devoid  of  an  adequate  raisou  cTetre.  ''  The 
present  volume,"  says  a  brief  preface,  "  endeavours  to  exhibit  for  the 
first  time  the  actual  woi-k  of  that  great  Governor-General,  as  reviewed 
from  the  firm  stand-point  of  the  original  records  now  made  available  to 
the  students  of  Indian  history."  Captain  Trotter  is  well  known  as  a 
competent  and  attractive  writer  on  Indian  history,  and  this  is  not  the 
first  time  that  Warren  Hastings  has  supplied  him  with  a  theme.' — 
The  Times. 

'  He  has  put  his  best  work  into  this  memoir  .  .  .  Captain  Trotter's 
memoir  is  more  valuable  [than  Sir  A.  Lyall's]  from  a  strictly  historical 
point  of  view.  It  contains  more  of  the  history  of  the  period,  and  it 
embraces  the  very  latest  information  that  casts  light  on  Hastings'  re- 
markable career  .  .  .  His  work  too  is  of  distinct  literary  merit,  and  is 
worthy  of  a  theme  than  which  British  history  presents  none  nobler. 
It  is  a  distinct  gain  to  the  British  race  to  be  enabled,  as  it  now  may, 
to  count  the  great  Governor-General  among  those  heroes  for  whom 
it  need  not  blush.' — Scotsman. 

'  Captain  Trotter  has  done  his  work  well,  and  his  volume  deserves 
to  stand  with  that  on  Dalhousie  by  Sir  William  Hunter.  Higher 
praise  it  would  be  hard  to  give  it.' — Neiv  York  Serald. 

'  This  is  an  able  book,  written  with  candour  and  discrimination.' — 
Leeds  Mercury. 

'  Captain  Trotter  has  done  full  justice  to  the  fascinating  story  of  the 
splendid  achievements  of  a  great  Englishman.' — Manchester  Guardian. 

*  This  neat  little  volume  contains  a  brief  but  admirable  biography  of 
the  first  Governor-General  of  India.  The  author  has  been  fortunate  in 
having  had  access  to  State  papers  which  cover  the  period  of  the 
entire  rule  of  Warren  Hastings.' — The  Newcastle  Chronicle. 

*  In  preparing  this  sketch  for  "  The  Eulers  of  India,"  Captain 
Trotter  has  had  the  advantage  of  consulting  the  "  Letters,  Despatches, 
and  other  State  Papers  preserved  in  the  Foreign  Department  of  the 
Government  of  India,  1772-85,"  a  period  which  covers  the  entire 
administration  of  Warren  Hastings.  The  present  volume,  therefore, 
may  truly  claim  that  it  "  exhibits  for  the  first  time  the  actual  work  of 
the  great  Governor-General,  as  re\dewed  from  the  firm  stand-point  of 
original  records."  It  is  a  book  which  all  must  peruse  who  desire  to 
be  "  up  to  date  "  on  the  subject.' — The  Globe. 


©pinions  of  tfje  ptcss 


VISCOTJlfT  HARDIH&E'S  'LOUD  HAEDIIGE.' 

*  An  exception  to  the  rule  that  biographies  ought  not  to  be  entrusted 
to  near  rehxtives.  Lord  Hardinge,  a  scholar  and  an  artist,  has  given 
us  an  accurate  record  of  his  father's  long  and  distinguished  services. 
There  is  no  filial  exaggeration.  The  author  has  dealt  with  some  con- 
troversial matters  with  skill,  and  has  managed  to  combine  truth  with 
tact  and  regard  for  the  feelings  of  others.' — The  Saturday  llevieio. 

'This  interesting  life  reveals  the  first  Lord  Hardinge  as  a  brave, 
just,  able  man,  the  very  soul  of  honour,  admired  and  trusted  equally 
by  friends  and  political  opponents.  The  biographer  .  .  .  has  produced  a 
most  engaging  volume,  which  is  enriched  by  many  private  and  official 
documents  that  have  not  before  seen  the  light.' — The  Anti-Jacohin. 

'  Loi'd  Hardinge  has  accomplished  a  grateful,  no  doubt,  but,  from 
the  abundance  of  material  and  delicacy  of  certain  matters,  a  very 
difficult  task  in  a  woi-kmanlike  manner,  marked  by  restraint  and 
lucidity.'— r/ie  Fall  Mall  Gazette. 

*  His  son  and  biographer  has  done  his  work  with  a  true  appreciation 
of  proportion,  and  has  added  substantially  to  our  knowledge  of  the 
Sutlej  Campaign.' — Vanity  Fair. 

'  The  present  Lord  Hardinge  is  in  some  respects  exceptionally  well 
qualified  to  tell  the  tale  of  the  eventful  four  years  of  his  father's 
Governor-Generalship,' — The  Times. 

'It  contains  a  full  account  of  everything  of  importance  in  Lord 
Hardinge's  military  and  political  career ;  it  is  aiTanged  ...  so  as  to 
bring  into  special  prominence  his  government  of  India  ;  and  it  gives  a 
lifelike  and  striking  picture  of  the  man.' — Academy. 

'  The  style  is  clear,  the  treatment  dispassionate,  and  the  total  result 
a  manual  which  does  credit  to  the  interesting  series  in  which  it  figures.' 
—The  Globe. 

'  The  concise  and  vivid  account  which  the  son  has  given  of  his 
father's  career  will  interest  many  readers.' — The  Morning  Post. 

'  Eminently  readable  for  everybody.  The  history  is  given  succinctly, 
and  the  unpublished  letters  quoted  are  of  real  value.' — The  Colonies 
and  India. 

'  Compiled  from  public  documents,  family  papers,  and  letters,  this 
brief  biography  gives  the  reader  a  clear  idea  of  what  Hardinge  was 
both  as  a  soldier  and  as  an  administrator.' — The  Manchester  Examiner. 

'  An  admirable  sketch.' — The  New  Yor/c  Herald. 

'  The  Memoir  is  well  and  concisely  written,  and  is  accompanied  by 
an  excellent  likeness  after  the  portrait  by  Sir  Francis  Grant.' — The 
Queen. 


©pinions  of  ti)t  Press 

ON 

MAJOR-GENERAL  SIR  OWEN  BURNE'S 
*  CLYDE  AND  STRATHNAIRN.' 

'In  "  Clyde  and  Strathnairn,"  a  contribution  to  Sir  William  Hunter's 
excellent  "  Hulers  of  India"  series  (Oxford,  at  the  Clarendon  Press), 
Sir  Owen  Burne  gives  a  lucid  sketch  of  the  military  history  of  the 
Indian  Mutiny  and  its  suppression  by  the  two  great  soldiers  who  give 
their  names  to  his  book.  The  space  is  limited  for  so  large  a  theme,  but 
Sir  Owen  Burne  skilfully  adjusts  his  treatment  to  his  limits,  and  rarely 
violates  the  conditions  of  proportion  imposed  upon  him.'  ,  .  ,  '  Sir  Owen 
Burne  does  not  confine  himself  exclusively  to  the  military  narrative. 
He  gives  a  brief  sketch  of  the  rise  and  progress  of  the  Mutiny,  and 
devotes  a  chapter  to  the  Reconstruction  whicli  followed  its  suppression.' 
.  .  .  '  —  well  written,  well  proportioned,  and  eminently  worthy  of  the 
series  to  which  it  belongs.' — The  Times. 

'Sir  Owen  Burne  who,  by  association,  experience,  and  relations  with 
one  of  these  generals,  is  well  qualified  for  the  task,  writes  with  know- 
ledge, perspicuity,  and  fairness,' — Saturday  Review. 

'  As  a  brief  record  of  a  momentous  epoch  in  India  this  little  book  is 
a  remarkable  piece  of  clear,  concise,  and  interesting  writing.' — The 
Colonies  and  India. 

'In  this  new  volume  of  the  excellent  "Rulers  of  India"  series, 
Major-Gen eral  Burne  gives  in  a  succinct  and  readable  form  an  account 
of  the  Mutiny,  its  causes,  its  nature,  and  the  changes  in  army  organisa- 
tion and  civil  administration  which  followed  upon  it.' — Glasgow  Herald. 

'  Like  the  rest  of  the  book,  this  part  is  not  only  excellently  written, 
but  is  excellently  reasoned  also.' — The  National  Observer. 

'  Sir  Owen  Burne,  Avho  has  written  the  latest  volume  for  Sir  William 
Hunter's  "Rulers  of  India"  series,  is  better  qualified  than  any  living 
person  to  narrate,  from  a  military  standpoint,  the  story  of  the  suppres- 
sion of  the  Indian  Mutiny.' — Daily  Telegraph. 

'Sir  Owen  Burne" s  book  on  "Clyde  and  Strathnairn "  is  worthy  to 
rank  with  the  best  in  the  admirable  series  to  which  it  belongs.' — 
Manchester  Examiner. 

'  The  book  is  admirably  written ;  and  there  is  probably  no  better 
sketch,  equally  brief,  of  the  stirring  events  with  which  it  deals.' 
Scotsman. 

'  Sir  Owen  Burne,  from  the  part  he  played  in  the  Indian  Mutiny,  and 
from  his  long  connexion  with  the  Government  of  India,  and  from  the 
fact  that  he  was  military  secretary  of  Lord  Strathnairn  both  in  India 
and  in  Ireland,  is  well  qualified  for  the  task  which  he  has  undertaken.'— 
The  Athenaeum. 

'Sir  W.  W.  Hunter  acted  wisely  in  commissioning  Sir  Owen  Tudor 
Burne  to  write  the  lives  of  "  Clyde  and  Strathnairn  "  for  this  series 
(Clarendon  Press).  Neither  of  these  generals  was,  strictly  speaking,  a 
Ruler  of  India  :  still  the  important  period  of  the  Mutiny  is  so  contained 
in  the  story  of  their  exploits,  that  perh;ips  it  was  as  well  to  choose  them 
as  the  personages  round  whom  might  be  grouped  the  history  of  that 
stirring  period.  ...  Sir  0.  T.  Burne's  book  is  well  worthy  of  a  place  in 
the  most  valuable  of  the  many  series  now  issuing  from  the  Press.' — The 
Header, 


aDpinions  of  tbe  lpres0 

ON 

MR,  KEEUE'S  'MAMATA  RAO  SINMIA.' 

'  The  life  of  such  a  man  sliould  be  interesting  to  all  those  who  have  en- 
tered, however  remotely,  into  the  inheritance  of  his  labours:  and  Mr.  Keene 
is  well  qualified,  both  by  his  knowledge  of  Indian  history  and  his  literary 
dexterity  in  its  treatment,  to  do  justice  to  his  subject.' — The  Times. 

'  Mr.  Keene  has  the  enormous  advantage,  not  enjoyed  by  every 
producer  of  a  book,  of  knowing  intimately  the  topic  he  has  taken  up. 
He  has  compressed  into  these  203  pages  an  immense  amount  of  informa- 
tion, drawn  from  the  best  sources,  and  presented  with  much  neatness  and 
etfect  .  .  .  Such  a  life  was  worth  tracing  in  connection  with  the  general 
history  of  the  times  ;  and  that  is  the  task  which  Mr.  Keene  has  so  well 
fulfilled  in  this  concise,  yet  attractive,  little  volume.' — The  Globe. 

'  In  this  brief  monograph  Mr.  Keene  goes  over  the  ground  already  tra- 
versed by  him  in  his  "  Fall  of  the  Moghul  Empire."  But  the  particular 
work  which  gives  Sindhia  his  place  in  Indian  history ...  is  here  made 
more  clearly  manifest,while  the  book  deals  almost  as  much  in  general  his- 
tory as  in  biography . .  It  is  valuable  as  bringing  out  the  originality  as  well 
as  the  greatness  of  the  unacknowledged  ruler  of  Hindustan  . . .  The  book 
is  interesting  .  . .  and  forms  a  valuable  addition  to  the  series.' — Scotsman. 

*  Mr.  Keene  tells  the  story  with  knowledge  and  impartiality,  and  also 
with  sufficient  graphic  power  to  make  it  thoroughly  readable.  The 
recognition  of  Sindhia  in  the  "  Rulers "  series  is  just  and  graceful, 
and  it  cannot  fail  to  give  satisfaction  to  the  educated  classes  of  our 
Indian  fellow-subjects.'- — North  British  Daily  Mail. 

'  This  is  probably  the  most  romantic  volume  in  the  whole  series,  and 
the  Sindhia's  difference  in  attitude  towards  De  Boigne  and  Warren 
Hastings  is  very  interestingly  stated.  The  history  of  the  foundation  of 
our  Indian  Empire  receives  much  elucidation  from  this  admirable 
volume.'  —Liverpool  Mercury. 

'  Mr.  H.G.  Keene,  CLE.,  M.A.,  has  added  a  very  acceptable  volume  to 
the  popular  half-crown  series  of  works  on  former  potentates  in  England's 
vast  Indian  dependency  .  .  .  From  the  signal  defeat  of  the  Marathas  at 
Panipat,  in  176 1,  in  which  engagement  Sindhia,  after  fighting  valiantly, 
very  nearly  lost  his  life,  until  his  death  in  1 794,  his  varying  fortunes  are 
traced.  The  important  affairs  in  which  he  figured  so  prominently,  as  also 
the  intrigues  and  machinations  that  were  directed  against  him,  are  re- 
corded, whilst  the  desirable  effect  of  his  policy  in  assuaging  the  fiierce 
passions  and  civilising  the  habits  of  the  people  is  depicted.  The  volume 
bears  incontestable  proofs  of  the  expenditure  of  considerable  research 
by  the  author,  and  sustains  the  reputation  he  had  already  acquired 
by  his  "  Sketch  of  the  History  of  Hindustan."' — Freeman  s  Journal. 

'  Among  the  eighteen  rulers  of  India  included  in  the  scheme  of  Sir 
William  Hunter  only  five  are  natives  of  India,  and  of  these  the  great 
Madhoji  Sindhia  is,  with  the  exception  of  Akbar,  the  most  illustrious. 
Mr.  H.  G.  Keene,  a  well-known  and  skilful  WTiter  on  Indian  questions, 
is  fortunate  in  his  subject,  for  the  career  of  the  greatest  bearer  of  the 
historic  name  of  Sindhia  covered  the  exciting  period  from  the  capture 
of  Delhi,  the  Imperial  capital,  by  the  Persian  Nadir  Shah,  to  the  occu- 
pation of  the  same  city  by  Lord  Lake.  .  .  .  Mr.  Keene  gives  a  lucid 
description  of  his  subsequent  policy,  especially  towards  the  English 
when  he  was  brought  face  to  face  with  Warren  Hastings.  The  conclu- 
sion of  his  hostility  to  us  was  the  real  beginning  of  his  own  political 
career  in  India.' —  The  Daily  GrapJiic, 


SDpinions  of  t&e  lg)re0g 

ON 

SIR  HENRY  CUNNINGHAM'S  *EARL 

CANNING.' 

*  The  life  of  Earl  Canning,  the  Viceroy  of  the  Indian  Mutiny,  affords 
an  excellent  subject  for  a  biographer  who  knows  his  business,  and 
therefore  we  need  hardly  say  that  "  Earl  Canning,"  by  Sir  H.  S. 
Cunningham,  K.C.I.E.,  is  an  admirable  contribution  to  the  series  of 
the  "Ptulers  of  India"  edited  by  Sir  W.  W.  Hunter  (Oxford,  at  the 
Clarendon  Press).  Sir  Henry  Cunningham's  rare  literary  skill  and  his 
knowledge  of  Indian  life  and  affairs  are  not  now  displayed  for  the  first 
time,  and  he  has  enjoyed  exceptional  advantages  in  dealing  with  his 
present  subject.  Lord  Granville,  Canning's  contemporary  at  school 
and  colleague  in  public  life  and  one  of  his  oldest  friends,  furnished  his 
biographer  with  notes  of  his  recollections  of  the  early  life  of  his  friend. 
Sir  Henry  Cunningham  has  also  been  allowed  access  to  the  Diary  of 
Canning's  private  secretary,  to  the  Journal  of  his  military  secretary, 
and  to  an  interesting  correspondence  between  the  Governor-General 
and  his  great  lieutenant,  Lord  Lawrence.  Of  these  exceptional  ad- 
vantages he  has  made  excellent  use,  and  the  result  is  a  biography 
second  in  interest  to  none  in  the  series  to  which  it  belongs.' — The  Times. 

'  Sir  Henry  Cunningham's  "  Earl  Canning  "  is  a  model  monograph. 
The  writer  knows  India,  as  well  as  Indian  history,  well ;  and  his  story 
has  a  vividness  which  none  but  an  Anglo-Indian  could  so  well  have 
imparted  to  it.  It  has  also  the  advantage  of  being  founded  to  a  large 
extent  on  hitherto  unused  material.' — The  Globe. 

'Sir  H.  S.  Cunningham  has  succeeded  in  writing  the  history  of  a 
critical  period  in  so  fair  and  dispassionate  a  manner  as  to  make  it 
almost  a  matter  of  astonishment  that  the  motives  which  he  has  so 
clearly  grasped  should  ever  have  been  misinterpreted,  and  the  results 
which  he  indicates  so  grossly  misjudged.  Nor  is  the  excellence  of  his 
work  less  conspicuous  from  the  literary  than  from  the  political  and 
historical  point  of  view.  The  style  is  clear  and  vivid,  the  language 
well  chosen  and  vigorous,  the  disposition  of  details  and  accessories 
striking  and  artistic,  and,  indeed,  under  whatever  aspect  the  work  be 
considered,  it  reaches  the  high  standard  of  workmanship  which,  from 
the  outset,  has  been  a  distinguishing  feature  of  the  series.' — Glasgow 
Herald. 

'  Sir  H.  S.  Cunningham  was  fortunate,  in  a  literary  sense,  in  the 
particular  Viceroy  and  period  of  Indian  history  allotted  to  his  pen  in 
the  important  and  valuable  series  of  biographical  volumes  on  "  Rulers 
of  India,"  being  published  at  the  Clarendon  Press,  Oxford,  under  the 
editorship  of  Sir  William  Wilson  Hunter.  In  Earl  Canninq,  first 
Viceroy  of  India,  Sir  H.  S.  Cunningham  had  a  subject  sufficiently 
inspiring  to  all  who  admire  honour,  courage,  patience,  wisdom,  all  the 
virtues  and  qualities  which  go  to  the  building  up  of  the  character  of  an 
ideal  English  gentleman  ;  while  the  episode  of  the  Mutiny,  culminating 
in  the  fall  of  Lucknow,  lends  itself  to  the  more  picturesque  and 
graphic  description.  Sir  H.  S.  Cunningham  has  treated  his  subject  ade- 
quately. In  vivid  language  he  paints  his  word-pictures,  and  with  calm 
judicial  analysis  he  also  proves  himself  an  able  critic  of  the  actualities, 
causes,  and  results  of  the  outbreak,  also  a  temperate,  just  appreciator 
of  the  character  and  policy  of  Earl  Canning.' — The  Court  Journal. 


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